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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of oil price movements on the UK economy.
To this end, it is composed of three chapters which use di¤erent approaches in
order to assess the causes and the consequences of oil price shocks on the main
UK macroeconomic fundamentals.
In Chapter 1, we analyse the impact of oil price uctuations on the UK economy
using a two-stage method. This empirical strategy allows us to decompose oil price
changes depending on the underlying source of the shock. In line with previous
studies, our results show that, since the mid-1970s, oil price movements have been
mainly associated with shocks to oil demand rather than oil supply. We contribute
to previous literature by nding that the consequences of oil price changes on UK
macroeconomic aggregates depend on the di¤erent types of oil shocks. Thus, for
instance, increases of global real economic activity do not depress the domestic
economy in the short run. Conversely, shortfalls in crude oil supply cause an
immediate fall of UK GDP growth. As a consequence, the Bank of England sets
the nominal interest rate depending on the nature of the shock hitting the oil
market. Our results also show that domestic ination increases following a rise in
the real oil price. Finally, we nd that in response to oil price increases, although
UK macroeconomic fundamentals worsen, the government decit reduces.
In Chapter 2, we develop and estimate, using Bayesian methods, an open
economy two-bloc DSGE model in order to analyse the responses of the UK
economy and the rest of the world to di¤erent sources of oil price shocks. We
consider the period in which the UK was a net oil exporter that also corresponds
to the Non-Inationary, Consistently Expansionary (NICE) decade (1990-2005).
In line with previous literature, our ndings conrm that global oil shocks are
mainly responsible for UK oil price changes. Our impulse response analysis shows
that a drop in the oil price stimulates UK GDP and reduces domestic ination
inducing the BoE to lower the nominal interest rate. In contrast to previous
studies, we nd that the UK exchange rate responds di¤erently according to the
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source of oil price shocks. In particular, a positive shock to foreign oil intensity
induces an appreciation of the Pound. Conversely, a positive shock to foreign
oil supply causes a depreciation of the British Sterling. Generally, a fall in the
oil price worsens the UK trade balance, since UK is a net oil exporter. Finally,
our historical decomposition analysis contributes to previous literature by showing
that episodes of sharp increases in the oil price are associated with falls in the UK
output and rises in the domestic ination.
In Chapter 3, we study the main transmission channels of oil price uctuations
for the UK economy and the consequences of oil price changes on its public nances.
Our model is estimated with Bayesian techniques over the same sample period as in
Chapter 2. In line with previous literature, our results show that foreign oil demand
and supply shocks are the main factors explaining the UK oil price volatility. In
contrast to existing studies we nd that the variation of UK government debt
is broadly explained by oil price uctuations related to changes in the foreign oil
intensity. We extend the previous literature by estimating the parameters of several
scal policy rules. In particular, we nd that the response of petroleum revenue
tax to oil price changes is stronger than the response of fuel duty tax to domestic
oil demand. In line with Chapter 2, our impulse response analysis indicates that
a decrease in the oil price positively a¤ects the UK economy inducing an increase
in its GDP and a fall in the domestic ination. However, the drop in the oil price
generates a negative e¤ect on the UK trade balance. In contrast to Chapter 2, we
nd that a positive foreign oil intensity shock causes depreciation in the Pound.
The latter e¤ect occurs as the decrease in the UK VAT causes a reduction in the
price of domestic consumption goods. Finally, we are able to quantify the size of
the responses of UK public nances to oil price shocks. Our results indicate that a
fall in the oil price induces a reduction in UK total tax receipts and, in turn, causes
the rise in the government debt. Thus, for example, we nd that a positive shock
to foreign oil intensity increases UK government debt by £ 700 millions during the
rst year and £ 1100 millions in four years.
ii
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Preface
Oil and its rened components are crucial resources in the modern economy.
Therefore, media, policy makers, and economists have been constantly interested
in understanding causes and e¤ects of large uctuations in oil price. A common
view is that sharp and persistent oil price upswings have been responsible for some
serious economic recessions, periods of excessive ination, reduced productivity
and lower economic growth. On the other hand, periods of low oil prices have
been considered as a boost for the economic performance.
Recent economic research made considerable advances in understanding the
causes and the consequences of oil price shocks. In particular, most recent studies
have shown that oil price uctuations do not derive exclusively from exogenous
shocks, such as supply disruptions due to political conicts or coordinated supply
constraints in producing nations, but can also be driven by endogenous changes in
global macroeconomic aggregates, including factors such as economic expansion,
existing ination, currencies uctuations or changes in interest rates (see for
example, Bernanke, 2004; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Kilian, 2008a and 2008b;
Balke et al., 2010). In other words, the real oil price ought to be considered as
endogenous to economic fundamentals. Accordingly, in order to fully understand
the economic e¤ects of oil price shocks, it is necessary to analyse the origins of oil
price uctuations.
The majority of papers analysing the relationship between oil and the
macroeconomy have studied the US case, with only a few studies focusing on
the UK economy (see for example, Harrison et al., 2011; Millard, 2011; Millard
and Shakir, 2013). However, the UK is a very interesting case study because it is a
developed economy which has transitioned from being a net oil importer in 1970s
to a net exporter in the 1980s and early 1990s and returned to be a net importer
again in mid-2000s. Therefore, the main objective of the present thesis is to ll
this gap. In particular, from di¤erent perspectives, each chapter aims to analyse
the causes and the e¤ects of oil price uctuations on the UK economy.
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In Chapter 1, we use an empirical framework based on a two-stage method in
order to assess the impact of oil price uctuations on the UK economy depending
on the underlying source of the shock. Chapter 2 develops an open economy
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model of the UK economy in
order to evaluate the economic repercussions of oil price uctuations. In Chapter
3, we extend the open economy DSGE model in order to analyse the specic e¤ects
of oil price movements on UK scal variables and, in particular, how quickly oil
price changes work through the economy into UK public nances.
In the rst chapter we aim to answer the following question: what are the
e¤ects of oil price movements on the UK economy conditional on the nature of
the underlying shock? To do so we estimate our model in two di¤erent steps.
In the rst step, following the framework of Kilian (2009), we use a structural
vector autoregression (VAR) in order to assess the causes of oil price changes. In
particular, we identify three types of underlying source for oil price movements:
crude oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil market-specic demand
shocks. An oil supply shock is dened as an exogenous shift in supply, independent
from any change in the macroeconomic environment. Demand-driven shocks can
either reect an increase in global real economic activity (aggregate demand shock),
or an increase in precautionary demand for oil associated with the uncertainty
about future supply (oil market-specic demand shock). In the second step,
we assess the e¤ects of these structural shocks on several UK macroeconomic
aggregates such as output growth, CPI ination, nominal interest rate and
government decit.
The sample of our analysis covers the period 1976-2014.1 In general, our
estimated results indicate that, since the mid-1970s, shortfalls in crude oil supply
1As we will describe below, this sample period is longer than the ones we will consider in
Chapter 2 and 3. Our choice is motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, the empirical framework
of Chapter 1 requires an extended sample period with su¢ cient variation in all oil demand and
supply shocks in order to provide accurate estimated results. As argued by Kilian (2014), the
estimated responses converge to the expected or average responses only if the sample period is
large. Secondly, our sample covers the period analysed by Kilian (2009). Therefore, we are able
to compare our estimated results concerning the causes of oil price shocks with Kilians ndings.
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have a small e¤ect on oil price movements. On the contrary, we nd that major
changes of real oil price are associated with shifts in the precautionary demand for
oil. These changes in precautionary demand are mainly caused by expectations
on future oil supply. Such expectations are linked to exogenous events (such as
military conicts or political decisions) in the Middle East and generate large
uctuations in the real oil price. For example, we nd that the surge in the real
oil price between 2011 and mid-2014 was driven primarily by a sustained increase
in oil-market specic demand. In particular, precautionary demand for oil was
pushed up by the political and social turmoil in North African regions and Middle
East countries together with the worsening of the nancial crisis.
As concerns the consequences of oil price uctuations, we nd that UK
macroeconomic fundamentals react di¤erently to the three types of shocks. More
specically, UK GDP growth falls immediately after a shortfall in crude oil supply.
On the other hand, expansions of global real economic activity initially have
negligible e¤ects on UK output growth although, in the long term, high oil prices
tend to depress domestic GDP growth. In general, we nd that increases in
the real oil price are associated with a rise in domestic ination. Our estimated
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) also indicate that the Bank of England2 tends
to increase its policy rate in response to positive oil demand shocks. The opposite
occurs in the case of oil supply disruptions. Finally, in line with previous literature
(see for example, Powell and Horton, 1985; Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000; OECD
Economic Surveys, 2002; OBR, 2010; Barrel et al., 2011), we nd that an increase
in the real oil price reduces the domestic government decit reecting the UKs
condition as an oil producer country.
We argue that the empirical framework developed in Chapter 1 substantially
contributes to our understanding of the causes and e¤ects of oil price shocks on
the UK economy. However, there are three main shortcomings that limit this
2More specically, only in May 1997 the UK government granted the Bank of England
operational independence allowing it to set domestic interest rates. Before that date, the
chancellor and governor held a monthly meeting during which they agreed the set up of interest
rates.
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approach. Firstly, although our estimated results, on average, correctly represent
the historical behaviour of UK economic fundamentals, they cannot be interpreted
as actual responses of these variables at specic points in time. Indeed, our
empirical approach is not able to capture the structural changes (for example, shifts
in monetary and scal policy) that occurred to UK macroeconomic aggregates
between 1976 and 2014. On the other hand, we cannot shorten or split our sample
because our VAR model needs a long sample period in order to accurately estimate
the structural shocks.
Secondly, our empirical model is not able to reect the geographic origin
underlying oil shocks. However, according to the report of the O¢ ce for Budget
Responsibility (2010), there are di¤erent economic e¤ects on the UK economy
depending on whether the oil shock is global or UK specic. Similarly, Kilian
(2014) argues that it is deeply misleading to treat an oil shock caused by, say, the
expansion of aggregate demand in China as identical to a crude oil supply shock
originating in the Middle East.
Thirdly, our structural VAR model cannot include a rich shock structure given
the joint demands of robust estimation and identication. For example, it is not
able to distinguish between di¤erent demand shocks. Thus, for instance, it cannot
recognize if an oil demand shock is driven by a change in foreign productivity or
a change of foreign monetary policy.
Recent advances in DSGE modelling of oil price shocks allow us to overcome
such limitations. Indeed, it is feasible for global DSGE models to include a variety
of shocks and where the oil market is one of many markets with endogenously
determined oil prices. In particular, the DSGE framework allows economists to
di¤erentiate between scal and monetary policy shocks as well as productivity and
oil intensity shocks, for example. That distinction is one of a number that will
turn out to be important. Similarly, the DSGE framework provides the possibility
of disentangling the shocks according to their geographic origins. In this regard,
this kind of model represents an ideal tool for macroeconomic policy analysis.
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Therefore, in Chapter 2, we develop an open economy two-bloc DSGE model
in order to study the transmission and impact of oil shocks on the UK economy
and the rest of the world. Our sample choice encapsulates the Non-Inationary,
Consistently Expansionary (NICE) decade and corresponds to the period in which
UK was a net oil exporter.
Our quantitative theoretical framework builds on the papers of Bodenstein and
Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein et al. (2012) who, in turn, drew upon the insights
of Backus and Crucini (2000) to develop a DSGE model with an endogenous real
price of oil. It also draws upon to the works of Barsky and Kilian (2004) and
Kilian (2008a) to incorporate an important demand-side channel to characterise
oil shocks over the sample period.
All these papers have exclusively studied the e¤ects of oil price uctuations
on the US economy. Therefore, in Chapter 2 we contribute to this literature by
assessing whether a small oil exporter economy, such as the UK, reacts di¤erently
from an oil importer country in response to global price uctuations.
We estimate our model via Bayesian technique using observed data series for
the UK economy and the rest of the world over the sample period 1990-2005.
More specically, observed variables for the foreign bloc are constructed using
the Loretan (2005) technique of trade weights and aggregating data of the main
trading partners of UK.
In line with the ndings of the papers analysing the US case (see, for example,
Barsky and Kilian, 2002; Kilian, 2008a and 2009; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Kilian
and Murphy, 2012; Kilian and Hicks, 2013; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013), our
estimated results show the overall importance of global oil demand and supply
factors for the UK economy. More specically, the source of oil price shocks
matters. Accordingly, we nd that foreign oil intensity is the main cause of UK
oil price variation.
In this regard, we dene oil intensity as the measure of oil e¢ ciency in a given
economy. In turn, oil e¢ ciency can be seen as the goal to reduce the amount of
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oil required to provide products and services. Thus, for example, oil e¢ ciency is
related to better methods of transportation and conservation e¤orts. Therefore,
in a given country, positive shocks to oil intensity imply the improvement of its oil
e¢ ciency and the reduction in its oil demand. In our theoretical framework, oil
intensity is modeled as an exogenous shock that a¤ects the functions of production
goods and consumption goods. Accordingly, a positive oil intensity shock induces
a fall in the oil demanded by the rms that produce both production goods and
consumption goods.
Our ndings also indicate that foreign technology shocks and foreign oil
supply shocks contribute signicantly to UK oil price uctuations. Moreover, our
estimated results show a strong persistence of oil shocks. The latter aspect implies
that the decrease of UK oil price is more intense in the case of a positive foreign
oil intensity shock.
We analyse the e¤ects of oil price shocks on the UK economy through our
estimated IRFs. In line with the estimated responses of Millard (2011) for the UK
economy, we nd that the lower oil price pushes down the costs of rms using oil
as production input. This tends to increase prots, stimulating employment and,
thus, real GDP. Moreover, the fall in the oil price translates into lower retail prices.
This boosts real incomes and therefore stimulates consumer spending. Given the
ination target, the UK nominal interest rate falls. Regarding nominal rigidities,
we nd high values for the Calvo (1983) re-pricing parameter and also for the wage
setting parameter. On the other hand, the data indicate a low degree of price and
wage indexation, implying that prices and wages are not signicantly linked to
past ination. We also nd a negligible response of wage ination to oil price
shocks.
Contrary to previous literature (see, for example, Hall et al., 1986 and Young,
2000) that predicted a depreciation of the Pound against other currencies in
the presence of a drop in the oil price, we nd something di¤erent. British
Sterling appreciates against other currencies in the presence of a positive foreign
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oil intensity shock while the opposite occurs after a positive oil supply shock and
a negative foreign technology shock. Moreover, our estimated responses show that
positive shocks to foreign oil supply and intensity imply the deterioration of UK
trade balance reecting the UKs position as net oil exporter.
An additional contribution of Chapter 2 is that we identify the main drivers in
the movements of UK GDP and ination for the period 1990-2005. In this regard,
the historical decompositions of these two variables show the strong inuence of
oil price uctuations on the UK economy. In particular, we nd that the sustained
increases in the oil price during the periods 1990:Q3-1992:Q3 and 1999:Q1-1999:Q3
were largely responsible for the relative GDP reductions. Moreover, the rise in the
real oil price during the second half of 1990 induced a sustained increase in UK
ination.
Although the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 2 captures the main
features of the UK economy, it does not reect the impact of oil shocks on scal
variables. Previous studies on the UK economy have stressed the importance of
considering the impact of oil price changes on the domestic public sector (see,
for example, Powell and Horton, 1985; Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000; OECD
Economic Surveys, 2002; OBR report, 2010; Barrel et al., 2011) but they have
been unable convincingly to quantify such e¤ects. In particular, since the UK is
an oil producer, oil price uctuations inuence directly the revenues coming from
oil sales.
Therefore, in Chapter 3, we model in detail the UK scal sector considering
government oil revenues and their relationship with overall UK public nances.
More specically, in the third chapter, we estimate an open economy DSGE model
in order to evaluate how oil price uctuations impact on the UK economy and
which scal variables are most a¤ected.
Our theoretical framework extends the one presented in Chapter 2 and, in
particular, it assumes the endogenous determination of real oil price and a world
economy model in a new Keynesian framework. From a theoretical point of view,
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Chapter 3 presents two main contributions over to Chapter 2. Firstly, we assume
that domestic households and rms face several distortive taxes. Secondly, we set
up a detailed scal sector which includes several policy rules for these distortive
taxes.
Our model is estimated using Bayesian techniques over the sample 1990-2005.
Therefore, it includes the NICE decade and corresponds to the period in which
the UK was a net exporter of oil. In order to estimate our model, we use data for
the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. The observed time series for the
foreign bloc are constructed as before using the Loretan (2005) method.
The third chapter extends the existing literature by showing that foreign oil
intensity shocks contribute signicantly to the variation of UK government debt.
The main reason is that the foreign oil intensity shock is the most relevant source
of oil price uctuations. Accordingly, relevant changes in oil price imply more
volatile oil tax and fuel duty revenues and, in turn, substantial uctuations of
government debt.
In line with the ndings of the second chapter, the estimated results of Chapter
3 show that foreign oil demand and supply shocks explain most of the variation of
UK oil price. We also nd a signicant e¤ect of foreign technology shocks on UK
oil price variation.
One of the main contributions of Chapter 3 is that we are able to estimate the
scal policy rules of our model. In this regard, we nd that the fuel duty tax rate
responds only moderately to UK oil demand whilst the petroleum revenue tax rate
responds more strongly to oil price variations.
In general, the results of our impulse response analysis are in line with those
of Chapter 2. More specically, in response to an oil price decrease, we nd an
increase in UK GDP and its major components. Similarly, domestic hours worked
tend to increase. Moreover, we observe a decline in UK ination that induces the
monetary authority to reduce its policy rate.
Since the UK is a net oil exporter, the reduction in oil price implies a worsening
8
in its oil trade balance inducing the UK overall trade balance to fall. Similarly
to Chapter 2, we nd a depreciation of the Pound in response to both positive
foreign oil supply shocks and negative foreign technology shocks. Di¤erently from
the second chapter, we nd that an increase in oil intensity abroad causes a
depreciation in the Pound. Indeed, the response of UK taxation to this shock
causes a reduction in the domestic price of consumption goods relative to imported
goods.
Finally, Chapter 3 contributes in quantifying the e¤ects of oil price shocks on
the UK public nances. In this regard, our analysis presents several advantages
over previous papers that have investigated this issue (see, for example, Powell
and Horton, 1985; Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000; NIESR, 2000; OECD Economic
Surveys, 2002; OBR, 2010; Barrell et al., 2011a and 2011b). Firstly, our study takes
into account several sources of oil price shocks. Indeed, the particular implications
of an oil price shock for the UK public nances di¤er depending on whether the
shock is global or UK specic. Similarly, the e¤ects implied by oil demand shocks
are di¤erent from the ones generated by oil supply shocks. Secondly, the impact
of oil price uctuations on the UK public nances also depends signicantly on
how long the oil price change lasts. Accordingly, our empirical strategy allows
us to estimate directly the persistence of the exogenous shocks a¤ecting the oil
price. Thirdly, the e¤ects of oil price movements on the UK public nances are
related to the size of the UK price elasticity of oil demand. Thus, we estimate the
latter using Bayesian techniques. Fourthly, our theoretical framework allows us to
consider the response of the UK scal variables in the case of actual and potential
economy.
Our results show that, although overall UK economic performance improves
after a fall in the real oil price, domestic public nances deteriorate. Indeed, the
negative direct e¤ect on Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), Value Added Tax (VAT)
and fuel duty tax receipts more than o¤set the positive indirect e¤ect on the other
tax revenues. Accordingly, we nd that following a positive shock to foreign oil
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intensity, UK government debt increases by £ 700 millions during the rst year
and it reaches £ 1100 millions in four years.
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Chapter 1: Causes and Consequences of Oil
Price Shocks on the UK Economy
1.1 Introduction
Since the dramatic oil price spikes of the 1970s, and the consequent global
recession, economists have analysed oil price uctuations in order to understand
their economic impact. In this regard, a large number of studies have investigated
the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil price shocks (see, for example, Hamilton, 1983
and 2003; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Bernanke et al., 1997; Papapetrou, 2001;
Lee and Ni, 2002; Bernanke, 2004; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Peersman, 2005;
Blanchard and Galí, 2007; Kilian, 2008a and 2009; Peersman and Van Robays,
2009; Lombardi and Van Robays, 2011).
Although these studies have found a negative correlation between oil price
increases and economic performance, a strong divergence appeared in the analysis
of the causes of oil price uctuations. In particular, Hamilton (2003) has assumed
the exogeneity of the oil price to economic fundamentals without distinguishing
between the di¤erent sources of oil price uctuations. However, Kilian (2009) has
shown that this assumption is inappropriate for two main reasons. Firstly, there
exists a reverse causality from macroeconomic aggregates to oil prices. Secondly,
oil prices are driven by structural demand and supply shocks which have direct
e¤ects on the macroeconomy as well as indirect e¤ects operating through the price
of oil. Hence, Kilian (2009) concludes that the real oil price ought to be considered
as endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions.
In the present paper we aim to analyse the impact of oil price changes on
the UK economy. We do this by using a structural vector autoregression (VAR)
approach to estimate these e¤ects. In particular, we adopt a two-stage method in
order to estimate our model. In the rst stage, we assess the causes of oil price
changes depending on the underlying source of the shock, that is, whether the oil
price has been driven by a supply or a demand disturbance. In the second stage,
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we examine the e¤ects of the structural shocks estimated in stage 1 on a set of UK
macroeconomic aggregates such as output growth, CPI ination, nominal interest
rate and government decit.
The empirical strategy adopted in the present chapter is in line with the
approach of Kilian (2009) and is fully consistent with our theoretical models
developed in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, as we will show in the next two
chapters, it justies our adoption of a macroeconomic model that endogenizes the
price of oil rather than relying on the assumption of exogenously given oil prices.3
Moreover, the empirical analysis developed in this paper focuses on the demand
side of the oil market. In particular, it shows that the traditional emphasis on
physical oil supply shocks in explaining oil price uctuations is misplaced.4 This
outcome conrms the results of our estimated DSGE models of Chapters 2 and 3
in which, as we will see, the demand side of the oil market is the most important
source of oil price variation.
Hitherto most of the papers analysing the relationship between oil and the
macroeconomy have focused on the United States. There have also been a few
cross-country studies. For example, Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2003) showed
that oil price uctuations signicantly a¤ected industrial production in European
countries. Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) compared the e¤ects of oil price
shocks between US, Euro Area and Japan. They found that the impact of oil
price increases on GDP was larger for the US than for the Euro Area and Japan.
Baumeister et al. (2010) found a smaller e¤ect on Euro Area GDP of oil supply
shocks than in the United States, although similar e¤ects in the two areas from
oil shocks driven by world activity.
In contrast to the above literature, this chapter focuses on the response of the
3In particular, we can mention several recent papers based on DSGE models such as Backus
and Crucini (2000), Bodenstein et al. (2008), Nakov and Pescatori (2010b), Nakov and Nuño
(2011), Bodenstein et al. (2011), Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein et al. (2012).
4In this regard recent economic literature provides a large number of studies such as Barsky
and Kilian (2002), Kilian (2008a), Apergis and Miller (2009), Basher et al. (2012), Kilian and
Murphy (2012) and (2014), Kilian and Hicks (2013), Baumeister and Peersman (2013).
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UKmacroeconomy to global oil price changes. In particular, we aim to analyse how
the e¤ects of oil price uctuations on the UK economy may depend on the nature
of the underlying shock. More specically, our structural VAR model distinguishes
between oil price changes caused by exogenous disruptions in oil production, oil
demand shocks driven by global real economic activity and oil market-specic
demand shocks associated with the uncertainty about future supply.
The sample of our analysis covers the period 1976-2014.5 In this regard, an
additional contribution of the present chapter is that we estimate our model with
monthly data. Indeed, as we will explain below, our empirical set up heavily relies
on delay restrictions that are economically plausible only at monthly frequency.
As far as the causes of oil price shocks are concerned, in general, our estimated
results conrm the ndings of Kilian (2009) for the sample 1976-2007. However,
as our sample runs to end 2014, we are able to explain oil price variation in recent
years.
More specically, we nd that most large and persistent uctuations in the real
price of oil since the mid-1970s have been associated with the cumulative e¤ects
of oil demand rather than oil supply shocks. The fact that ow supply disruptions
have had small e¤ects on the real oil price does not mean that political events in
the Middle East do not matter. On the contrary, these events have a¤ected the real
oil price by shifting expectations about future shortages of oil supply relative to oil
demand. In our model these expectations are captured by shocks on precautionary
demand for oil.
A meaningful example is given by the large increase in the real oil price
between 2011 and mid-2014. Indeed, during this period, there was a sustained
increase in oil market-specic demand that pushed up the oil price. This rise of
5As we explained earlier, this sample period is longer than the ones of Chapter 2 and 3.
Indeed, the empirical framework of the present chapter requires an extended sample period with
su¢ cient variation in all oil demand and supply shocks in order to provide accurate estimated
results. Moreover, our sample covers the period analysed by Kilian (2009). Therefore, we are
able to compare our estimated results concerning the causes of oil price shocks with Kilians
ndings.
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precautionary demand for oil occurred for two main reasons. Firstly, during the so-
called Arab Spring, social and political instability in the Middle East and North
African regions created worries of supply disruptions and possible oil shortage.
Secondly, as documented by Barrell et al. (2011b), the worsening of the nancial
crisis caused a sharp increase in investorsdemand for a safe haven asset, such as
oil, rather than complex nancial assets.
Turning to the consequences of oil price shocks on the UK economy, we nd
that oil supply disruptions induce an immediate fall in domestic GDP growth
and cause a sustained increase in domestic ination. Moreover, our estimated
results show that increases in aggregate demand, initially, have a negligible e¤ect
on UK output growth but in the long run they tend to depress it. Although
the overall performance of the UK economy deteriorates, after an increase in the
oil price, UK public nances improve. Indeed, our IRFs show that, in response
to negative shocks to crude oil supply, the domestic government decit decreases
because of the rise in oil revenues. Our impulse response analysis also indicates
that the Bank of England responds di¤erently to oil price uctuations associated
with unanticipated booms in oil demand compared to oil price changes due to
unexpected oil supply disruptions. Indeed, the nominal interest rate increases after
both aggregate demand shocks and oil market-specic demand shocks, whereas
negative shocks to the oil supply induce the Bank of England to loosen its monetary
policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss
the empirical framework describing the two di¤erent stages used to estimate the
e¤ects of di¤erent shocks (all of which a¤ect the price of oil) on the UK economy.
Section 3 discusses the estimated results distinguishing between the causes of oil
price changes and the e¤ects of oil price uctuations on the UK economy. Section
4 concludes.
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1.2 The Empirical Framework
As we mentioned above, we estimate our model in two distinct stages. In stage 1,
we adopt the framework of Kilian (2009) to capture supply and demand conditions
in the oil market using a SVAR and applying the identifying assumptions on
the relationships between the world variables to recover three structural shocks
a¤ecting oil prices: oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil market-
specic demand shocks (or precautionary demand shocks). In what follows we
describe each of these shocks. Firstly, oil supply shocks are shocks to current
availability of crude oil. Secondly, aggregate demand shocks are shocks to the
current demand for crude oil coming from changes in the global business cycle.
Thirdly, oil market-specic demand shocks are shocks driven by shifts in the
precautionary demand for oil. These shocks come from the uncertainty about
shortfalls of expected supply relative to expected demand. Thus, they include the
holdings of oil inventories as insurance against oil supply disruptions.
In stage 2, we assess the impact of structural innovations, estimated in stage
1, on several UK macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP growth, CPI
ination, the nominal interest rate and the real government decit. The use of
two-stage procedure presents two advantages. First, our approach enables us to
keep the number of variables in our SVAR manageable (less than four) given the
computational requirements associated with estimating larger VARs. Second, as
we will explain below, separating the process of identifying structural shocks in
the oil market removes the need to employ further identication restrictions on
the UK equations.
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1.2.1 Modelling the Causes of Oil Price Shocks: a World SVAR
Data. In the rst stage, we consider monthly data for the sample period 1976:1-
2014:12.6 In order to estimate the world structural VAR we use the following data
series.7 The percentage change of global crude oil production (prodt) is obtained
by the log di¤erences of world crude oil production in millions per barrels pumped
per day (averaged by month).
The index of global real economic activity (reat) is a measure of the component
of worldwide real economy activity that drives demand for industrial commodities
in global markets (Kilian, 2009). This index is based on dry cargo single voyage
ocean freight rates. As argued by Klovland (2004), world economic activity is the
most important determinant of the demand for transport services. Thus, following
the original idea of Kilian (2009), increases in freight rates are indicators of strong
cumulative global demand pressures.
The real price of oil (rpot) is obtained from the series of the US crude oil
imported acquisition cost by reners. In our analysis, we prefer to focus on the
latter series rather than using the Europe Brent spot price. As we can observe from
Figure 1.1, the Europe Brent spot price and US crude oil imported acquisition cost
by reners have very close patterns during the period considered.
Hence, we decide to focus our analysis on the series of US crude oil imported
acquisition cost by reners because of the availability of this series at monthly
frequency back to January 1974. Indeed, as we will explain below, the monthly
frequency of this data series is crucial for the identication assumptions of our
structural VAR. Moreover, the longer sample size of this series allows us to consider
the relevant episodes that occurred during the 1970s.
6We use the sample period 1974:1-1975:12 as training sample for our estimates.
7See Appendix A for a detailed description of data sources and the construction of the series
used to estimate the world structural VAR.
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Figure 1.1: US Crude Oil Imported Acquisition Cost by Reners and Europe Brent
Spot Price, May 1987 to December 2014
Source: US Department of Energy.
Figure 1.2 shows the nominal and real oil price series at monthly frequency
from the period January 1974 to December 2014. As we can observe from Figure
1.2, the crude oil price rose persistently from the end of 1970s to the mid 1980s.
Except for the peak episodes observed in 1990-1991 and 1999-2000, the oil price
remained fairly stable at around $20 per barrel from 1986 until the end of 2001.
Later that year the path of oil price steepened sharply until the end of 2008. This
surge in the oil price was followed by an even more spectacular collapse. In 2011
the oil price went back to the level achieved in 2007-2008. Finally, we observe a
plunge in the oil price at the end of 2014.
17
Figure 1.2: Real and Nominal Oil Prices (US Crude Oil Imp. Acq. Cost by Reners)
Source: US Department of Energy and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Specication and Identication of the Model. As a benchmark
specication for our model we adopt a structural VAR, whose reduced form is
dened by the following dynamic equation:
B0yt = ct +
24X
l=1
Blyt l + ut (1.1)
where yt = (prodt; reat; rpot)
0 indicates the three-variable vector of variables
specied above, ct is a vector of constants and ut denotes the vector of reduced-
form innovations. As an identication strategy, we adopt a Cholesky factorization
so to recover the vector of structural shocks "t from the reduced-form error ut in
(1.1), according to the following scheme:
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The Cholesky ordering in (1.2) corresponds to assuming the following set
of conditions. Firstly, crude oil supply shocks are dened as unpredictable
innovations to global oil production, that is, oil demand shocks (uaggregate demand shockt
and uoil market-specic demand shockt ) do not inuence crude oil supply (u
oil supply shock
t ) in
the same month. That assumption is plausible since adjusting oil production is
costly for oil producer countries and because the state of the crude oil market is
di¢ cult to forecast in the very short run. Hence, oil producer countries tend to
respond slowly to oil demand shocks.
Secondly, shocks to global real economic activity that are not explained by oil
supply shocks are identied as shocks to global demand for industrial commodities.
We simply dene these shocks as aggregate demand shocks. We assume that shocks
to oil market-specic demand (uoil market-specic demand shockt ) do not inuence global
real economic activity (uaggregate demand shockt ) in the same month. In general, our
assumption is reasonable because global real economic activity responds with a
delay to oil price increases.
Finally, shocks to the real oil price that are not explained by oil supply shocks
or aggregate demand shocks by construction reect changes in the demand for oil
in contrast to changes in the demand for all industrial commodities. We simply
dene these shocks as oil market-specic demand shocks. In particular, these
shocks represent the uctuations in precautionary demand for oil due to uncertain
future oil supply.
We estimate our VAR reduced-form equation (1.1) using least squares. The
resulting estimates are used to construct the structural VAR representation of the
model. We adopt the inference method used by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) which
implies a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.8
8This method is successful in dealing with conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form
in autoregressions. In particular, it is well known that there is evidence of conditional
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of many estimated dynamic regression models involving
monthly data. In general, standard residual-based bootstrap methods of inference for
autoregressions are invalidated by conditional heteroskedasticity. Therefore, Gonçalves and
Kilian (2004) propose the recursive-design wild bootstrap method. The latter tends to be much
more accurate than standard methods when it is applied to the residuals of the dynamic regression
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1.2.2 Modelling the Consequences of Oil Price Shocks on the UK
Economy
Having identied the shocks and obtained the responses of our world variables
to these shocks, we then estimate the impact of structural innovations in model
(1.1) to the growth rate of UK real GDP (yt), UK CPI ination (t), the UK
short-term nominal interest rate (rt) and the UK real government decit (dt).9
In particular, we measure the e¤ects of oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks
and oil specic demand shocks on these UK macroeconomic aggregates adopting
the following regressions:
yt = j +
12X
i=1
ji^jt i + zjt (1.3)
with : j = 1; 2; 3
t = j +
12X
i=1
ji^jt i + vjt (1.4)
with : j = 1; 2; 3
rt = j +
12X
i=1
ji^jt i + sjt (1.5)
with : j = 1; 2; 3
model.
9Appendix A provides a detailed description of data sources and the construction of the series
used to estimate the UK regression model.
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and:
dt = 'j +
12X
i=1
{ji^jt i + wjt (1.6)
with : j = 1; 2; 3
Our regression model is based on quarterly data for yt, t, rt, and dt. Thus,
in equations (1.3)-(1.6) ^jt represents the measure of quarterly shocks (estimated
in model (1.1)) constructed by averaging the monthly structural innovations for
each quarter:
^jt =
1
3
3X
i=1
u^j;t;1 (1.7)
with : j = 1; 2; 3
where u^j;t;1 indicates the estimated residual for the jth structural shock in the ith
month of the tth quarter of the sample.10 In equations (1.3)-(1.6) the impulse
response coe¢ cients correspond to ji, ji, ji, and {ji, respectively. The number
of lags is determined by the maximum horizon of the impulse response function,
that is set to twelve quarters. Finally, in equations (1.3)-(1.6) zjt, vjt, sjt and wjt
are potentially serially correlated errors. In order to deal with possible serial
correlation in the error term we use block bootstrap methods. Following the
empirical strategy of Kilian (2009), all our estimated results are obtained with
block size 4 and 20,000 bootstrap replications.
Our regression model (1.3)-(1.6) holds under the identifying assumption that
within a given a quarter there is no feedback from yt, t, rt, and dt to
^jt, j = 1; 2; 3. Thus, these shocks can be treated as exogenous and we can
assess their e¤ects on UK macroeconomic aggregates. The assumption that ^jt,
j = 1; 2; 3 are exogenous to UK GDP growth, CPI ination, nominal interest rate
and government decit can be defended as follows. We assume that the United
10These quarterly averages are not exactly uncorrelated but their correlation is so low that
they can be treated as uncorrelated.
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Kingdom is "small" in the sense that movements in UK variables have no e¤ects
on world variables. Although the United Kingdom produces oil, its average share
of oil production in the period 1976-2014 was 3% with a peak of 5% from 1984 to
1986 and it was 1% in 2014 according to the statistics of US Energy Information
Administration (Monthly Energy Review). Similarly, UK petroleum consumption
has been on average 3% of world consumption during the period 1976-2014 (US
Energy Information Administration - Monthly Energy Review). Given these data,
our assumption that oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil market-
specic demand shocks are exogenous to UK macroeconomic aggregates seems
justied.
1.3 Results
In this section, we show the estimation results of our empirical model. Firstly,
we start by discussing the results concerning the causes of oil shocks (stage 1).
Secondly, we focus on the consequences of oil shocks on the UK economy (stage
2).
1.3.1 Causes of Oil Shocks: Estimates
Figure 1.3 shows the historical evolution of the structural shocks considered in our
model for the period 1976-2014. Our analysis focuses on the episodes associated
with the major changes in the real oil price. In general, our estimated results
conrm the ndings of Kilian (2009) for the sample 1976-2007. However, as our
sample runs to end 2014, we are able to explain oil price variation in recent years.
In particular, from Graph (a), we do not observe any oil supply disruption
corresponding to the Iranian Revolution occurring in 1978-1979. Accordingly, our
interpretation is that the reductions of oil supply due to the Iranian Revolution
were more than o¤set by increases in production from other oil producer countries.
Moreover, we note that during the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 there is evidence of oil
supply disruption.
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Graph (b) shows that repeated large positive shocks to global aggregate demand
occurred in 1978, 1979 and 1980. Moreover, from Graph (c), we observe a large
unanticipated increase of oil market-specic demand during 1979. Indeed, in that
year the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan all created concern about the future availability of oil supply from the
Middle East. Thus, these episodes induced a higher precautionary demand for oil.
Figure 1.3: Historical Evolution of the Structural Shocks, 1976-2014
Note: Annual frequency average of structural residuals implied by the SVAR model (1).
Focusing on the most recent years, from 2002 to mid-2008, the large increase
in the real oil price was driven by a series of positive aggregate demand shocks
associated with shifts in global real economic activity (Graph (b)). Interestingly,
during the same period we nd that oil supply shocks played a negligible role in
oil price uctuations (Graph (a)). From Graph (b), we observe that, at the end
of 2008, the plunge in the real price of oil reected the falls of aggregate demand
and oil market-specic demand, respectively.
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The last episode that we analyse concerns the surge in the oil price that
occurred from 2011 to mid-2014. As we can see from Graph (c), during this period,
there is evidence of a series of positive oil market-specic demand shocks. Indeed,
serious concerns about political instability in the Middle East have emerged with
protests taking place in Tunisia and Egypt. Some signs of civil unrest have also
appeared in Lebanon, Algeria and Yemen. All these events have created concerns
about future oil shortages in the Middle East. As Barrell et al. (2011b) have
argued, the repeated oil market-specic demand shocks which occurred in this
period can also be explained by the sharp rise in investors demand as the nancial
crisis unfolded, with investors pulling out of complex nancial assets in search of
a safer haven.
Figure 1.4 shows the impulse response analysis of global oil production, global
real economic activity and the real price of oil to one standard deviation structural
shocks. In particular, we normalize the signs of the shocks in order to induce an
increase in the oil price.
In terms of results, Graph (a) shows that an unanticipated oil supply disruption
implies an immediate strong reduction of global oil production. After one year we
observe a partial recovery of global oil production. This result can be explained as
follows. In the presence of a negative oil production shock in one region, producer
countries of other regions in the world increase their production. From Graph
(b), we see that an unanticipated oil supply disruption does not signicantly a¤ect
global real economy activity. Interestingly, an unanticipated oil supply disruption
causes a small and partially signicant increase in the real price from fourth to
seventh month (Graph (c)).
From Graph (d), we note that an unexpected increase in aggregate demand
implies an expansion of global oil production that becomes signicant three months
after the shock occurs. Graph (e) shows that the unexpected increase in global
real economic activity is very strong in terms of magnitude and highly signicant.
Similarly, the unexpected increase in global real economic activity causes a sharp,
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very persistent and statistically signicant increase in the real oil price (Graph
(f)).
Graph (g) indicates that an unanticipated expansion of oil market-specic
demand does not inuence global oil production. From Graph (h), we see that an
unanticipated expansion of oil market-specic demand causes a temporary increase
of global real economic activity that is signicant until the tenth month. Finally,
we nd that an unanticipated expansion of oil market-specic demand implies
an immediate large increase in the real oil price (Graph (i)). This e¤ect is very
persistent and highly signicant.
Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Analysis to One St. Dev. Shocks
Note: Solid red lines: point estimates; dash and dotted blue lines: one and two
standard error bands, respectively.
In general, our results conrm the ndings of Kilian (2009) and Alquist and
Kilian (2010). In particular, the most important result emerging from our impulse
response analysis is that shortfalls of oil supply have small and partially signicant
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e¤ects on oil price changes. This outcome can be explained as follows. Oil supply
disruptions in one region are compensated by increases of endogenous oil supply
from other regions of the world. Accordingly, the question that arises is: how can
one explain the large increases in the real oil price following the major political
events in the Middle East? Figure 1.4 shows that the answer coincides with the
sharp increases of precautionary demand for oil. These changes in precautionary
demand are caused by shifts in expectations of future oil supply. Such expectations
respond on impact to exogenous political events in the Middle East and cause a
large increase in the oil price.
The cumulative e¤ects of oil demand and supply shocks on the real price of
oil are shown in Figure 1.5. In general, our results suggest that oil supply shocks
have played a small role in terms of determination of oil price. Aggregate demand
shocks and oil market-specic shocks explain most of the variation in the oil price.
In what follows we describe in detail the most important episodes of oil price
uctuations. Graph (c) shows that the surge in the oil price in 1980 was caused by
the increase in precautionary demand for oil. Indeed, the Iranian Revolution, the
Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created concern about
future supply of oil in the Middle East. Moreover, during the period 1980-1982,
aggregate demand grew continuously implying the rise in the oil price (Graph (b)).
Consequently, the increase in the oil price that occurred in late 1979 and continued
until 1985 was mainly caused by demand shocks. Conversely, during this period,
oil supply shocks do not inuence substantially oil price variation.
From Graph (c), we observe that the fall in the real price of oil that occurred in
1986 is mainly associated with the fall in oil market-specic demand. The increase
of Saudi Arabia oil production following the fall of OPEC cartel in the late 1985
does not seem to explain the drop in the oil price in in 1986 (Graph (a)).
In 1990-1991, we note a large increase in the oil market-specic demand that
caused the sharp increase in the oil price (Graph (c)). Indeed, precautionary
demand for oil increased in response to expected shortfalls in oil supply due to the
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Kuwait Invasion. According to Graph (a), the latter episode also caused a physical
disruption in oil supply. Again, oil market-specic demand shock was the main
cause of the oil price surge of 1999-2000 (Graph (c)).
Turning to more recent episodes of oil price uctuations, we nd that the
increase in the oil price during the period 2002-2008 coincided with a very large
swing in global real economic activity (Graph (b)). Indeed, during this period
there was sustained global demand pressure and the oil price increased more than
other commodity prices. The latter e¤ect occurred because the supply of crude oil
supply stagnated between 2002-2008 (Graph (a)). At the end of 2008, the drop in
oil price is associated with the fall in oil market-specic demand (Graph (c)).
Figure 1.5: Historical Decomposition of Real Oil Price
Note: Estimation results obtained from the SVar model (1).
From Graph (c), we observe that between 2011 and mid-2014 there was a
sustained increase in oil market-specic demand that pushed up the oil price.
This rise of precautionary demand for oil was associated with social and political
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instability in the Middle East and North African regions. In particular, the
unrest sweeping Tunisia in early 2011 rapidly spread over into many surrounding
countries, including major oil producers, such as Algeria and, most signicantly,
Libya. Clearly, instability in the region automatically raised worries of supply
disruptions and possible oil shortage. Moreover, between 2011 and mid-2014, the
worsening of the nancial crisis tended to increase precautionary demand for oil.
In particular, Barrell et al. (2011b) highlighted that the rise in the precautionary
demand for oil related to the sharp increase of investors demand for a safer haven
than complex nancial assets.
Finally, Graphs (b) and (c) show that the plunge in the oil price that started
in mid-2014 seems to be associated with the decreases of both aggregate demand
and oil market-specic demand.
In general, our analysis conrms the results of Barsky and Kilian (2002) and
Kilian (2009) showing that most large and persistent uctuations in the real price
of oil since mid-1970s have been associated with the cumulative e¤ects of oil
demand rather than oil supply shocks. Thus, our results are in contrast with
traditional studies (see for example Hamilton, 1983, 2003 and 2009) suggesting
that all major uctuations in the price of oil can be attributed to disruptions of oil
supply triggered by political events occurred in the Middle East that are exogenous
to the current or the past state of the economy.
The fact that ow supply disruptions have had small e¤ects on the real oil price
does not mean that political events in the Middle East do not matter. These events
have a¤ected the real oil price by shifting expectations about future shortages of
oil supply relative to oil demand. As we explained above, in our model these
expectations are captured by shocks to precautionary demand for oil. In this
regard, our results have shown that oil market-specic demand shocks cause large
uctuations of real oil price even when oil supply is unchanged.
Finally, focusing on the most recent years our results indicate that aggregate
demand shocks are mainly responsible for the "Great Surge" in the real price
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of oil between 2002 and mid-2008. Moreover, the increase in the real oil price
between 2011 and mid-2014 is mostly explained by oil market-specic demand
shocks associated with the social and political instability in the Middle East and
North African regions together with an intensifying nancial crisis. Interestingly,
we nd that the current oil price plunge that started in mid-2014 relates to a
combined fall in aggregate demand and oil market-specic demand.
1.3.2 Consequences of Oil Shocks on the UK Economy: Estimates
In this section, using our regression model specied according to equations
(1.3)-(1.6), we analyse the e¤ects of the identied shocks on UK real GDP
growth, CPI ination, the nominal interest rate, and the real government decit.
Accordingly, Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the impulse response functions of these UK
macroeconomic aggregates to the three types of shocks dened earlier.
IRFs for the UK GDP Growth and CPI Ination. We start by analysing
the responses of domestic GDP growth and CPI ination as shown in Figure
1.6. As we can see from Graph (a), the response of UK GDP growth to oil
supply disruptions is negative throughout all quarters. However, the one-standard
error condence intervals indicate that the negative response is signicant only for
the rst ve quarters. Graph (c) indicates that, on impact, the response of UK
GDP growth to aggregate demand expansions is positive but is not statistically
signicant. Seven quarters after the shock occurs, it turns to negative and it
becomes signicant from the second year onwards.
Graph (e) displays the response of UK GDP growth to oil market-specic
demand shock. In particular, one-standard error condence intervals indicate that
the response of UK GDP growth to this shock is not statistically signicant at
all horizons. There is some evidence of a decline in UK GDP growth six quarters
after the shock occurs.
From Graph (b), we note that negative oil supply shocks lead to increases in
UK CPI ination throughout all quarters. The response is statistically signicant
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at all horizons. Graph (d) shows that the impact of increases in aggregate demand
on the UK consumer price level is positive and statistically signicant from the
rst year onwards. The maximum is reached three years after the shock occurs.
Finally Graph (f) indicates that the impact of expansions of oil market-specic
demand on UK ination is more or less zero throughout all quarters.
Figure 1.6: IRFs of the UK Real GDP Growth and CPI Ination to Each Str. Shock
Note: Solid blue lines: point estimates; dash and dotted blue lines: one and two
standard error bands, respectively.
In general, our results are in line with the ndings of Millard and Shakir (2013)
for the UK economy. In particular, oil supply disruptions induce an immediate
fall in UK GDP growth and cause a sustained increase in UK ination.
In line with the ndings of Kilian (2009) for the US economy, we nd that
increases in aggregate demand initially have a negligible e¤ect on UK output
growth but in the long run they tend to depress it. This last result can be explained
as follows. On impact, positive unexpected global economic shocks stimulate UK
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real output growth and o¤set the growth-retarding e¤ects of a higher real price
of oil. However, as this stimulus disappears over time, the response of UK GDP
growth becomes negative. The most relevant example in this concern is the "Great
Surge" in the real price of oil between 2002 and mid-2008. During this period, the
UK economy did not experience any severe recession because the oil price surge was
mainly driven by unexpectedly strong demand for oil from emerging Asia which
o¤set the negative e¤ects of higher oil prices and other imported commodities.
Similarly to the results of Peersman and Van Robays (2012), we nd that
positive precautionary demand shocks have a very small impact on UK GDP
growth and have no signicant e¤ects on domestic ination. These ndings
suggest that precautionary demand shocks have small and insignicant e¤ects
on domestic GDP growth and CPI ination because the UK is an oil producer
country. Therefore, the UK economy has been less a¤ected by changes in inventory
holdings compared to typical oil importing countries. In this regard, the UK had
the possibility to increase its own oil production in order to self-insure against
interruptions to foreign oil supply instead of drawing upon inventory holdings.
IRFs for the UKNominal Interest Rate and Government Decit. Figure
1.7 shows the impulse response functions for the UK nominal interest rate and the
real government decit to each of the three shocks dened above.
In Graph (a), we observe that the nominal interest rate progressively falls in
response to oil supply disruptions. One-standard error condence intervals indicate
that the response of the UK nominal interest rate to this shock is statistically
signicant starting from the fourth quarter. Graph (c) shows that the increase
in aggregate demand induces a positive nominal interest rate. The response is
statistically signicant from the third quarter onwards. Graph (e) indicates that
positive oil specic-market demand shocks cause an increase in the nominal interest
rate. The positive impact of oil specic-market demand shocks on the nominal
interest rate is statistically signicant from the second to the seventh quarter.
Graph (b) shows that in response to negative shocks of crude oil supply, the UK
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government decit decreases. The one-standard error condence intervals indicate
that the negative response is signicant for all the quarters considered. As we
can observe from Graph (c), the response of UK government decit to increases in
aggregate demand is not statistically signicant at all horizons. Similarly, Graph
(e) shows that expansions of oil market-specic demand have more or less zero
e¤ect on the UK government decit.
Figure 1.7: IRFs of the UK Nom. Int. Rate and Gov. Def. to Each Str. Shock
Note: Solid blue lines: point estimates; dash and dotted blue lines: one and two
standard error bands, respectively.
In general, consistent with the results of Peersman and Van Robays (2012),
Graphs (a), (c) and (e) show that the Bank of England responds di¤erently to oil
price uctuations associated with unanticipated booms in oil demand with respect
to oil price changes due to unexpected oil supply disruptions. Evidently, these
di¤erent responses of the monetary authority relate to the corresponding e¤ects of
oil demand shocks and oil supply shocks on the UK economy.
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For example, as we have shown in Figure 1.6, an unexpected demand boom
driven by the global business cycle does not depress the UK economy in the short
run. Conversely, an unanticipated oil supply disruption reduces immediately UK
real output growth. This implies di¤erent reactions of UK monetary authority
depending on the composition of the oil demand and oil supply shocks underlying
the oil price shock.
In particular, Graphs (c) and (e) show that the nominal interest rate increases
after both an aggregate demand shock and an oil market-specic demand shock.
In this regard, the positive response to aggregate demand shocks is consistent with
the Bank of Englands decision to raise interest rates before the oil price shock of
1978-1980. Indeed, looking at the 3 Month Treasury Bills series, it is evident that
the Bank of England had been raising interest rates steadily from mid-1977 to the
end of 1980.
Figure 1.7 also shows that negative shocks to oil supply induce the Bank of
England to decrease the nominal interest rate. This result is in line with the
ndings of Kilian and Lewis (2011) about the behaviour of the Federal Reserve
in the case of negative oil supply shocks. In particular, the negative response of
the nominal interest rate to unanticipated oil supply disruptions is consistent with
the view that the Bank of England considers the resulting oil price increases as
adverse demand shocks.
Although the results shown in Graphs (a), (c) and (e) on average
correctly represent historical UK monetary policy, they cannot be interpreted as
representative of actual monetary policy responses at any given point in time.
Indeed, the well documented shifts in UK monetary policy between 1976 and 2014
imply that any VAR model that analyses the responses of the nominal interest
rate to oil supply and demand shocks should allow for time-varying coe¢ cients.
In this regard, an interesting example is provided by the paper of Millard and
Shakir (2013). In particular, Millard and Shakir (2013) have employed an empirical
framework with time-varying parameters in order to understand how the impact
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of oil price shocks on the UK economy may have developed over time. However,
as argued by Kilian (2014), the idea of analysing the responses of nominal interest
rate to oil demand and supply shocks within a time-varying parameter VAR is
not practical for two reasons. Firstly, the methodology underlying our structural
VAR requires long samples with su¢ cient variation in oil demand and oil supply
shocks to ensure e¢ cient estimation. Secondly, our identifying assumptions hold
only using data at monthly frequency. However, it is well documented that time-
varying parameter VARs are computationally infeasible when using monthly data.
This shortcoming does not apply to the recent generation of DSGE models
which are able to disentangle the responses of monetary policy to oil demand and
oil supply shocks. Indeed, recent advances in DSGE modelling of endogenous oil
price shocks provide a useful solution in this direction. In particular, such DSGE
models are able to distinguish between several causes of uctuations in the global
demand for industrial commodities and to estimate the impact of alternative policy
choices. Therefore, one of the objectives of Chapter 2 and 3 is to develop a DSGE
model in order to analyse the response of UK monetary policy to di¤erent types
of oil price shocks.
Focusing on the responses of the UK government decit, we nd that negative
shocks to world crude oil supply improve the UK public nances. In particular, the
reduction of global crude oil supply induces an increase in the real oil price. Since
the UK is an oil producer country this increase in oil price implies an improvement
of government oil revenues. Consequently, UK government budget improves.
Our estimated result is consistent with previous UK literature (see, among
the others, Powell and Horton, 1985; Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000; OECD
Economic Surveys, 2002; OBR, 2010; Barrel et al., 2011). In particular, all these
studies have found that, after an increase in the oil price, the UK scal position
is positively a¤ected by the additional North Sea revenues stemming from the
petroleum revenue tax and the VAT applied on oil products. In this regard, Young
(2000) argued that in a scenario of high oil price, although the performance of UK
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economy deteriorates, the government represents one of the few winners in the
short term.
As in the case of the nominal interest rate, we should be careful in the
interpretation of these responses. Indeed, our structural VAR model is unable
to take into account a large variety of sources of oil price shocks. More specically,
as we are going to show in Chapter 3, the particular implications of an oil price
shock for the UK public nances di¤er depending on whether the shock is global or
UK specic. Similarly, we will show that the e¤ects implied by oil demand shocks
are di¤erent from the ones generated by oil supply shocks.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the causes and the consequences of oil price
uctuations on the UK economy for the sample period 1976:1-2014:12. As an
empirical strategy, we adopted a two-stage method in order to estimate our model.
In the rst stage, we used the framework of Kilian (2009) to capture supply and
demand conditions in the oil market using a SVAR framework. In particular, we
identied shocks to the world oil price from three types of underlying source: oil
supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil market-specic demand shocks.
In the second stage, we assessed the impact of structural innovations estimated
in the rst stage on several UK macroeconomic aggregates such as, real GDP
growth, CPI ination, nominal interest rate and real government decit.
Our empirical approach assumes that the real oil price is endogenous with
respect to macroeconomic fundamentals. In order to estimate the causes of oil
price changes we have used monthly data whereas, in order to assess the e¤ects of
di¤erent oil price uctuations on the UK economy, we have constructed measures
of the quarterly shocks by averaging the monthly structural innovations for each
quarter.
Several important insights emerge from our analysis. Firstly, we nd that,
since the mid-1970s, shortfalls in oil supply have had small e¤ects on oil price
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changes. Therefore, our results contrast with the view of traditional studies stating
that major oil price changes are caused by disruptions in oil supply triggered by
exogenous political events occurring in the Middle East.
We nd that major uctuations in the real oil price coincide with shifts in
precautionary demand for oil. These changes in precautionary demand are mainly
caused by shifts in expectations about future oil supply. Such expectations respond
on impact to exogenous political events in the Middle East and cause large changes
in the oil price.
For example, we nd that the large increase in the real oil price, between 2011
and mid-2014, was mainly caused by oil market-specic demand shocks associated
with the social and political instability in the Middle East and North African
regions together with the nancial crisis. Our results also indicate that the recent
plunge in the oil price that started in mid-2014 was induced by decreases in both
aggregate demand and oil market-specic demand.
Secondly, our IRFs show di¤erent responses of UK macroeconomic aggregates
depending on the underlying shock a¤ecting oil price. More specically, UK GDP
growth goes down immediately in response to negative oil supply shocks whereas
increases in aggregate demand, initially, have small e¤ects on domestic output
growth but, in the long run, they tend to reduce it. In general, our estimated
responses show that oil shocks cause a sustained increase in UK ination.
Focusing on UK monetary policy, we nd that the nominal interest rate
increases after both aggregate demand shocks and oil market-specic demand
shocks. The opposite occurs in the case of negative shocks to oil supply. Our
estimated responses also indicate that the increase in the real oil price induces
an improvement of UK public nances because of the rise in oil revenues. More
specically, in response to negative shocks of crude oil supply the UK government
decit diminishes.
Although the empirical approach presented in this paper provides a useful
framework in order to understand the causes and the consequences of oil price
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shocks on the UK economy, it su¤ers from three main limitations. The rst
shortcoming concerns the e¤ects of oil price uctuations on the UK economy.
In particular, our large sample includes structural shifts in several macroeconomic
aggregates that a¤ected the UK economy during this period. For example, it is
well documented that UK monetary policy changed several times between 1976
and 2014. Therefore, our IRFs are not representative of actual policy responses at
any given point in time. They represent only the average historical behaviour of
UK macroeconomic aggregates during this period. Moreover, it is not possible to
split the sample of our analysis since the methodology underlying our structural
VAR requires long samples with su¢ cient variation in oil demand and oil supply
shocks to ensure e¢ cient estimation.
The second limitation of our structural VAR model is that it cannot
di¤erentiate between ow demand and supply shocks originating in di¤erent parts
of the world. For example, it cannot identify whether a given oil price shock is
caused by unexpected demand from China or by an exogenous supply disruption
in the Middle East, as long as both shocks occur abroad. However, as agued by
Kilian (2014), even controlling for the magnitude of the oil price shock on impact,
the responses of the economy depend on the type of structural shock in the model
and on where in the world this structural shock occurs.
The third shortcoming associated with the present structural VAR is that it
is not able to di¤erentiate between two distinct demand shocks. For example, it
cannot di¤erentiate whether a shock occurs to foreign productivity or to foreign
monetary policy.
All three limitations do not apply to the recent generation of DSGE models
which are able to distinguish between several causes of uctuations in the global
demand for industrial commodities and to estimate the impact of alternative policy
choices. Therefore, in Chapter 2, we are going to analyse an open economy DSGE
model for the UK economy in order to assess the e¤ects of oil price uctuations.
Finally, in Chapter 3, we use an open economy DSGE model in order to evaluate
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the specic e¤ects on UK scal sector and, in particular, the rate at which oil price
changes work through the economy into UK public nances.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Data
prodt : as we described in the main body of the paper, this is the percentage
change of global crude oil production. This series is obtained by the log di¤erences
of world crude oil production in millions per barrels pumped per day (averaged by
month). The source is the US Department of Energy.
reat : as we described in the main body of the paper, this is the index of global
real economic activity. The source of this series is Kilian website: http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/reaupdate.txt.
Kilian (2009) provides a clear explanation in order to obtain reat. In particular,
the data series to construct this index are taken from representative single-
voyage freight rates available in the monthly report on "Shipping Statistics and
Economics" published by Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd. These data series
relate to various bulk dry cargoes consisting of grain, oilseeds, coal, iron ore,
fertilizer and scrap metal. In order to eliminate the xed e¤ects for di¤erent
routes, commodities and ship sizes, Kilian adopts two steps. Firstly, he computes
the period-to-period growth rates for each series. Secondly, he takes the equal-
weighted average of these growth rates and cumulates the average growth rate.
The nal series is deated by the US CPI and linearly detrended. The base month
is January 1986. Kilian also provides evidence that this index based on industrial
commodity markets well represents the level of global real economic activity.
rpot : as we described in the main body of the paper, this is the real price
of oil and it is expressed in log terms. This series is obtained from the rener
acquisition cost of imported crude oil. The source is US Department of Energy.
The nominal series of oil price is deated by the US CPI. The source is the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
yt : it is the growth rate of UK real GDP. This series is obtained by the log
di¤erences of real UK GDP: "gross domestic product, chained volume measures,
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seasonally adjusted (£m)". The source is O¢ ce for National Statistics (code ABMI
in Quarterly National Accounts).
t : it is the UK CPI ination. This series is obtained by the log di¤erences
of UK consumption expenditure deator: "nal consumption expenditure by
household and NPISH deator, seasonally adjusted (base period: 2011)". The
source is O¢ ce for National Statistics (code YBFS in Quarterly National
Accounts).
rt : it is the UK short-term nominal interest rate. This series is the 3
month treasury bills: "quarterly average rate of discount, 3 month treasury bills
(Sterling)". The source is Bank of England (code IUQAAJNB in Statistical
Interactive Database).
dt : it is the UK real government decit. This series is obtained by the "central
government net cash requirement, current price, not seasonally adjusted, (£m)".
The source is O¢ ce for National Statistics (code RUUW in Quarterly National
Accounts). The original series is seasonally adjusted and deated by the nal
consumption expenditure by household and NPISH deator.
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Chapter 2: Oil Price Shocks and the UK
Economy, 1990-2005
2.1 Introduction
This paper aims to assess the e¤ects of movements in oil prices on the UK economy.
In particular, our objective is to analyse an open economy Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the United Kingdom in order to evaluate
the economic repercussions of oil price uctuations.
Media, policymakers and economists have been interested in oil prices changes
since the 1970s. Indeed, large uctuations in oil prices have signicant economic
e¤ects. In this regard, most of the exisisting literature has focused on the US
economy (see, for example, Kim and Loungani, 1992; Rotemberg and Woodford,
1996; Finn, 2000; Backus and Crucini, 2000; Barsky and Kilian, 2002 and 2004;
Leduc and Sill, 2004; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2006; Nakov and Pescatori, 2007;
Dhawan and Jeske, 2007; Kilian, 2008a and 2009; Arora and Gomis-Porqueras,
2011; Antonakakis et al., 2014).
On the other hand, only few studies have analysed the UK macroeconomy and
oil shocks. Thus, for instance, the paper by Harrison et al. (2011) investigates
the e¤ects of permanent energy price shocks for economies with declining stocks
of natural resources, such as the United Kingdom. Millard (2011) considers
a macroeconomic model which studies the e¤ects of many temporary shocks,
including but not limited to energy prices, on ination as well as how monetary
policy can respond to such shocks. Both these papers implicitly assume that the
real oil price is exogenous with respect to macroeconomic fundamentals. However,
this assumption has been proved to be incorrect (Kilian 2008a, 2008b and 2009).
Therefore, recent literature on DSGE models has largely investigated
endogenous oil price shocks. A careful analysis in this direction is o¤ered by the
papers of Bodenstein et al. (2008), and Nakov and Nuño (2011). In particular,
these two papers develop DSGE models with the endogenous real price of oil and
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monetary policy but without a global economic framework.
Another strand of literature has considered DSGE models with endogenous oil
prices but it has ignored the many sources of possible shocks that a¤ect oil price
uctuations (see, for example, Nakov and Pescatori 2010a and 2010b).
In contrast to the above literature, in the present chapter we develop a DSGE
model for the UK economy considering the endogenous determination of the oil
price and adopting a world economy model in a new Keynesian framework. In
addition, our model presents a rich stochastic structure accounting for a broad
range of shocks that potentially inuence the real oil price. In this regard, we
consider several causes for oil price changes. For example, oil price uctuations
can derive from an increased global demand as well as from oil supply disruptions.
Similarly, we consider the fact that a country reacts di¤erently to oil price
movements that originate domestically rather than abroad. Moreover, our model
evaluates the monetary policy responses following these oil price uctuations.
Therefore, our study o¤ers a useful tool for UK monetary policy makers in
responding to oil price shocks.
The theoretical framework of the present chapter is in line with the empirical
model analysed in Chapter 1. Firstly, as in the previous chapter, we assume that
the real oil price is endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions.
Secondly, we focus on the demand side of the oil market. In this regard, recent
economic literature has stressed the importance of oil demand shocks in order to
explain oil price uctuations (see, for example, Kilian, 2009 and 2014; Baumeister
and Peersman, 2013).
In the present paper we assume that there are two countries (UK and rest of
the world) that di¤er in population sizes, oil intensities, oil endowments, non-oil
trade ows and oil trade ows. In each country, we adopt a particular specication
of the production function considering oil as an imported commodity. In addition,
we assume that oil enters in the production function of consumption goods. This
allows us to consider the e¤ects of oil shocks on household demand. Accordingly,
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our approach is in line with the studies of Dhawan and Jeske (2008), Hamilton
(2009), Edelstein and Kilian (2009) and Bodenstein et al. (2011). Indeed, all
these papers have shown that the increases in oil price are expected to reduce
householdsdiscretionary income, as consumers have less money to spend after
paying their energy bills.
In order to estimate our model, we use observed data series for the UK economy
and the rest of the world over the sample period 1990-2005. The observed variables
for the foreign bloc are constructed using the Loretan (2005) technique of trade
weights and aggregating data of the main UK trading partners. Our sample
choice is motivated by the fact that, in this period, the UK economy is a net oil
exporter. Moreover, our sample period covers the "Non-Inationary, Consistently
Expansionary" (NICE) decade, as identied by King (2003), during which there
were no major changes to the macroeconomic policy environment.
Our results contribute to previous literature by showing that there are di¤erent
implications of oil price shocks on the UK economy depending on the specic
source the shock. More specically, we nd that foreign oil intensity shock is the
main cause of UK oil price variation. In this regard, oil intensity is dened as
the measure of oil e¢ ciency in a given economy. In particular, oil e¢ ciency is
related to the amount of oil required to provide products and services. Thus,
for instance, oil e¢ ciency depends on the methods of transportation and the
conservation e¤orts. Accordingly, in a given economy, the increase in oil intensity
induces an improvement in its oil e¢ ciency. As we will describe below, we model oil
intensity as an exogenous shock that a¤ects the functions of production goods and
consumption goods. Therefore, a positive oil intensity shock induces a fall in the
oil demanded by the rms that produce both production goods and consumption
goods.
We also nd that that foreign technology shock and foreign oil supply shock
explain signicantly the UK oil price volatility. Moreover, our estimated results
show a strong persistence of oil shocks.
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As concerns the e¤ects on the domestic economy, our IRFs are in line with
the estimated responses of Millard (2011) for the UK economy.11 In particular,
we nd that the lower oil price pushes down the costs of rms using oil as
production input. Accordingly, rms increase their prots and employment rises
stimulating real GDP. In addition, the fall in the oil price induces a drop in retail
prices. Consequently, real incomes increase boosting consumer spending. Given
the ination target, the UK nominal interest rate decreases.
Our estimated results also indicate high values for Calvo (1983) prices and
wages resetting parameters, whereas we nd low degrees of price and wage
indexations. In general, we observe that the reaction of wage ination in response
to oil shocks is close to zero. This nding refutes the predictions of Anderton and
Barrell (1995) and Barrell et al. (2011a).
In contrast to previous literature (see, for example, Hall et al., 1986 and Young,
2000) that predicted a depreciation of the Pound in the presence of a fall in the
oil price, our results show something di¤erent.12 In response to a positive foreign
oil supply shock British Sterling depreciates, whereas an increase in the foreign
oil intensity implies an appreciation of UK currency. Moreover, we nd that a
negative shock to foreign technology implies a depreciation of UK currency. In
general, positive shocks to foreign oil supply and oil intensity imply a deterioration
of the UK trade balance since the UK is an oil exporter country.
Finally, our historical decomposition analysis complements the existing
literature by showing that sharp increases in the oil price are associated with large
reductions in the UK GDP and spikes in domestic ination. More specically,
the large increases in oil price during 1990:Q3-1992:Q3 and 1999:Q1-1999:Q3
contributed considerably to the relative UK GDP recessions. Moreover, the surge
11In particular, Millard (2011) does not consider the di¤erent sources of oil price uctuations
assuming the real oil price as exogenous. Moreover, his analysis focuses on increases in real oil
price.
12In particular, Young (2000) nds that the UK currency appreciates in response to the raise
of oil price. Indeed, this author analyses the economic e¤ects of the oil price increases on the
UK economy. On the other hand, as we will show in Section 4, our impulse response analysis
focuses on the case of oil price decreases.
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of oil price in the second half of 1990 caused a large increase in UK ination.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
DSGE model on which our analysis is based. In Section 3, we illustrate the
estimation strategy and results of our DSGE model. Section 4 presents the impulse
response analysis of the estimated model. Section 5 shows the evolution of the
exogenous shocks over time and decomposes recent movements in output and
ination among them. The concluding remarks are found in Section 6.
2.2 Model
In this section, we present a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model which has two main features: rstly, the endogenous determination of
real oil price and, secondly, a global economic framework. Backus and Crucini
(2000) were the rst to develop a DSGE model with the endogenous real price of
oil. In two recent papers Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein et al.
(2012) extended this approach by considering a world economy in a new Keynesian
framework such as in the models of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets andWouters
(2003, 2007).
Our main interest lies in analysing the response of the UK economy to changes
in oil prices. Thus, we consider a world economy model with two symmetric
blocs: the UK economy and the rest of the world. Specically, we take into
account di¤erences of the two blocs related to population sizes, oil intensities, oil
endowments, non-oil trade ows and oil trade ows. We also assume that asset
markets are complete at the country level, but incomplete internationally.
In each country, a representative household has a utility function that includes
two arguments, consumption and labour. This representative household consumes
both oil and non-oil goods and has monopoly power over wages that implies
sticky nominal wages à la Calvo (1983). The representative household rents
capital services to intermediate production rms and decides how much capital
to accumulate given certain capital adjustment costs.
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Each country produces a single nal production good and a continuum of
intermediate production goods. The intermediate production rms produce under
monopolistic competition and uses capital services, labour and oil as input factors.
We assume that these intermediate production rms set prices according to the
Calvo model (1983).
As an additional assumption concerning nominal rigidities, we allow for partial
indexation of both wages and prices to past ination rates. In this regard, previous
studies on the UK economy (see, for example, Anderton and Barrell, 1995; Barrell
et al. 2011a) have stressed the importance of the behaviour of wage and price
setters in order to understand the impact of oil price shocks. However, these
papers were not able to convincingly quantify these e¤ects. Conversely, our model
allows us to directly assess the importance of price and wage indexations in the
presence of oil price shocks.
In each country, nal consumption goods are produced by rms that combine
non-oil consumption goods and oil goods. In this regard, we assume that oil
intensity shocks directly a¤ect the production of these goods. Accordingly, this
specication is able to capture the demand side channel for oil price variation. We
know that this aspect is potentially important from the study of Kilian (2008b).
Moreover, we assume that both oil and non-oil goods are traded across the two
countries.
Finally, our model includes a rich stochastic structure that allows us to
distinguish between the di¤erent sources of oil price uctuations. In particular, we
are able to di¤erentiate between ow demand and supply shocks with di¤erent
geographic origins and recognize the di¤erence between a ow demand shock
driven, for example, by foreign productivity shocks, foreign oil intensity shocks
or foreign monetary policy shocks.
Since the model is symmetric we will describe in detail only the model for the
domestic country.
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2.2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household maximizes its intertemporal utility function:
Et
1X
j=0
j1Ut (2.1)
where Et is the expectation operator at time t and 
j
1 is the discount factor. We
assume that the utility function is separable in consumption and labour:
Ut =

1
1  1
 
Zc1;tC1;t+j   1C1;t+j 1
1 1 + 1
1  1
(1  L1;t+j)1 1

(2.2)
where C1;t, the representative household consumption, is inuenced by the presence
of external habit, 1, related to aggregate past consumption. The parameter 1
is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the representative household or the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The variable L1;t represents
hours worked, while 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to
the real wage (or Frisch elasticity). As we can note, equation (2.2) also contains a
preference shock to consumption denoted by Zc1;t.
The representative household maximizes its intertemporal utility function
subject to the following time t budget constraint:
P c1;tC1;t + P
i
1;tI1;t +
e1;tP
b
2;tB1;t
b1;t
+
Z
S
P d1;t;t+1D1;t;t+1 (h) D1;t 1;t (2.3)
= W1;tL1;t +R
k
1;tK1;t 1 +  1;t + P
o
1;tY
o
1;t + e1;tB1;t 1
Financial wealth of the representative household derives from the purchase of state-
contingent domestic bonds, D1;t;t+1, and a non-state contingent foreign bond B1;t.
At time t, the price of domestic bonds is denoted by P d1;t, while P
b
2;t is the foreign
currency price of the non-state contingent foreign bond. e1;t represents the nominal
exchange rate expressed in units of the domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency. As in the paper of Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011), we assume that
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the representative household faces an intermediation cost to purchase the foreign
bond, b1;t in order to ensure that net foreign assets are stationary. The idea is
simple: the representative household will earn lower returns from holding foreign
bonds when it is a net lender. Conversely, the representative household will earn
higher returns from holding foreign bonds when it is a net debtor.
The representative household current income consists of four components:
labour income, W1;tL1;t, capital income, Rk1;tK1;t 1, an aliquot share,  1;t, coming
from rm and union prots, and a share of the countrys (unrened) oil endowment,
P o1;tY
o
1;t. The representative household uses both its current income and nancial
wealth in order to buy consumption, C1;t, and investment, I1;t, goods that are
purchased at the prices P c1;t and P
i
1;t, respectively.
We assume that the representative household owns the capital stock that it
rents out to the rms of intermediate production goods at a rental rate of Rk1;t.
The law of capital motion corresponds to:
K1;t = (1  1)K1;t 1 +
 
1  S

I1;t
I1;t 1
2!
Zi1;tI1;t (2.4)
where K1;t is the capital stock, 1 is the depreciation rate, and the adjustment cost
function S () is a positive function of changes in investment. In steady state, with
a constant level of investment, we assume that S () is equal to zero. Moreover,
its rst derivative around equilibrium equals to zero too. In the equation (2.4),
Zi1;t represents a disturbance to the investment specic technology process and is
assumed to follow a rst order autoregressive process.
Given prices, wages, union transfer and oil endowment, the representative
household chooses consumption, labour supply, investment, end of period capital
stock and holdings of domestic and foreign bonds in order to maximize its
intertemporal objective function (2.2) subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint (2.3) and the capital accumulation equation (2.4).
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Labour Supply. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we consider a
representative household that supplies its labour service to a labour union.
This union di¤erentiates the labour service and resells it to intermediate labour
bundlers. We assume that the union has monopoly power and sets the wage
according to the Calvo model (1983). Finally, rms of intermediate production
goods purchase a labour bundle from intermediate labour bundlers.
Assuming a continuum of households indexed by h, where h 2 [0; 1] ; the labour
bundle demanded by rms is determined as follows:
L1;t (h) =

W1;t (h)
W1;t
  1+w1;t
w1;t
Ld1;t (2.5)
where L1;t (h) is the labour service that labour bundlers purchase from union at
wageW1;t (h). Then, labour bundlers combine the labour service in order to obtain
Ld1;t, and resell it to intermediate production rms at wage W1;t. We assume that
the labour bundle demanded by rms, Ld1;t, and the aggregate nominal wage paid
by rms, W1;t, are determined by Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator functions:
Ld1;t =
24 1Z
0
L1;t (h)
1
1+w1;t dh
351+
w
1;t
(2.6)
W1;t =
24 1Z
0
W1;t (h)
  1
w1;t dh
35 
w
1;t
(2.7)
where w1;t is an exogenous rst order autoregressive process with an i.i.d. normal
error term reecting wage mark-up shocks.
We denote the nominal wage desired by the representative household by
W f1;t+j, which corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption. As we described above, the union has monopoly power so that
it can set the wage subject to the labour demanded by rms. Thus, the union
takes into account W f1;t+j during the negotiations with labour bundlers and gives
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to the representative household the mark-up above the nominal wage desired.
We assume that the union can adjust wages subject to nominal rigidities à
la Calvo. Thus, the probability that the union can change the nominal wage in
period t is constant and equal to 1  w1 . If the union receives a positive signal in
a given period it can set up a new nominal wage. Conversely, if the union cannot
change the wage in a given period, it keeps the wage as a geometric average of
nominal wage ination in the last period (!1;t 1) and the ination rate in steady
state (SS1 ). Thus, the maximization problem of the union h can be expressed as:
max
fW1;t(h)g
Et
1X
j=0
(w1 )
j  1;t;t+j
"
!l1;t;;jW1;t (h)L1;t+j (h)
 W f1;t+jL1;t+j (h)
#
(2.8)
s:t : L1;t (h) =

W1;t (h)
W1;t
  1+w1;t
w1;t
Ld1;t (2.9)
and : !l1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n
(!1;t 1+s)
w1
 
SS1
1 w1 o (2.10)
where w1 indicates the degree of wage indexation.
2.2.2 Firms
Production Goods. Each country produces a single nal production good and
a continuum of intermediate production goods indexed by i, where i 2 [0; 1]. In
order to produce a nal production good a continuum of representative bundlers
combine a variety of intermediate production goods. The nal production good
sector is perfectly competitive. There is monopolistic competition in the markets
for intermediate production goods: each intermediate production good is produced
by a single rm.
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Final Production Good Sector. The nal production good, Y d1;t, is
produced according to the following technology:
Y d1;t =
24 1Z
0
Y1;t (i)
1
1+
p
1;t di
351+
p
1;t
(2.11)
where Y1;t (i) is the quantity of intermediate production good of type i that is used
to produce the nal production good at time t. p1;t is a AR(1) stochastic process
that determines the time varying mark-up in the goods market. We consider shocks
to this parameter as "cost-push" shocks to the ination equation.
Each intermediate rm i faces the following demand function:
Y1;t (i) =

P1;t (i)
P d1;t
  1+p1;t

p
1;t
Y d1;t (2.12)
where P1;t (i) is the price of the intermediate production good j and P d1;t is the
price of the nal production good. As we mentioned above, the nal production
good sector is perfectly competitive. Thus, P d1;t can be expressed as:
P d1;t =
24 1Z
0
 
P d1;t (i)
  1

p
1;t di
35 
p
1;t
(2.13)
and we can dene the nominal exchange rate as:
e1;t =
P d1;t
Pm2;t
(2.14)
where Pm2;t is the price of imported goods for the foreign country.
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Intermediate Production Good Sector. Each intermediate production
good i is produced using three input factors: capital, labour, and oil. Following
Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein et al. (2012), we assume a nested
constant elasticity of substitution production function.
As well explained by Kilian (2008b), this specication has one main advantage:
imported oil enters as an input factor of the production function of domestic gross
output but does not enter in the production function of domestic value added.
Since gross output is separable in value added and imported energy, holding capital
and labour xed, this implies that oil price shocks do not move value added. Thus,
by denition, oil price shocks cannot be interpreted as productivity shocks for real
GDP.13
Thus, we can write the cost minimization problem of the rm i as:
min
fK1;t 1(i);L1;t(i);Oy1;t(i);V1;t(i)g
0B@ R
k
1;tK1;t 1 (i)+
W1;tL1;t (i)+
P o1;tO
y
1;t (i)
1CA (2.15)
s:t : Y1;t (i) =
0@ (!vy1 ) o11+o1 (V1;t (i)) 11+o1 +
(!oy1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
y
1;t (i)
 1
1+o1
1A1+
o
1
(2.16)
and : V1;t (i) =
0@  !k1 v11+v1 (K1;t 1 (i)) 11+v1 + 
!l1
 v1
1+v1 (Z1;tL1;t (i))
1
1+v1
1A1+
v
1
(2.17)
where K1;t (i) and L1;t (i) are capital and labour services that are used to produce
the value added input V1;t (i). In turn, oil input O
y
1;t (i) is combined with gross
value added input in order to produce the intermediate production good Y1;t (i).
We denote the respective weights of capital and labour in the value added
production function by !k1 and !
l
1, while 
v
1 represents the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour.
Moreover, Z1;t is a productivity shock assumed to follow a second order
13See Kilian (2008b) for a more detailed explanation of the supply transmission channel of oil
price shocks.
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autoregressive process with i.i.d. zero mean normally distributed error. As we
will describe in the results section, this shock plays a very important role for UK
oil price uctuations.
We consider oil intensity as factor augmenting technology. Thus, the term
Zo1;t represents an AR (2) stochastic process that inuences the oil intensity in
production. As we will show in Sections 3 and 4, this shock explains most of
the UK oil price volatility and, in turn, signicantly a¤ects the behaviour of the
domestic economy.
The parameters !oy1 and !
vy
1 determine the importance of oil and value added
inputs in the output of the rm i. Finally, o1 indicates the price elasticity of
demand for oil.
As in Calvo (1983), rms i are allowed to change their price with constant
probability 1  p1. Following Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), rms that cannot
change their prices keep their prices as a geometric average of ination in the last
period (d1;t 1) and the ination rate in steady state (
SS
1 ). Thus, the maximization
problem of the rm i can be expressed as:
max
fP d1;t(i)g
Et
1X
j=0
(p1)
j  1;t;t+j
"
d1;t;;jP
d
1;t (i)Y1;t+j (i)
 MC1;t+jY1;t+j (i)
#
(2.18)
s:t : Y1;t (i) =

P1;t (i)
P d1;t
  1+p1

p
1
Y d1;t (2.19)
and : d1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n 
d1;t 1+s
p1  SS1 1 p1o (2.20)
where p1 indicates the degree of price indexation. MC1;t denotes rm i marginal
cost at time t that is di¤erent from familiar formulation of Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007). Indeed, in this model the marginal cost depends on oil as an
additional factor input.
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Consumption Goods. Final consumption goods, C1;t, are produced by rms
that operate in a perfect competitive environment. These rms aggregate
domestic, Cd1;t, and foreign, M
c
1;t, intermediate consumption goods in order to
produce a non-oil consumption good, Cne1;t. In turn, the nal consumption good is
produced by combining non-oil and oil, Oc1;t, consumption goods. Finally, C1;t is
sold to the representative household. We can express the minimization problem of
the representative rm producing C1;t as follows:
min
fCd1;t;Mc1;t;Cne1;t;Oc1;tg
P d1;tC
d
1;t + P
m
1;tM
c
1;t + P
o
1;tO
c
1;t (2.21)
s:t : C1;t =

(!cc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Cne1;t
 1
1+o1 + (!oc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
c
1;t
 1
1+o1
1+o1
(2.22)
and : Cne1;t =

(!c1)
c1
1+c1
 
Cd1;t
 1
1+c1 + (!mc1 )
c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
c
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(2.23)
where the same shock Zo1;t that a¤ects oil intensity in production goods also a¤ects
the oil intensity in consumption goods. !cc1 and !
oc
1 indicate the weights of non-
oil and oil in the production of consumption goods, while o1 is the same price
elasticity of oil demand that we observed in the function of production goods.
As we can note, this specication allows us to consider oil not only as
intermediate input of production goods but also an input of consumption goods.
This is a very important point because, under standard assumptions, the cost share
of oil in production goods is known to be very small so that traditional models
are not able to explain large e¤ects on GDP due to oil shocks. Conversely, in
our model the oil intensity shock directly a¤ects the production of consumption
goods, implying a change of the representative household demand for these goods.
As Kilian (2008b) rightly noted, this is a very important transmission channel of
oil shocks.
In the production of non-oil consumption goods, !c1 and !
mc
1 determine the
weights of domestic and imported goods respectively. The elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign intermediate goods is denoted by c1. In addition,
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the term Zm1;t captures an import preference shock and can be expressed as an
AR(2) exogenous process.
Finally, we consider the price of consumption goods, P c1;t, as the Lagrange
multiplier of equation (2.22) in the problem of cost minimization faced by rms
producing nal consumption goods. We dene non-oil consumption goods, Cne1;t,
to comprise the core price level P ne1;t of the economy.
Investment Goods. Firms that produce investment goods, I1;t, work in a
competitive market. Contrary to rms producing consumption goods, those
producing investment goods do not need oil as an input factor. Investment goods
are produced combining domestic and foreign investment goods and are sold to the
representative household. The problem of cost minimization of a representative
investment rm can be expressed as:
min
fId1;t;M i1;tg
P d1;tI
d
1;t + P
m
1;tM
i
1;t (2.24)
s:t : I1;t =
 
!i1
 c1
1+c1
 
Id1;t
 1
1+c1 +
 
!mi1
 c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
i
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(2.25)
where !i1 and !
mi
1 are the weights of domestic and foreign goods in the production
of the nal investment good. We denote the exogenous AR(2) shock inuencing
preferences of investment imports by Zm1;t. As in the production of consumption
goods, c1 represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
intermediate goods. Finally, we assume that the price of investment goods,
P i1;t, coincides with the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem of cost
minimization faced by investment rms.
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2.2.3 The Oil Sector
As we discussed above, the main objective of this paper is to assess the e¤ects of
oil price changes on the UK economy. Thus, it is crucial to carefully describe the
dynamics of the oil market. In particular, we assume that the two blocs of the
model (UK and rest of the world) are endowed with a non-storable supply of oil
each period. As for non-oil goods, oil is traded across the two blocs. In addition,
consistently with the empirical evidence (Kilian, 2008b and 2009), we focus on
the oil demand side. Thus, we assume that the 2 blocs are not able to take any
decision concerning endogenous oil production. In particular, domestic (Y o1;t) and
foreign (Y o2;t) oil supplies follow two exogenous AR(2) processes respectively. As we
will note in Sections 3 and 4, the foreign oil supply shock signicantly a¤ects the
UK oil price variation and, in turn, it largely inuences the responses of domestic
macroeconomic variables.
With foreign and domestic oil productions determined exogenously, the real
price of oil, P o1;t, adjusts endogenously to clear the oil market. Thus, the oil
market clearing condition can be expressed as:
Y o1;t +
2
1
Y o2;t = O1;t +
2
1
O2;t (2.26)
where : O1;t = O
y
1;t +O
c
1;t (2.27)
where O1;t is the domestic oil demand of both rms and the representative
household. 1 and 2 represent the relative population sizes of the two blocs.
Finally, since we consider all the variables in per capita terms, we scale the foreign
variables by size of the home country, 1
1
.
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2.2.4 Monetary Policy
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate according to the following
monetary policy reaction function:
i1;t = {1 + 
i
1 (i1;t 1   {1) + (2.28) 
1  i1
  
core1;t   core1

+ 1
 
core1;t   core1   core1;t

+ y1y
gap
1;t

This is a modied version of the Taylor (1993) rule in which the Central Bank
responds to changes of past nominal interest rate, core ination and output gap
(dened as the di¤erence between actual and potential output). We denote the
steady state values for the nominal interest rate and core ination by {1 and core1 ,
respectively. The parameter i1 allows for interest rate smoothing, whereas 
y
1
and 1 indicate the reaction of interest rate on output gap and core ination,
respectively.
Moreover, we dene the core ination as the logarithmic percentage change in
the price of non-oil goods:
core1;t = log

P ne1;t
P ne1;t 1

(2.29)
Finally, we assume that core1;t reects a time varying ination target and can be
expressed as a AR(1) process.
2.2.5 Equilibrium of the Non-Oil Goods Market
The nal non-oil good market for the domestic economy is in equilibrium if
the production of rms equals demand by the representative household for
consumption and investment and imports of the foreign country:
Y d1;t = C
d
1;t + I
d
1;t +
2
1
M2;t (2.30)
where : M2;t =M
c
2;t +M
i
2;t (2.31)
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where M2;t denotes net imports of the foreign country. Again, since we consider
variables in per capita terms we scale foreign imports by the population scaling
factor 1
1
.
The law of motion of the non-state contingent foreign bond is given by:
e1;tP
b
2;tB1;t
b1;t
= e1;tB1;t 1 +
2
1
e1;tP
m
2;t
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(2.32)
 Pm1;t
 
M c1;t +M
i
1;t

+ P o1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

indicating that the evolution of the domestic holding of foreign bonds relates to
the domestic non-oil trade balance.
Finally, the market clearing condition for the non state-contingent bond states
that in equilibrium B1;t +B2;t = 0.
2.2.6 Shock Processes
Table 2.1 shows all the exogenous shocks driving the economy. Our choice of
the stochastic processes is in line with previous papers modelling both the closed
economy (Smets and Wouters, 2003; 2007) and the open economy and the oil
sector (Bodenstein and Guerrieri, 2011; Bodenstein et al., 2012). However, in our
model we do not consider the exogenous shock to government spending.
Di¤erently from Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011), in the case of UK economy
we do not consider the interpretation of a government spending shock that captures
all the movements in GDP that are not explained by the other exogenous shocks
to be pertinent. Accordingly, we believe that the UK scal sector should be
modelled carefully considering UK oil revenues and their relationship with UK
public nances. Therefore, as we have a di¤erent goal in this paper, we prefer
to exclude the government sector and leave this topic for a detailed analysis in
Chapter 3.
As we can see from Table 2.1 we assume AR(2) processes for productivity, oil
supply, oil intensity and import preferences shocks of both domestic and foreign
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countries. Our decision is motivated by the fact that AR(1) estimates for some of
these shocks were non-stationary. In addition, whilst we consider di¤erent standard
deviation sizes of our stochastic shocks, we assume the same persistence parameters
for home and foreign shocks a¤ecting productivity, oil intensity, consumption and
import preferences.14
Shocks Stochastic Process
Home Prod. ln (Z1;t)=
 
1 + z1;1   z2;1

ln (Z1;t 1) z1;1 ln (Z1;t 2)+"z1;t
Foreign Prod. ln (Z2;t)=
 
1 + z1;2   z2;2

ln (Z2;t 1) z1;2 ln (Z2;t 2)+"z2;t
Home Oil Sup. ln
 
Y o1;t

=
 
1 + yo1;1   yo2;1

ln
 
Y o1;t 1
 yo1;1 ln  Y o1;t 2+"yo1;t
Foreign Oil Sup. ln
 
Y o2;t

=
 
1 + yo1;2   yo2;2

ln
 
Y o2;t 1
 yo1;2 ln  Y o2;t 2+"yo2;t
Home Oil Int. ln
 
Zo1;t

=
 
1 + zo1;1   zo2;1

ln
 
Zo1;t 1
 zo1;1 ln  Zo1;t 2+"zo1;t
Foreign Oil Int. ln
 
Zo2;t

=
 
1 + zo1;2   zo2;2

ln
 
Zo2;t 1
 zo1;2 ln  Zo2;t 2+"zo2;t
Home Cons. ln
 
Zc1;t

= zc1;1 ln
 
Zc1;t 1

+"c1;t
Foreign Cons. ln
 
Zc2;t

= zc1;2 ln
 
Zc2;t 1

+"c2;t
Home Imp. Pref. ln
 
Zm1;t

=
 
1 + zm1;1   zm2;1

ln
 
Zm1;t 1
 zm1;1 ln  Zm1;t 2+"zm1;t
Foreign Imp. Pref. ln
 
Zm2;t

=
 
1 + zm1;2   zm2;2

ln
 
Zm2;t 1
 zm1;2 ln  Zm2;t 2+"zm2;t
Home Inv. ln
 
Zi1;t

= zi1;1 ln
 
Zi1;t 1

+"i1;t
Home Price Mar. ^
p
1;t= 
p
1;1^
p
1;t 1+"
p
1;t
Home Wage Mar. ^
w
1;t= 
w
1;1^
w
1;t 1+"w1;t
Home In. Target core1;t = 

1;1
core
1;t 1+"

1;t
Table 2.1: Exogenous Shocks
2.3 Estimation
In order to estimate the model, we log-linearize the equations described previously
around their non-stochastic steady states.15 As estimation technique, we use the
Bayesian approach on data for the sample period 1990:Q1-2005:Q4. In what
14This assumption allows us to reduce the number of parameters that we are going to estimate.
As it is well known, in order to have accurate results, the Bayesian approach requires that the
number of estimated parameters is not too large.
15In Appendix B, we show the model equilibrium conditions and their log-linearized expressions
in detail.
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follows, we initially briey discuss the estimation methodology (Section 3.1). Then
we describe the data used in order to estimate the model (Section 3.2) and we
present the parameters of the model (Section 3.3). We move on to discuss the
estimation results (Section 3.4) and nally we compare the business cycle moments
implied by our estimated model with those obtained from actual data (Section 3.5).
2.3.1 Estimation Methodology
Our theoretical model is estimated with the Bayesian approach. The attractions of
this approach are by now well known in the economic literature. When successful,
it provides a full characterisation of the data generating process and allows for
proper specication testing. In particular, this approach allows us to formalise the
use of prior information coming either from micro-econometric studies or previous
macro-econometric studies and thereby makes an explicit link with the previous
calibration-based literature. It also, as a consequence, reveals the underlying
shocks (as indicated by the model). Thus, in order to estimate the parameters
of the DSGE model presented in Section 2 we proceed with the following steps.
First, we estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximising the log
posterior function, which combines the prior information on the parameters with
the likelihood of the data. In a second step, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is
used to get a complete picture of the posterior distribution and to evaluate the
marginal likelihood of the model.16
2.3.2 Data
AsMillard and Shakir (2013) argued, the choice of the sample period is particularly
important when we analyse the impact of oil shocks on the UK economy. Indeed,
the United Kingdom has transitioned from net oil importer in the 1970s to net
exporter in the 1980s and 1990s and returned oil importer again in the mid-
2000s. Accordingly, we estimate the UK economy in the time period it was an oil
16All the estimations are done with Dynare (http://www.cpremap.cnrs.fr/dynare).
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exporter.
Since there are fourteen exogenous shocks in the model, fourteen data series
are used in the estimation. In particular, we use data on UK and foreign GDP, UK
and foreign oil production, the real price of oil, the UK broad e¤ective exchange
rate, UK private consumption expenditure, UK total gross xed capital formation,
UK oil imports, UK non-oil goods imports, UK non-oil goods exports, UK core
ination, UK wage ination and the UK nominal interest rate.17
The series of real UK GDP is taken from ONS and expressed in logarithmic
terms. We consider foreign GDP as the log of aggregated foreign GDPs. In
particular, this series corresponds to GDP data from the OECD source for the
10 most important trading partners of the United Kingdom.18 These countries
account for about the 73% of UK imports and exports.
UK crude oil production is taken from the Monthly Energy Review of the
EIA and expressed in logarithmic terms. We compute the log of foreign crude oil
production as the world production net of UK production taken from the Monthly
Energy Review of the EIA. The series of oil price is taken from EIA and corresponds
to the Europe Brent spot oil price. We convert this series into Sterling, we deate
it by using the UK GDP deator and, nally, we express it in log terms. The UK
broad e¤ective exchange rate corresponds to the log of the quarterly average broad
e¤ective exchange rate as provided by the Bank of England.
The UK consumption expenditure and UK total gross xed capital formation
are taken from ONS and expressed as relative shares of UK GDP. We dene UK
oil imports as petroleum imports taken from International Energy Statistics of
EIA expressed as a share of UK GDP using the series of oil price described above.
We construct the series of UK non-oil goods imports as the di¤erence between the
UK total imports (taken from ONS) and UK oil imports as dened above. We
express this series as a share of UK GDP. In a similar way, we dene the UK share
17See Appendix B for a detailed description of data construction and sources for the observed
variables of the model.
18These countries are: the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India.
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of non-oil goods exports on GDP as the di¤erence between the UK total exports
(obtained from ONS) and UK oil exports. Instead of deating these variables by
their own relative deators, we consider them as share of GDP because our model
has multiple relative prices that are oil and import prices.
We measure the UK core ination as the log change in the consumer price
index of all items excluding food and energy goods. We take this series from the
FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) database and we seasonally adjust it.
The UK wage ination series is the log change in total compensation of employees
taken from ONS. Finally, we measure the UK nominal interest rate as the 3 month
Treasury Bills rate taken from the Bank of England.
2.3.3 Model Parameters
We decide to split the parameters of the model into three groups. In the rst group
we follow previous literature on DSGE models. The second group of parameters
determines the steady state of the model and, hence, average ratios. These
parameters are set so as to be consistent with observed data of both domestic
and foreign blocs for the sample period 1990-2005. The third group includes
endogenous parameters for the home country and is estimated with the Bayesian
technique.
Fixed Parameters. We assume that these parameters have the same values for
domestic and foreign blocs, holding them as xed when we estimate the model
(Table 2.2). In particular, we x the discount factor in order to have a steady
state real interest rate of 4% per year. As is common in the literature, we
assume a capital depreciation rate of 0.025. Moreover, we x the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to 1. We choose a value of 0.33 for LSS1 . The latter
parameter determines the ratio between hours worked and leisure in steady state.
Moreover, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
corresponds to 0.8. This value is slightly higher than the one found by micro level
estimates of the UK economy (see Barnes et al., 2008). We follow Bodenstein et
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al. (2011) and assume a value of 0.0001 for the parameter capturing the curvature
of the bond intermediation cost.
Parameter Value Description Motivation
1 0:99 Discount Factor Assumption
1 0:025 Depreciation Rate Assumption
1 1 IES Assumption
LSS1 0:33 Labour Steady State Assumption
b 0:0001 Bond Intermediation Cost Bodenstein et al. (2011)
v1  5 Determines K-L Elas. Sub. 1+
v
1
v1
= 0:8
Table 2.2: First Group of Parameter Values
Calibrated Parameters According to Observed Data. The UK parameters
are constructed taking data from the ONS Quarterly National Accounts, the ONS
Input - Output Analysis database and EIA International Energy Statistics. As
concerning the foreign bloc, we use the Loretan (2005) technique of trade weights
and we aggregate data from the main trading partners of UK. The observed data of
UK trading partners are taken from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts, IMF
International Financial Statistics, the NIPA Input - Output database, the Eurostat
Input - Output database and EIA International Energy Statistics.19 Once these
parameters are computed we hold them as xed in order to estimate the model20
(Table 2.3).
We start by describing data concerning the UK bloc. In the period 1997-2005,
the share of oil on gross output accounts for the 3.98%. Between 1992 and 2004,
78% of total oil demand comes from the production sector. For the period 1990-
2005, EIA statistics indicate that the UK is a net oil exporter. Indeed, the average
UK oil exports and oil imports are, respectively, 2.01 and 1.32 millions of barrels
19See Appendix B for a detailed description of the data used to construct the steady state
parameters for the UK and foreign bloc.
20See Appendix B for the full derivation of composite parameters.
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per day. In terms of GDP shares, UK oil exports and imports correspond to 1.16%
and 0.79%, respectively. In addition, during this period in the United Kingdom
crude oil production is 1.22 times higher than oil consumption.
Moreover, according to ONS data private investment, government spending
and non-oil imports as shares of GDP are, respectively, 15%, 24% and 26% in the
period 1990-2005. In this period, the UK total imports are divided into 77% of
consumption goods and 23% of services.
Combining these statistics we are able to compute the steady state parameters
of the home bloc. In particular, we nd that the parameter capturing the weight
of capital in the value added production function (!k1) is 0.43. The parameter
determining the importance of oil in production (!oy1 ) corresponds to 0.03, while
the weight of oil in consumption (!oc1 ) is equal to 0.01. The parameter measuring
the weight of consumption goods in total imports (!mc1 ) is 0.32, while the one
capturing the weight of services in total imports (!mi1 ) corresponds to 0.38.
Now we move on to focus on the foreign bloc. These parameters are particularly
important for two reasons. Firstly, in contrast to previous studies on the UK
economy, we obtain their values aggregating data series for a large set of foreign
countries. Secondly, they determine the structure and the weight of the foreign
bloc with respect to the UK economy. Therefore, the e¤ects of oil shocks on the
UK economy crucially depend on these parameters.
Due to data limitations, we are not able to consider oil shares in every single
country for the main UK trading partners. Thus, we decide to construct a proxy of
this parameter. Since UK imports/exports with the Euro Area and US account for
around 58% of the UK total trade, we take a weighted average of EU (2000-2008)
and US (1990-2005) oil shares on their respective GDPs. Accordingly, we obtain
that the overall oil share of the foreign economy is equal to 3.31%.
Using the procedure just described, we compute the quantity of oil demanded
by the foreign production sector as a weighted average of the Euro Area (2000-
2005) and the US (1998-2005) data. Accordingly, the oil demanded by the foreign
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production sector corresponds to 76% of total foreign oil demand.
Parameter Description Home Country Foreign Country
Capital Weight in Value Added !k1= 0:43 !
k
2= 0:56
Weight of Oil in Production !oy1 = 0:03 !
oy
2 = 0:03
Weight of Oil in Consumption !oc1 = 0:01 !
oc
2 = 0:01
Weight of Cons. in Tot. Imp. !mc1 = 0:32 !
mc
2 = 0:48
Weight of Services in Tot. Imp. !mi1 = 0:38 !
mi
2 = 0:39
Share of Oil Production
(Y o1 )
SS
(Y o1 )
SS
+(Y o2 )
SS= 0:06
(Y o2 )
SS
(Y o1 )
SS
+(Y o2 )
SS= 0:94
Share of Oil Consumption (O1)
SS
(O1)
SS+(O2)
SS= 0:03
(O2)
SS
(O1)
SS+(O2)
SS= 0:97
Population Size 1= 0:02 1= 0:98
Table 2.3: Second Group of Parameter Values
In order to obtain the value of foreign oil demand satised by foreign oil
production, we apply the Loretan (2005) technique21 of trade weights to the 13
most important UK trading partners. Thus, for the period 1990-2005, we nd that
the ratio between foreign oil production and consumption is equal to 0.66.
In regards to the foreign ratios of private investment and government spending
on GDP, we compute these shares for the 13 most important UK trading partners
(1990-2005). Thus, applying the Loretan (2005) technique of trade weights once
again, we nd that foreign investment and government spending shares on GDP
are equal to 19.9% and 19.5%, respectively. During the same period, foreign total
imports are divided into 79% for consumption goods and 21% for services.
From this set of statistics we compute the steady state values for the foreign
bloc. Specically, we obtain that the parameter indicating the weight of capital
in the value added production function (!k2) is equal to 0.56. The parameter
capturing the weight of oil in production (!oy2 ) equals 0.03, while the weight of
21For a detailed description of the Loretan (2005) technique and the procedure used to
construct these series see Appendix B.
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oil in consumption (!oc2 ) corresponds to 0.01. The parameter determining the
importance of consumption goods in total imports (!mc2 ) is 0.48, while the one
capturing the weight of services in total imports (!mi2 ) is equal to 0.39.
Table 2.3 also shows the steady state parameters concerning the relative shares
of oil production and consumption for both home and foreign blocs. As we
mentioned in the description of our theoretical model, these shares are particularly
important in order to analyse the dynamics of the oil sector. Thus, the share of
oil produced by the United Kingdom on world oil production corresponds to 6%,
while the ratio of oil consumed by the UK on world oil consumption is equal to
3%. Finally, from Table 2.3 we observe that the share of the UK population on
world population corresponds to 2%.
Priors of the Estimated Parameters using Bayesian Techniques. We
show our assumed priors for the endogenous parameters of the home country in
Table 2.4, whereas the assumed priors for the exogenous shocks are presented in
Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
Par. Description Distrib. Mean St. Dev.
1 Degree of Habit Persistence in Cons. Beta 0.70 0.05
 1 Investment Adjustment Cost Gamma 4.00 1.50
1 Labour Supply Elasticity

1
2

Gamma 25.00 0.75
w1 Calvo Wages Probability Beta 0.60 0.20
p1 Calvo Prices Probability Beta 0.60 0.20
w1 Degree of Wage Indexation Beta 0.20 0.08
p1 Degree of Price Indexation Beta 0.20 0.08
1 Taylor Rule Coe¢ cient on Ination Gamma 0.90 0.05
y1 Taylor Rule Coe¢ cient on Output Gamma 1.20 0.20
i1 Degree of Int. Rate Smoothing in T.R. Beta 0.50 0.20
1+o1
o1
Price Elasticity of Oil Demand Gamma 0.10 0.05
1+c1
c1
Sub. El. between Dom. and For. Goods Gamma 2.00 0.10
Table 2.4: Priors for the Third Group of Endogenous Parameters
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Generally, we chose our priors following the papers of Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2008) and Millard (2011). More specically, our priors for habit
in consumption (1) and investment adjustment costs ( 1) are the same as Del
Negro and Schorfheide (2008). The prior for the parameter determining labour
supply elasticity (1) is in line with Bodenstein et al. (2012).
As regards nominal rigidities, we assume Calvo probabilities (for both wages,
w1 , and prices, 
p
1) and indexation parameters (for both wages, 
w
1 , and prices, 
p
1)
that are similar to those of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008).
Autocorrelation Coe¢ cients Distribution Mean St. Dev.
UK Productivity: z1;1 Beta 0.300 0.005
UK Productivity: z2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Oil Supply: yo1;1 Beta 0.500 0.050
UK Oil Supply: yo2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
Foreign Oil Supply: yo1;2 Beta 0.700 0.050
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2;2 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Oil Intensity: zo1;1 Beta 0.500 0.050
UK Oil Intensity: zo2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0020
UK Consumption: zc1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Investment: zc1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Import Preferences: zm1;1 Beta 0.100 0.005
UK Import Preferences: zm2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Price Mark-up: p1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Wage Mark-up: w1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Ination Target: 1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
Table 2.5: Priors of Shock Processes: Persistence Parameters
Moreover, our priors for the coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule are set
up such that the nominal interest rate strongly responds to changes in output
gap (y1) and ination (

1 ). As is standard in the literature, the policy rate
smoothing parameter (i1) is beta distributed with a mean equal to 0.50 and
standard deviation equal to 0.20.
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In the last two rows of Table 2.4, we focus on the choice of the priors for
the price elasticity of oil demand (1+
o
1
o1
) and the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign non-oil goods (1+
c
1
c1
). As concerns the rst parameter, we
chose a prior mean value that is slightly lower than the one assumed by several
empirical studies on the US economy.22 As regards the prior of the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign non-oil goods, its mean value is in line
with typical estimates of UK aggregate data.23
Shock Standard Errors Distribution Mean St. Dev.
UK Productivity: z1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Productivity: z2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Oil Supply: yo1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Oil Intensity: zo1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Oil Intensity: zo2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Consumption: zc1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Consumption: zc2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Import Preferences: zm1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Import Preferences: zm2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Investment: zi1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Price Mark-up: p1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Wage Mark-up: w1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Ination Target: 1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Table 2.6: Priors of Shock Processes: Standard Errors
In general, we use beta distributions for the persistence parameters of the
several shocks (Table 2.5).
As regards AR(1) processes, we chose prior mean values of 0.70 and prior
standard deviations of 0.20. In regards to AR(2) processes, we assume prior values
implying that the productivity shock is more persistent than the import preferences
22See for example the papers of Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein et al. (2012).
23See for example Hooper et al. (2000).
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shock. In terms of oil intensity shock we assume that zo1;1 has a prior mean and
a standard deviation equal to 0.50 and 0.05, respectively, whereas zo1;2 has a prior
mean and a standard deviation equal to 0.0045 and 0.0020, respectively. We also
assume distinct prior values for UK and foreign oil supply shocks. In particular,
our prior values imply that the foreign oil supply shock is more persistent than
the domestic oil supply shock.
Finally, we use inverse gamma distributions for standard errors of exogenous
shocks with means equal to 0.01 and innite degrees of freedom (Table 2.6). We
chose these extremely loose priors as we have few strong priors and we wish to be
guided more strongly by the data.
2.3.4 Estimation Results
As is standard in the literature, before proceeding with the estimation procedure
we detrend our observed data.24 As we explained above, we estimate the mode
of the posterior distribution by maximising the log posterior function, which
combines the priors with the likelihood function given by the data. Finally, we
use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain the full posterior distribution.
Our sample includes 250,000 draws and we drop the rst 100,000 of them. Our
acceptation rate corresponds to 27%. In order to test the stability of the sample,
we use the Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostic, which compares within and
between moments of multiple chains. Table 2.7 shows the posterior modes and
means for the endogenous parameters with a 90% condence interval.25
In terms of estimation results, the posterior mean of consumption habit (1) is
well identied and corresponds to 0.90. This value is slightly higher than previous
estimates on UK data.26
24To do so we use the HP lter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1,600. Alternatively, we
estimated our model demeaning the series of UK core ination, wage ination and detrending
the remaining series. Comparing the estimated results of these two di¤erent specications we
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Par. Description Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
1 Cons. Habit 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.93
 1 Inv. Adj. Cost 6.86 6.83 4.58 9.18
1 Lab. Supply El.

1
2

24.89 25.10 23.88 26.34
w1 Calvo Wages Prob. 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.99
p1 Calvo Prices Prob. 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.90
w1 Degree of Wage Ind. 0.64 0.09 0.03 0.15
p1 Degree of Price Ind. 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.30
1 T. R. Coef. on Ination 0.88 0.59 0.45 0.72
y1 T. R. Coef. on Output 1.82 1.70 1.39 1.99
i1 Int. Rate Smoothing Par. 0.66 0.59 0.45 0.72
1+o1
o1
Oil Elasticity 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.09
1+c1
c1
Trade Elasticity 2.56 2.54 2.42 2.68
Table 2.7: Estimation Results of Endogenous Parameters
The estimated parameter of the investment adjustment cost ( 1) is well
identied and is higher than its prior mean. Our estimated value is much smaller
than the one found by DiCecio and Nelson (2007).27 The posterior mean estimate
of the parameter determining the elasticity of labour supply (1) is much higher
than values found by Harrison and Oomen (2010) and Millard (2011). This large
di¤erence is due to our theoretical framework that includes additional channels
a¤ecting real wages with respect to the standard small economy models (such
those in the papers of Harrison and Oomen, 2010, and Millard, 2011).
In terms of nominal rigidities, the posterior mean estimate of the Calvo wage
setting probability (w1 ) is higher than our prior assumption. Our results show that
the probability of optimally resetting nominal wages is around 0.01, meaning that
did not nd any particular di¤erence in the posterior estimates.
25In Appendix B we show all the prior and posterior density functions for the estimated
parameters.
26The estimated values found by Di Cecio and Nelson (2007), Harrison and Oomen (2010) and
Millard (2011) range between 0.42 and 0.78.
27DiCecio and Nelson (2007) argue that their "... estimates imply large investment adjustment
costs, mainly driven by the matching of the smoother investment responses after the initial
period". In addition, they state that: "the model does not match the apparent initial spike in
investment observed in the data".
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nominal wages are very sticky.28 As we can note from Table 2.7, the estimated
mean of the Calvo price setting probability (p1) is higher than its prior. This
implies that our Calvo readjustment probability is around 0.14. This compares to
the estimate of 0.10 for the probability of changing price in the non-energy sector
found by Millard (2011). Moreover, our posterior mean estimates show that the
indexation of wages to past ination (w1 ) is lower than the indexation of price to
past ination (p1). This result is broadly consistent with the ndings of Millard
(2011).29
Our estimates of the monetary policy reaction function show that the response
to the output gap (y1) is higher than the response to core ination (

1 ). In
particular, the mean estimate of the long run response to output gap (y1) is well
identied and is higher than its prior mean. On the contrary, the long run response
to core ination (1 ) is not well identied. Interestingly, the mean estimate of
the interest rate smoothing parameter (i1) is well identied and shows that the
nominal interest rate is highly autocorrelated.
As we can see from Table 2.7, the posterior mean estimate of the price elasticity
of oil demand corresponds to 0.05. This parameter is well identied and its
posterior mean estimate is in line with values of oil price elasticities found by
Dahl (1993) and Cooper (2003).30
Moreover, we estimate the posterior mean of the elasticity between domestic
and foreign non-oil goods is equal to 2.5. Our estimated result is higher than the
export price elasticity estimated by Hooper et al. (2000) for the UK economy.31
Turning to the shocks, Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the estimated posterior modes
28In general, our estimated value of w1 is higher than values found by previous studies on the
UK economy (see for example Harrison and Oomen, 2010).
29Millard (2011) nds that: "wage changes are hardly indexed to lagged wage ination, as
might be expected given the lack of formal indexation of wage bargains in the United Kingdom".
30Dahl (1993) provides a survey of oil demand elasticities for developing countries. He nds
that the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil is 0.07. Cooper (2003) estimates the
short-run price elasticity for crude oil demand of UK economy. He nds that it is equal to 0.068.
However, both these studies do not distinguish between oil demand and oil supply shocks.
31Hooper et al. (2000) estimated trade price elasticities for G-7 countries. They reported a
long run elasticity of 1.6 for the United Kingdom.
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and means of all the exogenous processes, together with a 90% condence interval.
Autocorr. Coe¢ cients Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
UK Productivity: z1;1 0.2997 0.2996 0.2912 0.3078
UK Productivity: z2;1 0.0114 0.0182 0.0046 0.0319
UK Oil Supply: yo1;1 0.4255 0.4300 0.3526 0.5038
UK Oil Supply: yo2;1 0.0004 0.0071 0.0001 0.0176
Foreign Oil Supply: yo1;2 0.6283 0.6356 0.5465 0.7229
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2;2 0.0008 0.0055 0.0001 0.0117
UK Oil Intensity: zo1;1 0.4078 0.4026 0.3285 0.4755
UK Oil Intensity: zo2;1 0.0034 0.0044 0.0012 0.0074
UK Consumption: zc1;1 0.4362 0.4653 0.2799 0.6503
UK Investment: zi1;1 0.2351 0.2672 0.1260 0.4129
UK Import Preferences: zm1;1 0.1012 0.1014 0.0932 0.1098
UK Import Preferences: zm2;1 0.0005 0.0026 0.0001 0.0054
UK Price Mark-up: p1;1 0.3133 0.2422 0.0548 0.4144
UK Wage Mark-up: w1;1 0.8789 0.7058 0.4156 0.9984
UK Ination Target: 1;1 0.9955 0.9954 0.9898 0.9999
Table 2.8: Estimation Results of Shock Processes: Persistence Parameters
In general, data appear to be very informative on most of the stochastic
processes for the exogenous disturbances. As concerns AR(1) processes, estimated
posterior means suggest that the ination target (1;1) shock appears to be the
most persistent followed by wage mark-up (w1;1), consumption (
zc
1;1), investment
(zi1;1) and price mark-up (
p
1;1) shocks. Considering the posterior mean estimates
of AR(2) non-oil processes, the productivity shock (whose coe¢ cients are z1;1 and
z2;1) is more persistent than the import preference shock (whose coe¢ cients are
zm1;1 and 
zm
2;1 ).
Focusing on the UK oil sector, our results suggest that the persistence of the
foreign oil production shock (whose coe¢ cients are yo1;2 and 
yo
2;2) is higher than
the UK oil production shock (whose coe¢ cients are yo1;1 and 
yo
2;1). Concerning
the oil intensity shock, the posterior mean estimate of zo1;2 is well identied and
corresponds to 0.40, whereas zo2;2 is not well identied and corresponds 0.0044.
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As we can observe from Table 2.9, posterior mean estimates indicate that UK
price markup shock (p1) appears to be the most volatile. Moreover, the posterior
mean estimate of UK productivity shock (z1) corresponds to 0.018. Considering
the posterior mean estimates of oil shocks volatilities, the standard error of UK
oil intensity (zo1 ) is the highest, followed by UK oil production (
yo
1 ), foreign oil
intensity (zo2 ), and foreign oil production (
yo
2 ), respectively.
Shock Standard Error Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
UK Productivity: z1 0.0170 0.0179 0.0143 0.0213
Foreign Productivity: z2 0.0632 0.0660 0.0546 0.0770
UK Oil Supply: yo1 0.0896 0.0902 0.0765 0.1033
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2 0.0120 0.0123 0.0104 0.0143
UK Oil Intensity: zo1 0.1359 0.1418 0.1188 0.1647
Foreign Oil Intensity: zo2 0.0761 0.0772 0.0656 0.0889
UK Consumption: zc1 0.0119 0.0126 0.0101 0.0151
Foreign Consumption: zc2 0.0933 0.0974 0.0827 0.1115
UK Import Preferences: zm1 0.0227 0.0233 0.0197 0.0269
Foreign Import Preferences: zm2 0.0521 0.0530 0.0453 0.0611
UK Investment: zi1 0.3495 0.3454 0.2158 0.4670
UK Price Mark-up: p1 1.1641 1.4703 0.6594 2.3154
UK Wage Mark-up: w1 0.0046 0.0076 0.0026 0.0128
UK Ination Target: 1 0.0043 0.0065 0.0037 0.0092
Table 2.9: Estimation Results of Shock Processes: Standard Errors
Variance Decomposition Analysis. Table 2.10 shows the importance of each
shock in terms of the variance of several endogenous variables. In particular, the
variance decomposition analysis is based on the simulation of the estimated model
(10,000 iterations).32 More specically, our strategy consists of two steps. As
rst step we run the model estimation and we obtain that the parameters and
the variance matrix of the shocks are set to the mode for the maximum likelihood
32Our simulation results are detrended using the HP lter with a smoothing parameter equal
to 1,600.
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estimation or posterior mode computation. As second step, we simulate the model
so that our simulation of the estimated model is based on the posterior modes of
the model.33
Oil UK UK UK For. UK UK Ov. UK
Price GDP Cons. Inv. GDP Head. Bal. Ex.
(real) (real) (GDP (GDP (real) In. (GDP Rate
share) share) share) (real)
H. Prod. 0 59 12 4 1 4 4 0
F. Prod. 5 2 0 3 72 8 4 1
H. Cons. 0 1 17 1 1 2 7 0
F. Cons. 3 4 35 14 17 7 62 1
H. Imp. 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 10
F. Imp. 0 7 2 1 2 13 3 85
H. Oil Sup. 0 8 2 0 0 0 3 0
F. Oil Sup. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H. Oil Int. 0 10 10 1 0 7 7 1
F. Oil Int. 90 4 14 32 5 8 3 2
H. Inv. 0 4 6 45 1 2 7 0
H. W. Mar. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H. P. Mar. 0 1 0 0 0 28 0 0
H. M. Pol. 0 0 0. 0 0 14 0 0
Table 2.10: Variance Decompositions (Percentage) - All Shocks
In general, domestic shocks do not contribute to the variation of oil price.
On the contrary, the foreign oil intensity shock explains most of the variance of
oil price (90%). As we can observe from the rst column of Table 2.10, foreign
productivity, foreign consumption preferences and foreign oil supply also contribute
to the variation of oil price.
33In general it is preferable to follow this approach because the exact distributions of the
posteriors are not known. Consequently, in the presence of irregular posteriors the mode is
preferred to the mean as a measure of the central tendency of the distribution.
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Interestingly, oil shocks inuence several other UK observed variables. In
particular, the sum of (domestic and foreign) oil shocks signicantly contribute
to variations of UK GDP, consumption, investment and headline ination equal.
The domestic productivity shock is the most important in explaining UK output,
accounting for 59% of GDP variation. Moreover, the foreign consumption shock
contributes substantially to the variation of UK consumption (35%) whereas
domestic investment shock explains most of the variance of UK investment (45%).
Turning to nominal variables, 41% of the variation of UK headline ination is
explained by the combination of price mark-up and ination target shocks, with
the combination of domestic and foreign preferences shocks accounting for the 20%.
The 62% of variation of total trade balance is explained by foreign consumption
preferences shock. The bulk of the variation of the UK broad e¤ective exchange
rate is explained by the foreign import preferences shock that accounts for 85%.
2.3.5 Business Cycle Moments
In order to evaluate the predictions of our estimated model we compare its
statistical moments with similar moments that summarise the actual experience
of the UK economy.
The business cycle statistics implied by our model are computed with same
procedure used to obtain the variance decomposition analysis.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 report summary statistics on HP cyclical components
(smoothing parameter equal to 1600) of key variables implied by our model and
actual data.
As we can see from Table 2.11, our model is able to reproduce the volatility of
most of the variables that we observe from actual data.
More specically, the real oil price is much more volatile than UK GDP. We
also observe higher volatility of domestic and foreign oil productions, real e¤ective
exchange rate and nominal interest rate with respect to GDP.
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Variable Model Data
UK GDP 1.00 1.00
UK Oil Production 6.50 7.58
Foreign Oil Production 1.17 1.74
UK Oil Imports (GDP Share) 0.53 0.16
Real Oil Price 21.88 20.95
UK Non-Oil Goods Imports (GDP Share) 0.63 0.93
UK Goods Exports (GDP Share) 0.73 0.78
UK Real Exchange Rate (qr.) 4.70 4.39
UK Consumption (GDP share) 0.82 0.48
UK Investment (GDP share) 0.64 0.64
UK Headline Ination 0.39 0.56
UK 3 Months Treasury Bills (qr.) 1.63 1.22
UK Wage Ination 0.26 0.07
Table 2.11: Observed Data and Model Implications - Relative St. Deviations to GDP
On the contrary, private consumption and gross xed capital formation display
almost half of the volatility of GDP. Considering wage ination, we observe that
it is much less volatile than gross domestic product.
Table 2.12 shows the coe¢ cients of autocorrelation for the same variables
described above. As we can observe from this table, the persistence generated
by the model is as high as in the observed data. In particular, the rst
order correlation for most of the macroeconomic aggregates is on the order of
0.9. Interestingly, in line with observed data, headline ination displays a low
persistence.
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Variable Model Data
UK GDP 0.82 0.96
UK Oil Production 0.86 0.85
Foreign Oil Production 0.91 0.93
UK Oil Imports (GDP Share) 0.88 0.81
Real Oil Price 0.96 0.84
UK Non-Oil Goods Imports (GDP Share) 0.84 0.90
UK Goods Exports (GDP Share) 0.89 0.94
UK Real Exchange Rate (qr.) 0.77 0.96
UK Consumption (GDP share) 0.89 0.92
UK Investment (GDP share) 0.88 0.89
UK Headline Ination 0.30 0.53
UK 3 Months Treasury Bills (qr.) 0.73 0.97
UK Wage Ination 0.90 0.57
Table 2.12: Observed Data and Model Implications - Autocorrelations
2.4 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, we show the results of impulse response functions (IRFs) for the
estimated model considering some of the exogenous shocks driving the economy.
In particular, we focus on the two shocks in the oil sector that most a¤ect oil
price variation, i.e. the foreign oil intensity shock and foreign oil supply shock.
Moreover, we consider the foreign technology shock that accounts for 5% oil price
change according to our variance decomposition analysis. In each gure we show
the IRFs following a temporary one-standard deviation change in the exogenous
shock. The signs of the shocks are chosen in order to induce a decrease in the price
of oil.34
34In Appendix B, we show the impulse responses for the standard domestic technology shock.
We believe that this case is not particularly relevant for the purposes of the present analysis.
Indeed, it is evident that general transmission mechanisms on the several variables are dominated
by the direct e¤ects of this shock rather than oil market considerations.
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2.4.1 Oil Shocks
We start by describing the IRFs for oil shocks. As we explained above, oil
price uctuations can derive from changes in oil intensity as well as oil supply.
Similarly, we consider the fact that the UK reacts di¤erently to oil price movements
that originate domestically rather than abroad. According to our variance
decomposition (Table 2.10), foreign oil shocks explain most of the oil price
volatility. In particular, the foreign intensity shock has a much higher contribution
than foreign oil supply shock in terms of UK oil price variation.
Foreign Oil Intensity. Figure 2.1 shows the e¤ects of a shock that increases
foreign oil intensity (Zo2;t). As we explained above, oil intensity can be dened
as the measure of the energy e¢ ciency of a nations economy. In turn, energy
e¢ ciency can be seen as the goal to reduce the amount of energy required to
provide products and services. Thus, energy e¢ ciency is related to better methods
of transportation, better use of building materials (for example: insulation),
better capacities of mass transit, energy rationing and conservation e¤orts. As
a consequence, shifts in oil e¢ ciency include changes to both consumption
behaviours and production processes. Accordingly, in a given country, a positive
oil intensity shock implies an improvement in its oil e¢ ciency and a reduction of
its oil demand.
As we can note from Graph (a), the persistence of this shock is very high and
resembles a unit root process. Accordingly, most of the variables react almost
permanently in response to the foreign oil intensity shock.
In particular, after a positive shock to oil intensity occurred abroad foreign oil
demand reduces and, in turn, the real price of oil in UK currency decreases (Graph
(a)). As we can see from Graph (b), the reduction of domestic oil price implies an
increase of UK oil demand.
In line with the results of Bodenstein et al. (2012) for the US economy,
we nd that the increase of oil used in production has e¤ects on output and
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domestic absorption (dened as the sum of domestic consumption and domestic
investment) similar to a persistent improvement in productivity, (Graphs (c) and
(i), respectively).35
However, on impact, actual output responds negatively to the shock (Graph
(c)). This result can be explained in two ways. Firstly, the presence of real rigidities
does not allow output and domestic absorption to adjust immediately after
the shock. Secondly, nominal rigidities prevent realized output from improving
immediately.
Evidently, monetary policy also inuences the response of actual output.
Indeed, the decrease of nominal interest (Graph (h)) contributes to improve
realized output. As a consequence, realized output expands more than potential
output over time. From Graph (j), we note that hours worked mirror the behaviour
of domestic output.
In contrast to the papers of Harrison et al. (2011) and Millard (2011), our
model explicitly considers the trade channel between the UK and the rest of the
world. In this regard, Graph (k) shows that the UK total balance worsens in
response to a positive shock in foreign oil intensity. This reduction is due to the
decrease of oil exports (Graph (k)) since the UK is a net oil exporter country.
From Graph (k) we note that non-oil trade balance does not change substantially
in response to the shock.
We dene the real exchange rate as the price of the foreign consumption
basket over the price of the domestic consumption basket in a common currency.
Therefore, the downward movement shown in Graph (l) means the appreciation
of UK Sterling Pound. Indeed, the positive e¤ect on the foreign economy induced
by an improvement of foreign oil intensity implies that the price of consumption
goods in the foreign country falls more substantially than the price of consumption
goods in the UK.36 This result contrasts with the qualitative predictions of previous
35Note that Bodenstein et al. (2012) assume a negative shock to foreign oil intensity which
induces persistent falls in both output and domestic absorption.
36In this regard, our model assumes that the oil intensity shock enters directly in the production
function of the nal consumption goods (see equation B24 in Appendix B).
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studies on the UK economy such as Hall et al. (1986) and Young(2000).
Figure 2.1: IRFs, Positive Foreign Oil Intensity Shock
Now we come to focus on the ination dynamics. Graph (g) displays the
IRFs for domestic goods ination and marginal cost. Considering domestic goods
ination, the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve provides a useful tool to
understand the transmission mechanisms of oil price movements. For simplicity,
we set up the parameter governing lagged indexation, p1, equal to zero and we
abstract from the mark-up. Thus, we can express domestic ination, ^d1;t, as:
^d1;t =
1X
s=0
s1
(1  1p1) (1  p1)
p1
Etmc^1;t+1 (2.33)
In words, the rst order approximation of current ination can be thought of as
the discounted sum of current and expected marginal cost of production. In our
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case the marginal cost depends on oil as an additional factor input and can be
expressed as:
mc^1;t = !
oy
1
0@" P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
 mp^o1;t
1A+ !vy1 k1  r^k1;t  mp^k1;t (2.34)
+!vy1
 
1  k1

(w^1;t  mp^l1;t)
where mp^o1;t, mp^k1;t, and mp^l1;t are the marginal products of oil, capital and
labour respectively. Thus, domestic ination depends on these gaps between the
rental rates and the marginal products of each input. When nominal rigidities are
absent, these gaps are zero and real marginal cost is constant. On the contrary,
with nominal rigidities these gaps can be large.
The positive foreign oil intensity shock induces an increase of oil input and
causes a decrease of its marginal product (Graph (e)). The real rental rate of oil
decreases as well. From Graph (e) we note that the gap between the rental rate
and marginal product of oil does not contribute substantially to the decrease in
the marginal cost. Since rms expand their demands for cheaper oil, they decrease
the relative demands for other factor inputs. As we can note from Graph (f)
there is a persistent negative gap between real wage and labour marginal product.
Similarly, we note a signicant negative di¤erence between capital rental rate and
capital marginal product (Graph (d)). These two persistent negative gaps are the
key contributors to the decrease of marginal cost and, in turn, domestic ination
(Graph (g)).
Interestingly, contrary to the results of Anderton and Barrell (1995) and Barrell
et al. (2011a), we nd that the response of UK wage ination to the fall in the oil
price is close to zero for the entire period considered (Graph (h)).37
Finally, in line with the ndings of Millard (2011), Graph (h) shows that UK
core ination decreases inducing the UK Central Bank to loosen its monetary
37In particular, Anderton and Barrell (1995) and Barrell et al. (2011a) found that an increase
in the oil price induces a rise in wage ination.
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policy.38
Foreign Oil Supply Shock. Figure 2.2 displays the responses of the UK
economy to a positive oil supply shock occurring abroad (Y o2;t). In general, the
e¤ects of this shock are similar to those for foreign oil intensity shock. The only
di¤erence between these two shocks is in terms of the magnitude of the e¤ects.
Indeed, our estimated results (Table 2.9) indicate that the foreign oil intensity
shock has higher volatility than the foreign oil supply shock. Thus, the nal
e¤ects of the foreign oil supply shock are smaller than those following the foreign
oil intensity shock.
As we can note from Graph (a), the foreign oil supply shock is very similar
to a stationary process and the return to the steady state happens beyond the
horizons shown in the gure. In particular, the resulting persistent decrease of oil
price (Graph (a)) leads to an increase in domestic oil demand (Graph (b)).
The responses of output (Graph (c)) and domestic absorption (Graph (h)) are
similar to those occurring after a positive productivity shock. This result conrms
the ndings of Bodenstein et al. (2011) for the US economy.39
In particular, Graph (c) shows that the initial increase in actual output is
lower than potential output. This e¤ect is caused by the presence of both real
and nominal rigidities. However, in the long run, loose monetary policy induces
a more rapid expansion of actual output compared with potential. Moreover, the
responses of hours worked mimic those of domestic output (Graph (j)).
Focusing on trade, we observe that the UK oil balance worsens inducing a fall
in domestic total balance (Graph (k)). Moreover, Graph (k) shows that the UK
non-oil trade balance remains close to zero for all the horizons considered. This
result is line with the nding of the previous section and extends the previous
literature (see, for example, Harrison et al., 2011; Millard, 2011) by showing that
38More specically, Millard (2011) nds that a positive world oil price shock induces a rise in
the nominal interest rate.
39In particular, Bodenstein et al. (2011) nd that a negative shock foreign oil supply reduces
both US output and domestic absorption.
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a fall in the oil price adversely a¤ects the UK trade sector because the UK is a net
oil exporter country.
FromGraph (l), we observe that UK real e¤ective exchange rate has a U-shaped
response to the shock. In particular, it appreciates from quarter four to quarter
six. However, from the seventh quarter onwards British Sterling Pound depreciates
vis-à-vis with foreign currency. Di¤erently from the foreign oil intensity shock, a
positive shock to foreign oil supply implies that the fall in the price of domestic
consumption goods is larger than the one in foreign consumption goods. As a
consequence, the UK currency depreciates. This result is line with the standard
predictions of previous studies on the UK economy (such as Powell and Horton,
1985; Hall et al., 1986 and Young, 2000) relying on the fact that the fall in oil
price induces the depreciation of the currency in the net oil exporter country.
Figure 2.2: IRFs, Positive Foreign Oil Supply Shock
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Considering ination dynamics, Graph (g) shows the negative response of rms
marginal cost that causes a fall in domestic goods ination. As we described above,
the drop in the domestic marginal cost depends on the negative gaps between the
rental rates and the marginal products of each production factor (Graphs (d), (e)
and (f)).
As we can observe from Graph (h), the decrease in UK core ination is
immediately followed by the reduction of the nominal interest rate. Accordingly, in
line with the results of Millard (2011), we nd the drop of the oil price in response
to this shock induces the Bank of England to reduce its policy rate.
As for the case of the shock to foreign oil intensity, UK wage ination does not
react signicantly (Graph (h)). Again, this response contrasts with the ndings of
existing papers analysing the UK economy (such as Anderton and Barrell, 1995;
Barrell et al., 2011a).
2.4.2 Foreign Technology Shock
Our analysis of the model variance decomposition suggested that the foreign
technology shock signicantly a¤ects the variation of the UK oil price (see
Table 2.10). Hence, it is important to understand the behaviour of the main
macroeconomic variables after this shock through our IRFs analysis. Thus, Figure
2.3 shows a negative shock to foreign technology (Z2;t).
Contrary to the ndings of Bodenstein et al. (2011), our results show that
oil market transmission channels prevail on the standard e¤ects of the foreign
technology shock. In particular, the negative shock to foreign productivity causes
the fall in foreign oil demand pushing down UK oil price (Graph (a)). As a
consequence of less expensive oil, domestic households and rms increase their
demand for this input (Graph (b)).
Since this shock is very persistent the e¤ects on the several UK macroeconomic
variables last for a long time period.
In line with the results of Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011), we nd that
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domestic output increases immediately in response to the shock and remains
positive for all the quarters considered (Graph (c)).40 In particular, potential
output displays a stronger initial increase than actual output.
As in Bodenstein et al. (2011), we nd that domestic absorption positively
responds to the fall in foreign technology (Graph (i)).41 Moreover, from Graph (j)
we note that the response of actual and potential hours worked mirrors the patters
of actual and potential outputs.
Figure 2.3: IRFs, Negative Foreign Technology Shock
Focusing on international relative prices (Graph (l)), we note that the UK
real e¤ective exchange rate depreciates. Indeed, in response to the negative
40Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) nd a negative response of US GDP in response to a foreign
technology shock that causes an increase in the oil price.
41According to Bodenstein et al. (2011) an increase in the oil price induces a fall in US domestic
absorption.
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productivity shock that occurred abroad the relative price of imported goods with
respect to domestic goods increases. This result is broadly in line with the ndings
of Powell and Horton (1985), Hall et al. (1986) and Young (2000).
Although Sterling depreciates, we observe the deterioration of the domestic
non-oil trade balance (Graph (k)). That can be explained by the strong
consumption habits of domestic households. In particular, domestic households
dislike changes in the composition of the consumption basket. Therefore, the
increase in the price of imported goods does not a¤ect substantially the demand
for these goods. As a consequence, the value of imports increases more than the
value of exports and we observe a decit in the non-oil goods balance. Similarly,
oil trade balance decreases because UK net oil exports reduce. The nal e¤ect is
a large fall in the UK total trade balance (Graph (k)).
In general, these ndings complement the existing literature by showing specic
transmission channels of oil shocks that were missing in previous studies on the
UK economy (see, for example, Harrison et al., 2011; Millard, 2011).
Turning to the ination dynamics, we note a decrease of marginal cost and
domestic goods ination (Graph (g)). As explained above, domestic marginal cost
depends on the gaps between rental rates and marginal products of each production
input. As we can see from Graph (d) and (f), the largest negative gaps correspond
to labour and capital inputs.
Interestingly, on the shock impact UK core ination expands due to the spike
in import prices (Graph (g)). However, after four quarters it turns to be negative.
Although the immediate response of the nominal interest rate is positive, after six
quarters it turns to be negative (Graph (h)).
Finally, contrary to the results of Anderton and Barrell (1995) and Barrell et
al. (2011a), we note that the reaction of wage ination is negligible compared to
core ination (Graph (h)).
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2.5 Using the Model to Decompose Movements in Output
and Ination
The major motivation for estimating this model is to analyse the e¤ects of
movements in oil prices on the UK economy. In this section we will focus on the
main drivers of domestic output and ination during the sample period 1990-2005.
Given that estimation produces time series for the shocks, it possible to
decompose movements in output and ination into those fractions caused by each
of the shocks.
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show the estimated series for the exogenous shocks of the
model.
Figure 2.4: Exogenous Shocks (1)
As we can observe from these gures, home price mark-up, home investment,
home oil intensity, foreign oil intensity, home oil supply and foreign consumption
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preferences show high volatilities over this period.
Figure 2.5: Exogenous Shocks (2)
To investigate further which shocks have been driving the UK economy over
this sample period, Figure 2.6 shows the historical decomposition of UK GDP
into the portions caused by each of the shocks. We can observe that major UK
GDP expansions have occurred during the quarters 1990:Q1-1990:Q2 and 2000:Q1-
2000:Q4 whereas most severe recessions happened during the quarters 1990:Q3-
1992:Q3 and 1999:Q1-1999:Q3. In what follows we analyse in detail each of these
episodes. In general, oil prices have considerable e¤ects on GDP and ination.
In particular, from Figure 2.6, we can see that during the period 1990:Q1-
1990:Q2 the economy has been a¤ected by a large positive shock to domestic
productivity. As reported in the OECDEconomic Surveys (1991), the UK economy
started to expand in early 1987 and continued to grow until mid-1990.
According to the OECD Economic Surveys (1991), the UK GDP expansion
was the result of structural reforms which raised productivity and also led
to strong private sector condence. In the same period, the UK economy
experienced a strong expansion of its domestic demand occurred mainly because
of the unprecedented upsurge in private investment due to the nancial-market
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liberalisation which enabled households and companies to borrow much more freely
than ever before.42
Figure 2.6: Shock Decomposition for UK GDP
Figure 2.6 also shows that during the period 2000:Q1-2000:Q4 two main
positive shocks occurred to both domestic productivity and domestic investment.
Firstly, the positive productivity shock reected the outcomes deriving from
structural reforms undertaken by UK government in order to enhance productivity
so as to boost total labour supply. As observed by the OECD Economic Surveys
(2000), during this period, the UK productivity beneted from positive e¤ects
of social sphere reforms aimed at lifting people out of poverty and alleviating
exclusion. Secondly, the positive investment shock was associated with the boom
42For a careful description of the causes of this increase in the UK aggregate demand see the
OECD Economic Surveys (1991).
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of business investment registered in UK in that period. Indeed, the ratio between
business investment and GDP achieved the highest level since at least the mid
1960s.
Interestingly, oil shocks were the major drivers of two recessions experienced by
UK economy during this period. In particular, Figure 2.6 shows that during the
period 1990:Q3-1992:Q3 the economy was a¤ected by negative shocks to foreign oil
supply, foreign oil intensity and foreign import preferences. As we have described
in Chapter 1, during this period there was a large increase in oil-market specic
demand that caused a sharp increase in oil price. Indeed, precautionary demand for
oil increased in response to expected shortfalls in oil supply due to Iraqs invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. The latter episode also caused a small physical disruption
in oil supply. In addition, the Gulf conict increased private sector uncertainty
inducing a drop in the UK trade sector.43
Moreover, from Figure 2.6, we can see that during the period 1999:Q1-1999:Q3
a large negative shock to foreign oil intensity caused the immediate increase in
UK oil price implying a fall of domestic output. As we have shown in Chapter 1,
even in this case the increase of precautionary demand for oil was the main cause
of the oil price surge. Contemporaneously, UK economy experienced negative
shocks to domestic investment and foreign consumption preferences. The former
shock reected the fall of investment in the manufacturing sector as reported by
the OECD Economic Surveys (2000). The negative shock to foreign consumption
preferences can be explained by the strong appreciation of the pound during that
period.44
Turning to ination, Figure 2.7 suggests that oil intensity and oil supply shocks
were pushing up oil price in the second half of 1990 in correspondence with the
Kuwait Invasion. As a consequence, headline ination increased substantially in
that period. Domestic and foreign and import preferences shocks also contributed
43See the OECD Economic Surveys (1991) for a more detailed explanation of the negative
e¤ects on UK trade sector caused by the Gulf war.
44See the OECD Economic Surveys (2000) for a detailed description of the pattern of the UK
real e¤ective exchange rate during this period.
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to the rise of headline ination.
On the contrary, the relatively low oil price in 1993 pushed down headline
ination. As we have shown in Chapter 1, during that period there were negative
shocks to both aggregate and oil market-specic demands that caused a decrease
in oil price. Consistently with this nding, our model shows that the negative
foreign oil intensity shock was the main cause of the decrease in headline ination.
Figure 2.7: Shock Decomposition for UK Headline Ination
2.6 Conclusion
Hitherto, economists have used global DSGE models to analyse largely the US
and the EU economies. In this chapter, we construct a global model capturing
the 73% of the UKs export markets. In this framework, we are able to model the
endogenous formation of oil prices and analyse how vulnerable the UK economy
has been to variations in the oil price.
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In particular, we analyse a period in which the UK was a net oil exporter
and where, otherwise, the domestic economic environment was relatively stable
(no nominal regime changes). Our results indicate that movements of the UK oil
price occur mainly for 2 reasons: rstly, changes in global oil demand (foreign
oil intensity shock and foreign productivity shock); secondly, changes in global oil
supply (foreign oil supply shock).
Moreover, our ndings show that the main consequences of oil price decreases
on the UK economy are the following. Negative oil price shocks push down the
costs of rms using oil as production input. These shocks tend to increase prots,
stimulating employment and thus real GDP. Moreover, negative oil price shocks
translate to lower retail prices. This improves real incomes and therefore stimulates
consumer spending. Our impulse response analysis also shows that UK Central
Bank decreases its policy rate in response to the reduction of domestic ination.
We also nd a negligible response of the wage ination to oil price shocks.
In regards to the external sector, the UK total trade balance worsens after
negative oil shocks since UK net oil exports reduce. Moreover, British Sterling
appreciates against other currencies in the presence of a positive foreign oil
intensity shock while the opposite occurs after a positive oil supply shock and
a negative foreign technology shock.
These ndings contrast with the existing analysis of the UK economy over this
period. We would highlight, in particular, that the response of the UK exchange
rate to oil price uctuations depends on the specic source of the oil price shock.
Moreover, contrary to the papers of Harrison et al. (2011) and Millard (2011), our
model explicitly considers the trade channel between the UK and the rest of the
world. Therefore, we nd that the worsening of the UK trade balance in response
to a drop in the oil price depends on the fact that the UK was a net oil exporter
for the period considered.
Interestingly, our results di¤er from those found by Anderton and Barrell (1995)
and Barrell et al. (2011a), showing that wage ination is not signicantly a¤ected
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by oil price changes. Finally, the ndings of our historical decomposition analysis
complement existing literature by showing that episodes of sustained increase of oil
price contributed to UK GDP recessions and caused spikes of domestic ination.
The model presented in this paper provides a clear understanding of the
impact of oil price movements and changes in the global oil market structure
on the UK economy. However, our theoretical framework does not include the
government sector. In particular, the latter is expected to play an important
role in response to oil price changes especially in a oil producer country such as
United Kingdom. Therefore, in the next chapter we extend the present theoretical
framework modelling the UK scal sector in detail. Accordingly, our objective will
concern the development of an open economy DSGE model in order to assess the
scal policy responses to oil price uctuations in the UK economy.
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B Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 Model Solution
This appendix shows the non-linearized and linearized versions of the key
optimality and market clearing conditions used in our analysis of the models
equilibrium dynamics. Here, we focus on the endogenous variables of the model
whereas the stochastic processes and the relative exogenous variables are reported
in Table 2.1. We denote by small letters with hat, x^i;t, the log-deviation of a given
variable, X1;t, from its steady state value, while (X1)
SS stands for its steady state
value.
B.1.1 Country-Specic Relations
In what follows we derive the relations for the domestic country assuming that the
same conditions apply to the foreign country because the model is symmetric.
Representative Household Maximization Problem. The representative
household solves the following intertemporal problem:
Et
( 1X
j=0
j1
"
1
1 1
 
Zc1;tC1;t+j   1C1;t+j 1
1 1 +
1
1 1 (1  L1;t+j)
1 1
#)
(B1)
subject to the budget constraint:
P c1;tC1;t + P
i
1;tI1;t +
e1;tP
b
2;tB1;t
b1;t
+
Z
S
P d1;t;t+1D1;t;t+1 (h) D1;t 1;t (B2)
= W1;tL1;t +R
k
1;tK1;t 1 +  1;t + P
o
1;tY
o
1;t + e1;tB1;t 1
and the capital accumulation equation:
K1;t = (1  1)K1;t 1 +
 
1  S

I1;t
I1;t 1
2!
Zi1;tI1;t (B3)
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The rst order condition for C1;t is:
 
Zc1;tC1;t   1C1;t 1
 1
Zc1;t = 
q
1;t
P c1;t
P d1;t
(B4)
where:
q1;t = 
c
1;tP
d
1;t
and c1;t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the representative household
budget constraint. The linearized equation is given by:
1
1  1
 
c^1;t + z^
c
1;t

=
1
1  1 c^1;t 1 + z^
c
1;t   ^
q
1;t  
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(B5)
The rst order condition for L1;t is:
(1  L1;t) 1 = q1;twf1;t
where:
wf1;t =
W f1;t
P d1;t
(B6)
that is wf1;t is the desired real wage expressed in terms of P
d
1;t. The linearized
equation is given by:
w^f1;t =
(L1)
SS
1  (L1)SS
1l^1;t   ^
q
1;t (B7)
Labour Supply Decision. If wages are exible:
w^1;t = w^
f
1;t +
(w1 )
SS
1 + (w1 )
SS
^
w
1;t (B8)
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If wages are sticky, the labour union solves the following maximization problem:
max
fW1;t(h)g
Et
1X
j=0
(w1 )
j  1;t;t+j
"
!l1;t;;jW1;t (h)L1;t+j (h) 
W f1;t+jL1;t+j (h)
#
(B9)
s:t : L1;t (h) =

W1;t (h)
W1;t
  1+w1;t
w1;t
Ld1;t (B10)
and : !l1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n
(!1;t 1+s)
w1
 
SS1
1 w1 o (B11)
the rst order condition is given by:
Et
1X
j=0
w1;t+j
24 W1;t(h)W1;t 1w1;t+j 
W f1;t+j
P d1;t+j
P d1;t+j
W1;t+j

W1;t!l1;t;j
W1;t+j
 1
1+w1;t+j
w1;t+j
35 = 0 (B12)
where:
w1;t+j = (
w
1 )
j  1;t;t+jL1;t+j (h)!
l
1;t;j
The linearized equation is given by:
1
SS1
(!^1;t   w1 !^1;t 1) 
1
SS1
(!^1;t+1   w1 !^1;t) (B13)
=
(1  w1 1) (1  w1 )
w1
 
w^f1;t+j   w^1;t+j +
(w1 )
SS
1 + (w1 )
SS
^
w
1;t
!
where:
1
SS1
(!^1;t   w1 !^1;t 1) = !^1;t   w1 !^1;t 1
The wage ination is:
!1;t = log

W1;t
W1;t 1

(B14)
the linearized equation is given by:
!^1;t = w^1;t   w^1;t 1 + ^d1;t (B15)
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Capital Accumulation. The representative household solves the following
intertemporal problem:
Et
( 1X
j=0
j1
"
1
1 1
 
Zc1;tC1;t+j   1C1;t+j 1
1 1 +
1
1 1 (1  L1;t+j)
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#)
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subject to the budget constraint:
P c1;tC1;t + P
i
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e1;tP
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+ (B17)Z
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o
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o
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and the capital accumulation equation:
K1;t = (1  1)K1;t 1 +
 
1  S

I1;t
I1;t 1
2!
Zi1;tI1;t (B18)
The rst order condition for I1;t is:
0 = 1  q1;tZi1;t
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1  1
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
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  1
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
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i
1
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I1;t
  1

I1;t+1
(I1;t)
2
where:
q1;t =
Q1;t
P i1;t
c
1;t
and Q1;t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital accumulation
equation. The linearized equation is given by:
q^1;t = '
i
1 (^{1;t   {^1;t 1)  'i11 (^{1;t+1   {^1;t)  z^i1;t (B20)
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The rst order condition for K1;t is:
q1;t = 1
q1;t+1
q1;t
P d1;t
P i1;t
Rk1;t+1
P d1;t+1
(B21)
+1 (1  1) q1;t+1
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P d1;t+1
P d1;t
P i1;t
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The linearized equation is given by:
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q
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q
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P^ i
P^ d
#
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1A (B22)
+(1  11)
0@q^1;t+1 " P^ i
P^ d
#
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 
"
P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
1A
The linearized capital accumulation equation is:
k^1;t = (1  1) k^1;t 1 + 1
 
z^i1;t + {^1;t

(B23)
Firms - Production of Consumption Goods. The consumption basket
equation is:
C1;t =

(!cc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Cne1;t
 1
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the linearized equation is given by:
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1 c^
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1
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o
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(B25)
The non-oil consumption aggregate equation is:
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 
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 1
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the linearized equation is given by:
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1c^
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The rst order condition for Cd1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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The rst order condition for M c1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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The rst order condition for Oc1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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Firms - Production of Investment Goods. The investment basket equation
is:
I1;t =
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 c1
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the linearized equation is given by:
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The rst order condition for Id1;t in the investment basket equation is:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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The rst order condition for M i1;t in the investment basket equation is:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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Firms - Production of Domestic Intermediate Goods. The value added
aggregate production function is:
V1;t (i) =
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the linearized equation is given by:
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and:
k1 + 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The gross output aggregate production function is:
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the linearized equation is given by:
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The rst order condition for K1;t 1 in the output aggregator:
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the linearized equation is given by:
rk1;t = mc^1;t +
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t)  
v
1
1 + v1

v^1;t   k^1;t 1

(B47)
The rst order condition for L1;t in the output aggregator:
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the linearized equation is given by:
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The rst order condition for Oy1;t in the output aggregator:
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the linearized equation is given by:"
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Evolution of the Marginal Cost. If prices are exible:
MC1;t
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=
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the linearized equation is given by:
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If prices are sticky, the prot maximization problem of rms that are allowed to
reoptimize their prices at time t can be expressed as:
max
fP d1;t(i)g
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the rst order condition is given by:
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The linearized equation is given by:
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Remaining Relations. The market clearing condition for the domestic non-oil
goods market is:
Y d1;t = C
d
1;t + I
d
1;t +X1;t (B61)
the linearized equation is given by:
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SS 
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The oil demand equation is:
O1;t = O
y
1;t +O
c
1;t (B63)
the linearized equation is given by:
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The nominal interest rate is:
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The relative linearized equation is given by:
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Thus the real interest rate is:
r^rs1;t = r^
s
1;t   ^d1;t+1 =  

^
q
1;t+1   ^
q
1;t

(B67)
The Taylor rule is:
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
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where:
i1;t = R
s
1;t   1 (B69)
the linearized equation is given by:
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The core price level P ne1;t is given by:
P ne1;t = P
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the linearized expression is given by:"
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As we can note from expression (B72) the shock to oil intensity enters since it
a¤ects the headline price P^ c1;t.
The ination of domestic prices is given by:
d1;t = log
 
P d1;t
P d1;t 1
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(B73)
the linearized equation is given by:
^d1;t = p^
d
1;t   p^d1;t 1 (B74)
The ination of core prices is given by:
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(B75)
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the linearized equation is given by:
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The ination of headline prices is given by:
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the linearized equation is given by:
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The equation for aggregate imports is given by:
M1;t =
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the linearized expression is given by:
m^1;t =
(M c1)
SS
(M1)
SS
0@" P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
+ m^c1;t
1A+ (M i1)SS
(M1)
SS
0@" P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
+ m^i1;t
1A (B80)
because relative prices are assumed to be 1 in the steady state.
The equation for aggregate exports is given by:
X1;t =
2
1
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(B81)
because country 1 real per capita exports, X1;t, and country 2 real per capita
imports, M2;t, are related by the relative population weight,
2
1
.
The linearized expression is given by:
x^1;t =
(M c2)
SS
(M c2)
SS + (M i2)
SS
m^c2;t +
(M i2)
SS
(M c2)
SS + (M i2)
SS
m^i2;t (B82)
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The ratio between total trade balance and gross output is given by:
T bal1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
=
X1;t  M1;t + P
o
1;t
P d1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

Y d1;t
(B83)
the linearized equation is given by:
t^bal1;t =
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS x^1;t   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS m^1;t + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS y^o1;t (B84)
  (P
o
1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS o^1;t   (P o1 )
SS
h
(O1)
SS   (Y o1 )SS
i
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
The ratio between non-oil goods trade balance and gross output is given by:
Gbal1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
=
X1;t  M1;t
Y d1;t
(B85)
the linearized equation is given by:
g^bal1;t =
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS x^1;t   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS m^1;t +
"
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS
#
y^d1;t (B86)
B.1.2 Bilateral Relations
For country 1, the relative import prices can be expressed as follows:
Pm1;t
P d1;t
=
e1;tP
c
2;t
P c1;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P c1;t
P d1;t
(B87)
where e1;t is the nominal exchange rate. Considering that the consumption real
exchange rate is:
rer1;t =
e1;tP
c
2;t
P c1;t
(B88)
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the linearized expression for (B87) is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
= re^r1;t  
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(B89)
For country 2, the linearized expression for the relative import prices is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
2;t
=  re^r1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(B90)
The uncovered interest rate parity condition is:
q2;t+1
q2;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P c2;t+1
P d2;t+1
= b1;t
rer1;t+1
rer1;t
q1;t+1
q1;t
P d1;t
P c1;t
P c1;t+1
P d1;t+1
(B91)
the linearized equation is given by:
^
q
2;t+1   ^
q
2;t

=

^
q
1;t+1   ^
q
1;t

+ b1b^
f
1;t + re^r1;t+1   re^r1;t (B92)
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t+1
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t+1
The net foreign asset condition is:
e1;t
 
P b2;t
 1
B1;t
b1;t
= e1;tB1;t 1 +
2
1
e1;tP
m
2;t
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(B93)
 Pm1;t
 
M c1;t +M
i
1;t

+ P o1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

the linearized equation is given by:
1b^1;t = b^1;t 1 + t^
bal
1;t (B94)
where:
b^1;t =
e1;tB1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
(B95)
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The oil market clearing condition is:
Y o1;t +
2
1
Y o2;t = O1;t +
2
1
O2;t (B96)
the linearized equation is given by:
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
y^o1;t +
(Y o2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
y^o2;t (B97)
=
1
2
(O1)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
o^1;t +
(O2)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
o^2;t
The law of one price for oil is:
P o1;t
P d1;t
= rer1;t
P c1;t
P d1;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P o2;t
P d2;t
(B98)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
= re^r1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
2;t
(B99)
B.1.3 Important Denitions
The denition of GDP1;t using Laspeyres index is:
GDP1;t = GDP1;t 1
P d1;t 1Y1;t   P o1;t 1Oy1;t + P o1;t 1Y o1;t
P d1;t 1Y1;t 1   P o1;t 1Oy1;t 1 + P o1;t 1Y o1;t 1
(B100)
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the linearized equation is given by: 
1  (P
o
1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
!
(B101)
gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1

  (y^1;t   y^1;t 1)
=  
 
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
! 
o^y1;t   o^y1;t 1

+
 
(P o1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
! 
y^o1;t   y^o1;t 1

The ratio between nominal GDP and nominal gross output is:
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
= 1  P
o
1;tO
y
1;t
P d1;tY1;t
+
P o1;tY
o
1;t
P d1;tY1;t
(B102)
the linearized equation is given by:
(NGDP1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
(B103)
=
 
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS   (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
!0@y^1;t   " P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
1A
  (P
o
1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS o^y1;t + (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS y^o1;t
The equation for the oil price deated by the GDP deator is:
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
PGDP1;t
P o1;t 1
=
P o1;t
P d1;t
P d1;t 1
P o1;t 1
NGDP1;t 1
P d1;t 1Y1;t 1
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
GDP1;t
GDP1;t 1
Y1;t 1
Y1;t
(B104)
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the linearized equation is given by:
log
 
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
obs!
  log
 
P o1;t 1
PGDP1;t 1
obs!
(B105)
=  
0@"NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
 
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t 1
1A  (y^1;t   y^1;t 1)
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t 1
+ gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1
The ratio between the total trade balance and nominal GDP is:
T bal1;t
NGDP1;t
=
T bal1;t
P d1;tY1;t
P d1;tY1;t
NGDP1;t
(B106)
the linearized equation is given by:"
T^ bal
NGD^P
#
1;t
=
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
t^bal1;t (B107)
The ratio between the non-oil goods trade balance and nominal GDP is:
Gbal1;t
NGDP1;t
=
1
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
 
X1;t
Y1;t
  P
d
1;t
P d1;t
M1;t
Y1;t
!
(B108)
the linearized equation is given by:"
G^bal
NGD^P
#
1;t
=   1
(NGDP1)
SS
(P d1 )
SS
(Y1)
SS
 
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS  
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS
(Y1)
SS
!
(B109)
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
+
1
(NGDP1)
SS
(P d1 )
SS
(Y1)
SS
g^bal1;t
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B.1.4 Observation Equations
In what follows we denote by Xobsi;t the observed data series associated with a given
linearized variable, x^i;t. We start listing the observation equations for country 1.
The observation equation for GDP is:
log
 
GDP obs1;t
  log  GDP obs1;t 1 = gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1 (B110)
The observation equation for oil production is:
log

Y o;obs1;t

  log

Y o;obs1;t 1

= y^o1;t   y^o1;t 1 (B111)
The observation equation for oil imports as share of nominal GDP is:
OIL IMP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS   (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS
!
(B112)24 "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t
35
+
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS o^1;t   (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS y^o1;t
!
The observation equation for the real oil price is:
log
 
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
obs!
  log
 
P o1;t 1
PGDP1;t 1
obs!
=
"
P^ o
P^GDP
#
1;t
 
"
P^ o
P^GDP
#
1;t 1
(B113)
The observation equation for non-oil imports as share of nominal GDP is:
NONOIL IMP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B114)0@m^1;t   y^1;t   "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
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The observation equation for non-oil exports as share of nominal GDP is:
NONOIL EXP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS
(X1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B115)0@x^1;t   y^1;t   "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for the real exchange rate is:
rerobs1;t = re^r1;t (B116)
The observation equation for consumption as share of nominal GDP is:
CONSobs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
(P c1 )
SS (C1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B117)0@c^1;t + " P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t  
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for total gross xed capital formation as share of nominal
GDP is:
INV obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
(P i1)
SS
(I1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B118)0@{^1;t + " P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t  
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for core price ination is:
core;obs1;t = ^
core
1;t (B119)
The observation equation for wage ination is:
!obs1;t = !^1;t (B120)
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The observation equation for nominal interest rate is:
rb;obs1;t = r^
b
1;t (B121)
For country 2 the observation equations are the following.
The observation equation for GDP is:
log
 
GDP obs2;t
  log  GDP obs2;t 1 = gd^p2;t   gd^p2;t 1 (B122)
The observation equation for oil production is:
log

Y o;obs2;t

  log

Y o;obs2;t 1

= y^o2;t   y^o2;t 1 (B123)
B.1.5 Decomposition of the Marginal Costs
As we derived above, from the prot maximization problem of rms producing
intermediate domestic goods we have that:
k1 =
 
!k1
 v1
1+v1
 
(K1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(B124)
l1 =
 
!l1
 v1
1+v1
 
(L1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(B125)
and:
k1 + 
l
1 = 1
Thus, recasting (B124) and (B125), respectively:
k1 = !
k
1

shareky1
!k1sharevy1
 1
1+v1
(B126)
l1 = !
l
1

sharely1
!l1sharevy1
 1
1+v1
(B127)
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and:
k1 + 
l
1 = 1
The marginal products of oil, capital and labour are respectively:
mp^o1;t =
o1
1 + o1
 
y^1;t   o^y1;t   z^o1;t

+ z^o1;t (B128)
mp^k1;t =
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t) + 
v
1
1 + v1

v^1;t   k^1;t 1

(B129)
mp^l1;t =
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t) + 
v
1
1 + v1

v^1;t   l^1;t   z^1;t

+ z^1;t (B130)
and from the rst order conditions:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
= mc^1;t +mp^o1;t (B131)
r^k1;t = mc^1;t +mp^k1;t (B132)
w^1;t = mc^1;t +mp^l1;t (B133)
Multiplying equation (B131) by !oy1 , equation (B132) by !
vy
1 
k
1, and equation
(B133) by !vy1
 
1  k1

, and summing up these three equations we have that:
mc^1;t = !
oy
1
0@" P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
 mp^o1;t
1A (B134)
+!vy1 
k
1
 
r^k1;t  mp^k1;t

+!vy1
 
1  k1

(w^1;t  mp^l1;t)
where:
!oy1 + !
vy
1 
k
1 + !
vy
1
 
1  k1

= 1
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B.1.6 Calibrated Parameters
As we explained in the main body of the paper, some of the parameter values
are taken from observed data means. In what follows we describe the relative
expressions associated with these values.
The share of nominal oil demand on nominal gross output is:
shareoy1 =
(P o1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = (O1)SS 
Y d1
SS (B135)
because the real price of oil is assumed to be 1 in steady state.
The ratio between oil used in production and oil used in consumption is:
ratiooyoc1 =
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS
(Oc1)
SS
=
(Oy1)
SS
(Oc1)
SS
(B136)
The share of investment on gross output is:
shareiy1 =
 
Id1
SS 
Y d1
SS (B137)
The share of government spending on gross output is:
sharegy1 =
 
Gd1
SS 
Y d1
SS (B138)
The ratio between oil production and oil demand is:
ratioyoo1 =
(Y o1 )
SS
(O1)
SS
(B139)
The share of imports on gross output is:
sharemy1 =
(M1)
SS 
Y d1
SS (B140)
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption goods
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is:
ratioyoo1 =
(M i1)
SS
(M c1)
SS
(B141)
Finally, we assume that the weight of labour in the value added production function
is:
!l1 = 1 (B142)
B.1.7 Composite Parameters
Given the parameter values taken from observed data means and the expressions
listed above, we can derive the remaining parameters as follows.
The share of hours worked is:
labshare1 =
LSS1
1  LSS1
(B143)
The weight of oil input in the overall output production function is:
!oy1 =
(Oy1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = shareoyy1 (B144)
The weight of value added input in the overall output production function is:
!vy1 = 1  !oy1 =
(V1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = sharevy1 (B145)
The real rental rate in steady state is:
 
rk1
SS
=
1
1
  1 + 1 (B146)
The share of capital on gross output is:
(K1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = 11 shareiy1 = shareky1 (B147)
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The weight of capital in the value added production function is:
!k1 =
1
1

1
1
  1 + 1
 1+v1
v1 shareiy1
sharevy1
(B148)
The share of labour on gross output is:
(L1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = sharevy11  !k1  rk1SS  1v11+v1 = sharely1 (B149)
The share of nominal consumption on nominal gross output is:
(P c1 )
SS (C1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = 1 
 
P d1
SS
(I1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS  
 
P d1
SS
(G1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B150)
+
(P o1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS   (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
= sharecy1
that is:
sharecy1 = 1  shareiy1   sharegy1 + shareyoy1   shareoyy1 (B151)
The weight of oil in the production of consumption goods is:
!oc1 =
(Oc1)
SS
(C1)
SS
= shareocc1 (B152)
where:
shareocc1 =
shareoy1   shareoyy1
sharecy1
(B153)
The weight of non-oil in the production of consumption goods is:
!cc1 = 1  !oc1 =
(Cne1 )
SS
(C1)
SS
(B154)
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The weight of domestic goods in the production of consumption goods is:
!c1 = 1  !mc1 =
 
Cd1
SS
(Cne1 )
SS
= sharecdcn1 (B155)
The weight of imported goods in the production of consumption goods is:
!mc1 =
(M c1)
SS
(Cne1 )
SS
= sharemccn1 (B156)
where:
sharemccn1 =
sharemy1
sharecy1  sharecnc1
1
1 + ratiomimc1
(B157)
The weight of domestic goods in the production of investment goods is:
!i1 = 1  !mi1 =
 
Id1
SS
(I1)
SS
(B158)
The weight of imported goods in the production of investment goods is:
!mi1 =
(M i1)
SS
(I1)
SS
= sharemii1 (B159)
where:
sharemii1 =
sharemy1
shareiy1
ratiomimc1
1 + ratiomimc1
(B160)
The share of exports on gross output of country 1 is: 
P d1
SS
(X1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS =
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B161)
+
(P o1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
  (P
o
1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
= sharexy1
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or:
sharexy1 = sharemy1 + shareoy1   shareyoy1 (B162)
The share of exports on gross output of country 2 is:
(X2)
SS 
Y d2
SS = (M2)SS 
Y d2
SS  
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS + (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS
!  
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (B163)
or:
sharexy2 = sharemy2   (shareoy1   shareyoy1)
 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (B164)
The share of imports on gross output of country 2 is: 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (O1   Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B165)
=
(e1)
SS  P d2 SS (M2)SS 
P d2
SS  
Y d2
SS
 
P d2
SS 
P d1
SS
 
Y d2
SS 
Y d1
SS 2
= sharemy2
or:
sharemy2 = (sharemy1 + (shareoy1   shareyoy1))
 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (B166)
The ratio between nominal GDP and nominal gross output is:
(NGDP1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = 1  (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (B167)
or:
sharengdpny1 = 1  shareoyy1 + shareyoy1 (B168)
The ratio between gross outputs of country 1 and 2 is: 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS = sharely2sharely1 (L1)
SS
(L2)
SS
(B169)
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The share in world oil production for country 2 is:
(Y o2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
(B170)
=
(Y o2 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS +
(Y o2 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
= shareoprod2
or:
shareoprod2 =
shareyoy2
1
2
shareyoy1
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS + shareyoy2
(B171)
The share in world oil consumption for country 2 is:
(O2)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
(B172)
=
(O2)
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS +
(O2)
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
= shareocons2
or:
shareocons2 =
shareoy2
1
2
shareoy1
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS + shareoy2
(B173)
The overall oil production as share of gross output is:
(Y o1 )
SS 
Y d1
SS = (Y o1 )SS(O1)SS (O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = shareyoy1 (B174)
or:
shareyoy1 = ratioyoo1  shareoy1 (B175)
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B.2 Observed Data Construction
As we described in the main body of the paper, we use quarterly data and the
model is estimated for the sample period 1990:Q1-2005:Q4 with a pre-sample
from 1988:Q1 to 1989:Q4. In this appendix we provide the several sources and
construction methods of the observed series. Unless otherwise noted, all original
series are seasonally adjusted.
UK GDP. The UK GDP is the log of real UK GDP (code ABMI in ONS
Quarterly National Accounts).
Foreign GDP. The foreign GDP is the log of trade-weighted foreign GDP.
The data series for real GDPs of the foreign countries are taken from the OECD
- Quarterly National Accounts45. The countries are: the Euro area, the United
States, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Australia and
India. These are the most important trading partners of the United Kingdom for
the period considered. We follow the paper of Loretan (2005) in order to construct
the relative imports/exports weights.
UK crude oil production. The UK crude oil production is the log of the
UK crude oil production taken from US Energy Information Administration46 -
Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.1b.
Foreign crude oil production. The foreign crude oil production is the log of
foreign crude oil production (calculated as world production net of UK production)
taken from US Energy Information Administration47 - Monthly Energy Review -
Table 11.1b.
Real oil price. The real oil price is the log of the Europe Brent Spot Price
FOB from the US Energy Information Administration48 converted from US dollars
to Sterling Pounds using the Quarterly Average Forward Exchange Rate, 3 month,
US$ into Sterling (code XUQADS3 in Bank of England Statistical Interactive
45http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/oecd/na/2012-06.
46http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#petroleum.
47http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#petroleum.
48http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M.
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Database49) and deated by the UK GDP deator (code YBGB in ONS Quarterly
National Accounts).
UK real e¤ective exchange rate. The UK real e¤ective exchange rate
is the log of the Quarterly Average Broad E¤ective Exchange Rate Index, (code
XUQABK82 in the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database50).
UK private consumption expenditure. The UK private consumption
expenditure is the Household Final Consumption Expenditure at market prices
(code ABJQ in ONS Quarterly National Accounts) and it is expressed as share of
UK GDP at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK total gross xed capital formation. The UK total gross xed capital
formation is the total gross xed capital formation at market prices (code NPQS
in ONS Quarterly National Accounts) and it is expressed as share of UK GDP at
Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK oil imports. The UK oil imports are total oil gross imports (Petroleum -
Imports) taken from the US Energy Information Administration51 - International
Energy Statistics, expressed as share of UK GDP using the Europe Brent Spot
Price FOB (British Sterling per Barrel) and the UK GDP at Market Prices (code
YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK non-oil goods imports. The UK non-oil goods imports are the Goods
Imports at market prices (code BOKH in ONS Quarterly National Accounts)
minus the UK oil imports, expressed as share of UK GDP using the UK GDP
at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK non-oil goods exports. The UK non-oil goods exports are the Goods
Exports at market prices (code BOKG in ONS Quarterly National Accounts)
minus the UK oil exports, expressed as share of UK GDP using the UK GDP at
49http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
50http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
51http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=50&pid=76&aid=3&cid=UK,
&syid=1988&eyid=2005&freq=Q&unit=TBPD.
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Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK core ination. The UK core ination is the log change in the
Consumer Price Index: All Items Excluding Food and Energy, Index 2010=100
and NSA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Code:
GBRCPICORMINMEI, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis52). The series is seasonally adjusted with Eviews.
UK wage ination. The UK wage ination obtained from the log change in
UK Total Compensation of Employees at Current Prices (Code DTWM in ONS -
UK Output, Income and Expenditure Tables; and LF2G in ONS - LFS).
UK nominal interest rate. The UK nominal interest rate is the Quarterly
Average Rate of Discount - 3 Month Treasury Bills (Code IUQAAJNB in Bank of
England Statistical Interactive Database53).
52https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GBRCPICORMINMEI/.
53http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
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B.3 Data Used to Construct the Steady State Parameters
for the UK and Foreign Bloc
As we discussed in the main body of the paper, the steady state parameters of the
UK and the foreign country are constructed using observed data. In this appendix
we show the data sources for each bloc.
B.3.1 Average Ratios for the UK Economy
Unless otherwise noted, the average ratios are computed for the period 1990-2005.
The UK oil share on nominal gross output is dened as:
shareoy =
GV A GV A excl Oil and Gas
GV A
(B176)
where GV A is the total gross value added at basic prices (Code ABMM in ONS)
and GV A excl Oil and Gas is the gross value added excluding oil and gas at
basic prices (Code KLS2 in ONS). Due to data availability for these two series we
consider the sample period 1997-2005.
The ratio between oil used in production and oil used in consumption is dened
as:
ratiooyoc =
Oy
Oc
(B177)
where Oy is the total supply of products at purchasersprices of coke and rened
petroleum products (taken from ONS Input-Output Tables). Oc is the households
nal consumption expenditure of coke and rened petroleum products (taken ONS
Input-Output Tables). Due to data availability for these two series we consider
the sample period 1992-2004.
The share of investment on GDP is dened as:
shareiy =
I
Y
(B178)
where I is the real total gross xed capital formation (Code NPQT in ONS) and
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Y is the real gross domestic product (Code ABMI in ONS).
The share of government spending on GDP is dened as:
sharegy =
G
Y
(B179)
where G is the general government nal consumption expenditure (Code NMRY
in ONS).
The ratio between oil production and oil demand is dened as:
ratioyoo =
Y o
O
(B180)
where Y o is the crude oil production of the United Kingdom (taken from the US
Energy Information Administration - Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.1b) and
O is the petroleum consumption of United Kingdom (taken from the US Energy
Information Administration - Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.2).
The share of imports on GDP is dened as:
sharemy =
M
Y
(B181)
where M are the real imports of goods and services (Code IKBL in ONS).
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption
goods is dened as:
ratioyoo =
M i
M c
(B182)
where M i are total imports of services (Code IKBC in ONS) and M c are total
imports of goods (Code IKBI in ONS).
Finally, 1 is the sum of the total population of United Kingdom (taken from
OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
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B.3.2 Average Ratios for the Foreign Bloc
In order to aggregate data for the foreign countries we use the Loretan (2005)
technique. In particular, we proceed as follows. Firstly, from the Direction of
Trade Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund we compute the
average of imports/exports between the UK and foreign countries for the period
1990-2005. Secondly, we select the major UK trading partners. Specically, they
are the Euro Area, the United States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The
average of imports/exports of the UK with this group of countries corresponds to
80% of total UK trade. Thirdly, we compute the average ratios for the foreign
bloc by aggregating their data series through the weighted average for the period
1990-2005.
Unless otherwise noted, the average ratios are computed for the period 1990-
2005.
Due to data availability in order to construct foreign oil share we only consider
the Euro Area and the United States. The Euro Area and the US oil shares on
their nominal gross outputs are dened as:
shareoy =
Petroleum Items Exp
GDP
(B183)
For the Euro Area, Petroleum Items Exp is the sum of crude petroleum and
natural gas expenditures and coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuels
expenditures (taken from Eurostat Input-Output Tables). GDP is the nominal
gross domestic product (taken from the Eurostat interactive database). Due to
data availability the sample period is 2000-2008.
For the US, Petroleum Items Exp is the sum of natural gas expenditures
and petroleum expenditures (taken from the Annual Energy Outlook of US EIA).
GDP is the nominal gross domestic product (taken from FRED).
Due to data availability in order to construct ratio between oil used in
production and oil used in consumption we only consider the Euro Area and the
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United States. This ratio is dened as:
ratiooyoc =
Oy
Oc
(B184)
For the Euro Area, Oy is the total use at basic prices of coke, rened petroleum
products and nuclear fuel (taken from the Eurostat Input-Output Tables). Oc
is the nal consumption expenditure at basic prices of coke, rened petroleum
products and nuclear fuel (taken from the Eurostat Input-Output Tables). Due to
the availability of these two series we consider the sample period 2000-2005.
For the US, Oy is the total commodity output of petroleum and coal products
(taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output Tables). Oc is the
personal consumption expenditures of petroleum and coal products (taken from
Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output Tables). Due to the availability of
these two series we consider the sample period 1998-2005.
The share of investment on GDP for foreign countries is dened as:
shareiy =
I
Y
(B185)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India, I is the gross xed capital formation
(taken fromOECD - Quarterly National Accounts) whereas Y is the gross domestic
product (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
For China (sample period 1998-2005), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, I is the gross xed capital formation (Code 93E.ZF in International
Financial Statistics - IMF) whereas Y is the gross domestic product (Code 99B.ZF
in International Financial Statistics - IMF).
The share of government spending on GDP for foreign countries is dened as:
sharegy =
G
Y
(B186)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
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Canada, Denmark, Australia and India, G is the general government nal
consumption expenditure (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts)
whereas Y is the gross domestic product (taken from OECD - Quarterly National
Accounts).
For China (sample period 1998-2005), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, G is the government consumption expenditure (Code 91F.ZF in
International Financial Statistics - IMF) whereas Y is the gross domestic product
(Code 99B.ZF in International Financial Statistics - IMF).
The ratio between oil production and oil demand for the foreign bloc is dened
as:
ratioyoo =
Y o
O
(B187)
For the Euro Area, the United States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Norway, Canada, Denmark, Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, Y o is petroleum production (taken from the US Energy
Information Administration - International Energy Statistics) whereas O is the
petroleum consumption (taken from the US Energy Information Administration -
International Energy Statistics).
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption
goods for the foreign bloc is dened as:
ratioyoo =
M i
M c
(B188)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India,M i is the series of imports of goods (taken
from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts) whereas M c is the series of imports
of services (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
Finally, 2 is the sum of the total population of the Euro Area, the United
States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Australia,
India, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (taken from OECD - Quarterly
National Accounts).
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B.4 Prior and Posterior Parameters Distributions
In the following gures, prior distributions correspond to dashed blue lines whereas
posterior distributions correspond to solid blue black lines.
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B.5 IRFs: Negative Domestic Technology Shock
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Chapter 3: Oil Price Shocks and the UK Fiscal
Regime, 1990-2005
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we found that foreign oil intensity shock, foreign oil supply
shock and foreign technology shock were important for the evolution of the UK
macroeconomy. However, although we allowed monetary policy to operate, we
e¤ectively ignored scal policy. This was an important omission and in the
present chapter we rectify our analysis. Therefore, in the present paper, we
develop and estimate an open economy DSGE model in order to evaluate the
economic repercussions and scal policy responses to oil price uctuations in the
UK economy. Our model is estimated with Bayesian techniques over the period
1990-2005. This sample choice encapsulates the "Non-Inationary, Consistently
Expansionary" (NICE) decade54 and corresponds to the period in which the UK
was a net oil exporter.
Our theoretical framework is in line with the papers of Bodenstein and Guerrieri
(2011) and Bodenstein et al. (2012) and assumes the endogenous determination of
real oil price and a world economy model in a new Keynesian framework. From a
theoretical point of view our paper presents two main contributions with respect
to these two papers. Firstly, we assume that domestic households and rms face
several distortive taxes that a¤ect their respective behaviours. In this regard, our
paper follows the extensive literature on DSGE modelling and scal policy (see,
among the others, Coenen et al., 2008; Forni et al. 2009; Strulik and Trimborn,
2012; Cogan et al., 2013). Secondly, we set up a detailed scal sector which includes
several policy rules for these distortive taxes. In this regard, following the paper
of Leeper et al. (2009), we employ Bayesian techniques in order to estimate these
scal policy rules.
54According to the denition of King (2003).
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We estimate our open economy DSGEmodel using observed data for the United
Kingdom and the rest of the world. In particular, we construct the time series for
the foreign bloc using the Loretan (2005) method.
In line with the results of the previous chapter, we nd that foreign oil demand
and supply shocks explain most of the variation of the UK oil price. Moreover, we
nd a signicant e¤ect of foreign technology shock on the UK oil price variation.
We contribute to existing literature by showing that foreign oil intensity shock
contributes signicantly to the variation of the UK government debt. The main
reason is that foreign oil intensity shock is the most relevant source of the UK oil
price uctuation. Accordingly, relevant changes in oil price imply more volatile oil
tax and fuel duty revenues and, in turn, government debt.
Our estimated scal rules extend previous literature by showing that the fuel
duty tax responds moderately to the UK oil demand whereas the response of the
petroleum revenue tax to oil price changes is stronger.
In general, our impulse response analysis conrms that, the e¤ects of an oil
price decrease are similar to those following a positive productivity shock. In
particular, we nd an increase in UK GDP and its major components. Similarly,
domestic hours worked tend to increase in response to the reduction of oil price.
Moreover, we observe a decline in domestic core ination that induces monetary
authority to loosen its policy rate. Therefore, these results are in line with the
ndings of the impulse response analysis presented in Chapter 2.
As concerns the external sector, in contrast to the results of Chapter 2, we
nd that a positive foreign oil intensity shock induces a depreciation of the UK
currency. Indeed, the response of UK taxation to this shock stimulates domestic
consumption reducing the price of domestic consumption goods with respect to
imported goods. In line with the results of Chapter 2, our model predicts a
depreciation of the Pound in response to a positive foreign oil supply shock and
a negative foreign technology shock. Moreover, we nd that the reduction of oil
price implies a worsening of the UK oil goods balance since it is a net oil exporter.
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In turn, this reduction induces a deterioration of the UK overall trade balance.
We compare our estimates of the scal impact of oil shocks with contemporary
estimates of leading forecasters, including the HM Treasury, the National Institute
of Economic and Social Research (for more details see Powell and Horton, 1985;
Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000; OECD Economic Surveys, 2002; OBR report, 2010;
Barrell et al., 2011a and 2011b). In general, we nd that domestic public nances
su¤er in a scenario of low oil price although overall economy improves; the domestic
government debt actually increases. In particular, the direct negative e¤ect on
petroleum revenue tax, VAT and fuel duty tax receipts more than o¤set the indirect
positive e¤ect on the other tax revenues. In turn, this implies that domestic public
nances deteriorate in response to low oil prices. Thus, for instance, following a
positive shock to foreign oil intensity, UK government debt increases by £ 700
millions during the rst year and it reaches £ 1100 millions in four years.
Our results are di¤erent from what the HM Treasury and the NIESR found
because they did not take into account the several sources of oil price shocks.
Secondly, these studies did not estimate directly the persistence of the exogenous
shocks a¤ecting the oil price. Thirdly, in their analysis, the HM Treasury and the
NIESR were not able to estimate the UK price elasticity of oil demand. Lastly,
the HM Treasury and the NIESR did not distinguish between the cases of actual
and potential economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model describing the several sectors of our open economy DSGE model. Section 3
outlines the data used in order to estimate the model, the parameters set up and
the estimation results. In Section 4, we quantify the e¤ects of oil price uctuations
on UK public nances. Section 5 presents some of the impulse response functions
of our estimated model. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility function by choosing
purchases of the consumption good, C1;t, purchases of the investment good, I1;t,
capital stock, K1;t, next periods holdings of both domestic government bonds,
B1;t, and foreign government bonds, B
f
1;t, given the following intertemporal utility
function:
Et
( 1X
j=0
j1
"
1
1 1
 
Zc1;tC1;t+j   1C1;t+j 1
1 1 +
1
1 1 (1  L1;t+j)
1 1
#)
(3.1)
where Et is expectation operator at time t and 
j
1 is the discount factor. As we can
note from equation (3.1), the representative household consumption, is inuenced
by the presence of external habit, 1, related to aggregate past consumption.
The parameter 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the representative
household or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
variable L1;t represents hours worked, while 1 is the inverse of the elasticity
of work e¤ort with respect to the real wage (or Frisch elasticity). In addition,
equation (3.1) also contains a preference shock to consumption denoted by Zc1;t.
The representative household faces the following period-by-period budget
constraint:
 
1 +  c1;t

P c1;tC1;t + P
i
1;tI1;t +
 
Rb1;t
 1
B1;t+1 +
e1;t
 
Rb2;t
 1
Bf1;t+1
b1;t
(3.2)
=
 
1   l1;t   wh1;t

W1;tL1;t +R
k
1;tK1;t 1 +
 
1   d1;t

D1;t
+P o1;tY
o
1;t +B1;t + e1;tB
f
1;t
where P c1;t and P
i
1;t denote the prices of consumption and investment goods,
respectively. The gross nominal return of the domestic government bond is denoted
by Rb1;t, while, R
b
2;t is the gross nominal return of the foreign government bond.
The latter is denominated in foreign currency and, thus, its domestic value depends
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on the nominal exchange rate, e1;t, expressed in units of the domestic currency per
unit of foreign currency. As in the paper of Bodenstein et al. (2012), we assume
that the representative household faces an intermediation cost to purchase the
foreign bond, b1;t in order to ensure that net foreign assets are stationary. We
indicate by W1;t the aggregate nominal wage, while Rk1;t is the rental rate for
capital services, K1;t 1. D1;t represents the dividends paid by production goods
rms that are owned by the representative household. P o1;tY
o
1;t is a share of the
countrys (unrened) oil endowment.
The scal authority absorbs part of the gross income of the representative
household in order to nance its expenditure. In this context,  c1;t denotes the
consumption tax rate levied on consumption purchases (VAT tax in the UK scal
regime). Moreover,  l1;t and 
d
1;t are the tax rates levied on labour income and
dividends, respectively. In the UK taxation system, the former corresponds to
the income tax, whereas the latter is the corporation tax. In addition, wh1;t is
the additional pay-roll tax rate levied on representative household labour income.
Thus, it represents the UK National Insurance Contribution (NIC) tax paid by
households.
The capital stock owned by the representative household evolves according to
the following capital accumulation equation:
K1;t = (1  1)K1;t 1 +
 
1  S

I1;t
I1;t 1
2!
Zi1;tI1;t (3.3)
where K1;t is the capital stock, 1 is the depreciation rate, and the adjustment cost
function S () is a positive function of changes in investment. In steady state, with
a constant level of investment, we assume that S () is equal to zero. Moreover, its
rst derivative around equilibrium equals to zero too. In addition, equation (3.3)
includes an investment specic technology shock denoted by Zi1;t.
The representative household chooses C1;t, I1;t, K1;t, L1;t, B1;t and B2;t
maximizing its intertemporal objective function (3.1) subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint (3.2) and the capital accumulation equation (3.3).
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Labour Supply. We assume the same wage setting as in Smets and Wouters
(2007). Thus, labour service supplied by the representative household is
di¤erentiated by a labour union that has some monopoly power. This results
in an explicit wage equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal
wages à la Calvo (1983).
We assume that there is a continuum of households indexed by h 2 [0; 1].
Therefore, the demand for labour from rms of intermediate production goods is
given by:
L1;t (h) =

W1;t (h)
W1;t
  1+w1;t
w1;t
Ld1;t (3.4)
where the aggregate labour demand, Ld1;t, and the aggregate nominal wage, W1;t,
correspond to:
Ld1;t =
24 1Z
0
L1;t (h)
1
1+w1;t dh
351+
w
1;t
(3.5)
W1;t =
24 1Z
0
W1;t (h)
  1
w1;t dh
35 
w
1;t
(3.6)
where w1;t is an exogenous rst order autoregressive process with an i.i.d. normal
error term reecting wage markup shocks.
As we described above, the labour union acts as price-setter in the labour
market. According to the Calvo-style wage-setting frictions, we assume that, in
period t, the labour union can change the nominal wage with probability 1  w1 ,
whereas if the union cannot change the wage in a given period, it keeps the wage
as a geometric average of nominal wage ination in the last period (!1;t 1) and
the ination rate in steady state (SS1 ). In particular, the labour union solves the
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following maximization problem:
max
fW1;t(h)g
Et
1X
j=0
(w1 )
j  1;t;t+j
"
!l1;t;;jW1;t (h)L1;t+j (h) 
W f1;t+jL1;t+j (h)
#
(3.7)
s:t : L1;t (h) =

W1;t (h)
W1;t
  1+w1;t
w1;t
Ld1;t (3.8)
and : !l1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n
(!1;t 1+s)
w1
 
SS1
1 w1 o (3.9)
where w1 indicates the degree of wage indexation. We indicate by W
f
1;t+j the
nominal wage desired by the representative household that corresponds to the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. The union takes
into account W f1;t+j during the negotiations with labour bundlers and gives to the
representative household the markup above the nominal wage desired.
3.2.2 Firms
Production Goods. In each country there is a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1] that produces di¤erentiated varieties
of intermediate production goods, and a single nal production good rm that
combines the variety of intermediate production goods under perfect competition.
Final Production Good Sector. The aggregation technology of the nal
production good rm is given by:
Y d1;t =
24 1Z
0
Y1;t (i)
1
1+
p
1;t di
351+
p
1;t
(3.10)
where Y1;t (i) denotes the quantity used of di¤erentiated good i at time t. 
p
1;t is a
AR(1) stochastic process that determines the time varying markup in the goods
market.
Prot maximization yields the downward-sloping demand for each intermediate
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input:
Y1;t (i) =

P1;t (i)
P d1;t
  1+p1;t

p
1;t
Y d1;t (3.11)
where P1;t (i) is the price of the intermediate production good i and P d1;t is the price
of the nal production good. Perfect competition in the nal production goods
sector implies that P d1;t is given by:
P d1;t =
24 1Z
0
 
P d1;t (i)
  1

p
1;t di
35 
p
1;t
(3.12)
Considering the producer currency pricing, the exports are expressed in foreign
prices:
e1;t =
P d1;t
Pm2;t
(3.13)
where Pm2;t indicates the price of imported goods of country 2.
Intermediate Production Good Sector. The production function for a
typical intermediate production good rm i is assumed to be a nested constant
elasticity of substitution with three inputs: capital, labour and oil. Thus, the
cost minimization problem of rm i that produces overall output Y1;t (i) can be
expressed as:
min
fK1;t 1(i);L1;t(i);Oy1;t(i);V1;t(i)g
0BB@
Rk1;tK1;t 1 (i)+
1 + wf1;t

W1;tL1;t (i)+
P o1;tO
y
1;t (i)
1CCA (3.14)
s:t : Y1;t (i) =
0@ (!vy1 ) o11+o1 (V1;t (i)) 11+o1 +
(!oy1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
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1+o1
1A1+
o
1
(3.15)
and : V1;t (i) =
0@  !k1 v11+v1 (K1;t 1 (i)) 11+v1 + 
!l1
 v1
1+v1 (Z1;tL1;t (i))
1
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1
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where V1;t (i) represents the value added produced by capital, K1;t (i), and labour,
L1;t (i), services. The intermediate production good is produced combining the
value added input with oil input Oy1;t (i). In addition, we denote by 
wf
t the payroll
tax rate levied on wage payments. In the UK scal regime, this represents the UK
National Insurance Contribution (NIC) tax paid by rms.
The weights of capital and labour in the value added production function are
denoted by !k1 and !
l
1, respectively. Similarly, !
oy
1 and !
vy
1 are the respective
weights of oil input and value added input in the overall output production
function. Moreover, v1 indicates the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour services, whereas o1 denotes the price elasticity of demand for oil.
We assume an exogenous productivity shock, Z1;t, that follows an AR(2)
stochastic process. In the results section, we will note that this shock signicantly
inuences the variance of the UK oil price.
In addition, we consider an exogenous shock driving the oil intensity in
production. We denote it by Zo1;t and we assume that it is given by second order
autoregressive process. As we will show below, this shock has important e¤ects on
the UK macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, it explains most of the volatility
of the UK oil price and it contributes signicantly to the variation of the UK
government debt.
In the intermediate production good sector, there is a sluggish price adjustment
due to staggered price contracts à la Calvo. Accordingly, rms i receives the
permission to optimally reset prices in a given period t with probability 1   p1.
Following Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), rms that cannot change their prices
keep their prices as a geometric average of ination in the last period (d1;t 1) and
the ination rate in steady state (SS1 ). Thus, the prot maximization problem of
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rms that are allowed to reoptimize their prices at time t can be expressed as:
max
fP d1;t(i)g
Et
1X
j=0
(p1)
j  1;t;t+j
"
d1;t;;jP
d
1;t (i)Y1;t+j (i) 
MC1;t+jY1;t+j (i)
#
(3.17)
s:t : Y1;t (i) =
 
P d1;t (i)
P d1;t
!  1+p1

p
1
Y d1;t (3.18)
and : d1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n 
d1;t 1+s
p1  SS1 1 p1o (3.19)
where p1 represents the degree of price indexation, whereas MC1;t denotes the
marginal cost at time t that accounts for capital, labour and oil as factor inputs.
Consumption Goods. Final consumption goods, C1;t, are produced under
perfect competition and sold to the representative household. The representative
rm producing nal consumption goods uses a nested constant elasticity of
substitution production function. In particular, domestic, Cd1;t, and foreign,
M c1;t, intermediate consumption goods are combined in order to obtain non-oil
consumption goods, Cne1;t. Accordingly, nal consumption goods are produced
combining non-oil and oil, Oc1;t, consumption goods. The cost minimization
problem faced by the representative rm producing nal consumption goods is
given by:
min
fCd1;t;Mc1;t;Cne1;t;Oc1;tg
P d1;tC
d
1;t + P
m
1;tM
c
1;t +
 
1 +  oc1;t

P o1;tO
c
1;t (3.20)
s:t : C1;t =

(!cc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Cne1;t
 1
1+o1 + (!oc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
c
1;t
 1
1+o1
1+o1
(3.21)
and : Cne1;t =

(!c1)
c1
1+c1
 
Cd1;t
 1
1+c1 + (!mc1 )
c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
c
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(3.22)
where  oct indicates a tax on oil used for consumption goods. In the UK taxation
system it can be seen as the fuel duty levied on some prices of fuels used by
road vehicles. We denote by !c1 and !
mc
1 the weights of domestic and imported
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goods, whereas !cc1 and !
oc
1 are the weights of non-oil and oil in the production of
consumption goods. Moreover, c1 represents the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign intermediate goods, whereas o1 corresponds to the same
price elasticity of oil demand included in equation (3.15). We assume that import
preferences are driven by an exogenous shock, Zm1;t, that has the form of an AR(2)
process. In addition, we consider an oil intensity shock a¤ecting the production of
consumption goods, Zo1;t, that is the same of equation (3.15).
The Lagrange multiplier associated with the cost minimization problem of
the representative rm producing nal consumption goods is dened as the
price of consumption goods P c1;t, whereas the price of non-oil consumption goods
corresponds to the core price level P ne1;t of the economy.
Investment Goods. Firms producing investment goods, I1;t, use a nested
constant elasticity of substitution production function but, contrarily to
consumption good rms, without oil as an input factor. These rms operate under
perfect competition and sell investment goods to the representative household. In
particular, domestic and foreign investment goods, denoted respectively by Id1;t and
M i1;t, are combined in order to obtain nal investment goods. We can express the
cost minimization problem of typical rm producing investment goods as follows:
min
fId1;t;M i1;tg
P d1;tI
d
1;t + P
m
1;tM
i
1;t (3.23)
s:t : I1;t =
 
!i1
 c1
1+c1
 
Id1;t
 1
1+c1 +
 
!mi1
 c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
i
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(3.24)
where !i1 and !
mi
1 indicate the weights of domestic and foreign investment goods.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is denoted by c1,
as in the production of consumption goods. We also assume that investment goods
are inuenced by an import preferences shock, Zm1;t, that is the same we assumed
in the production of consumption goods. We note that the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the problem of cost minimization of the typical investment goods
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rm coincides with the price of investment goods P i1;t.
3.2.3 The Oil Sector
The oil sector is dened according to the most recent economic literature (see, for
example, Bodenstein and Guerrieri, 2011; Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Hicks, 2011;
Kilian and Murphy, 2010 and 2012; Bodenstein et al., 2012). More specically, we
focus on the demand side of the oil market while we set up a simple framework for
the supply side. Our decision is motivated by the fact that there is an intense
debate on how to model the supply side of the oil market (see, for example,
Nakov and Pescatori, 2010a; Balke et al., 2010; Nakov and Nuño, 2011) but,
unfortunately, there is lack of relevant economic data (see, for example, Smith,
2005; Almoguera et al., 2011) in order to test these models.
Accordingly, we assume that domestic (Y o1;t) and foreign (Y
o
2;t) production of oil
are exogenously determined and that they have the forms of two distinct second
order autoregressive processes. As we will show below, the foreign oil supply
shock plays an important role in terms of oil price volatility and, in turn, it a¤ects
signicantly the behaviour of UK macroeconomic variables.
The real oil price (P o1;t) adjusts endogenously in order to clear the world oil
market according to the following condition:
Y o1;t +
2
1
Y o2;t = O1;t +
2
1
O2;t (3.26)
where : O1;t = O
y
1;t +O
c
1;t (3.27)
where O1;t and O2;t are the domestic and foreign oil demand, respectively, while
1 and 2 indicate the relative population sizes of home and foreign country,
respectively. Simply, this oil market clearing condition states that the oil produced
in the domestic and foreign countries equals the oil consumed by households and
rms in domestic and foreign countries.
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3.2.4 Fiscal Authority
As we discussed above, the main objective of this paper is to analyse how oil price
uctuations impact on tax receipts, including the rate at which oil price changes
work through the economy into the public nances. In order to achieve these goals
we set up a detailed scal sector that includes several policy rules for the distortive
taxes.
In particular, we assume that the scal authoritys period-by-period budget
constraint has the following form:
P g1;tG
d
1;t +B1;t = 
c
1;tP
c
1;tC1;t +

 l1;t + 
wh
1;t + 
wf
1;t

W1;tL1;t + (3.28)
 d1;tD1;t + 
oc
1;tP
o
1;tO
c
1;t + 
yo
1;tP
o
1;tY
o
1;t +
 
Rb1;t
 1
B1;t+1
whereGd1;t is the government expenditure while B1;t indicates the government debt.
As described above,  c1;t, 
l
1;t, 
wh
1;t , 
wf
1;t , 
d
1;t and 
oc
t are VAT, income, households
and rms NIC, corporation, and fuel duty taxes, respectively. Finally, we dene
 yot as the UK Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT).
We consider the government expenditure as a fraction of the nominal domestic
output:
g^d1;t =
P g1;tG
d
1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
(3.29)
and we assume that g^d1;t follows an exogenous AR(1) process.
We also dene the government debt as a fraction of the nominal domestic
output:
b^1;t =
B1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
(3.30)
Moreover, we assume that the log-linearized expressions for the scal policy rules
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concerning the distortive taxes are:
^ c1;t =  
cc
1 c^1;t (3.31)
^ l1;t =  
ly
1 y^
d
1;t +  
lb
1 b^1;t 4 (3.32)
^wh1;t =  
wb
1 b^1;t 4 (3.33)
^ oc1;t =  
ococ
1 o^
c
1;t (3.34)
^wf1;t =  
wb
1 b^1;t 4 (3.35)
^ d1;t =  
dd
1 d^1;t (3.36)
^ yo1;t =  
yopo
1
"
P^ o
P^GDP
#
1;t
(3.37)
where the small letters with the hats denote log-deviations of the variables from
their respective steady states. Moreover, in line with Leeper et al. (2009), we
assume that the coe¢ cients linking taxes to the several variables have positive
values (i.e.  x1  0 for x = fcc; ly; lb; wb; ococ; dd; yopog).
The scal rule (3.31) implies that the consumption tax depends on total nal
consumption. In particular, the parameter  cc1 indicates the response of the
consumption tax rate to changes in the level of consumption. Our formulation
is consistent with the high value of the contemporaneous correlation between the
UK VAT rate and the total private consumption expenditure.55
As in Leeper et al. (2009), the scal rule for the labour income tax (equation
(3.32)) allows for a response to the cyclical position of the economy and to changes
in the level of government debt. Accordingly, the coe¢ cients  ly1 and  
lb
1 denote
the responses of the labour income tax rate to changes in the UK GDP and
government debt, respectively. More specically, we assume that the labour income
tax immediately responds to changes in the UK GDP whereas it responds with a
delay of one year to variations of the UK government debt. Our choice is motivated
by the fact that the estimated correlation between the UK IT rate and the one
55In particular, the estimated correlation between the VAT rate and the total private
consumption expenditure is equal to 0.62.
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year lagged government debt is higher than the correlation between the IT rate
and the government debt both at time t.56
The scal rules (3.33) and (3.35) imply that the National Insurance
Contribution paid by households and rms depends only on variations in the level
of government debt.57 Thus, the parameter  wb1 represents the response of the
NIC rate to one year lagged government debt. Our decision is related to the fact
that the correlation between the NIC rate and the one year lagged government
debt is higher than the contemporaneous correlation between the NIC rate and
the government debt.58
As shown in equation (3.36), the scal rule for the corporation tax allows for
the response to changes in domestic dividends. In particular,  dd1 indicates the
response of the corporation tax rate to changes in the dividends of rms.
The scal rule (3.34) implies that the fuel duty tax depends on the oil demand
of the domestic country. More specically,  ococ1 denotes the response of the fuel
duty tax rate to current changes in domestic oil demand. Our assumption is
consistent with the estimated correlation between the fuel duty tax rate and the
UK oil consumption.59
Finally, as we can note from equation (3.37), the petroleum revenue tax varies
according to the domestic oil price at time t. In particular,  yopo1 represents the
response of the PRT rate to variations in the real oil price. Our choice is motivated
by the important correlation between the PRT rate and the real oil price.60
56In particular, the estimated correlation between the IT rate and the one year lagged
government debt as a share of GDP is equal to 0.015.
57We assume that the NIC does not depend on domestic output because we found a negative
correlation between the NIC rate and the UK GDP.
58In particular, the correlation between NIC rate and the one year lagged government debt
over GDP is equal to 0.019.
59In particular, the estimated correlation between the fuel duty rate and the UK oil
consumption is equal to 0.16.
60In particular, the estimated correlation between the PRT rate and the real oil price is equal
to 0.28.
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3.2.5 Central Bank
The central bank is assumed to follow a Taylor-type interest-rate rule (Taylor,
1993) specied in terms of past nominal interest rate, core ination and output
gap (i.e., the di¤erence between actual and potential output):
i1;t = {1 + 
i
1 (i1;t 1   {1) + (3.38) 
1  i1
  
core1;t   core1

+ 1
 
core1;t   core1   core1;t

+ y1y
gap
1;t

where {1 and core1 indicate the steady state values for the nominal interest rate
and ination, respectively. Moreover, we denote by i1 the interest rate smoothing
parameter, while y1 and 

1 represent the reaction of interest rate on output gap
and ination, respectively. Finally, we assume that the core ination is given by
the logarithmic percentage change in the price of non-oil goods:
core1;t = log

P ne1;t
P ne1;t 1

(3.39)
and that core1;t is an exogenous AR(1) process indicating a time varying ination
target.
3.2.6 Equilibrium of the Non-Oil Goods Market
Imposing the market-clearing condition for the non-oil good market of the domestic
economy implies the following aggregate resource constraint:
Y d1;t = C
d
1;t + I
d
1;t +G
d
1;t +
2
1
M2;t (3.40)
where : M2;t =M c2;t +M
i
2;t
where M2;t indicates the net imports of the foreign country, while 1 and 2
represent the relative population sizes of home and foreign country, respectively.
Simply, the market clearing condition (3.40) states that the production of domestic
rms equals the domestic demand of the representative household for consumption
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and investment goods plus domestic government expenditure and total imports of
the foreign country.
Moreover, the domestic holdings of internationally traded bonds (that is,
the home countrys net foreign assets, denominated in foreign currency) evolve
according to:
e1;t
 
Rb2;t
 1
Bf1;t+1
b1;t
= e1;tB
f
1;t +
2
1
e1;tP
m
2;t
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(3.41)
 Pm1;t
 
M c1;t +M
i
1;t

+ P o1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

that is, holding bonds of the foreign country is equal to the domestic non-oil trade
balance.
Finally, the market clearing condition for the holdings of foreign assets states
that Bf1;t +B
f
2;t = 0.
3.2.7 Shock Processes
According to the framework outlined above, we consider fteen shocks driving
the economy (Table 3.1). More specically, these shocks a¤ect domestic and
foreign productivities, domestic and foreign oil productions, domestic and foreign
oil intensities, domestic and foreign consumption preferences, domestic and
foreign import preferences, domestic investment specic technology, domestic
price markup, domestic wage markup, domestic ination target and domestic
government expenditure.
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Shocks Stochastic Process
Home Prod. ln (Z1;t)=
 
1 + z1;1   z2;1

ln (Z1;t 1) z1;1 ln (Z1;t 2)+"z1;t
Foreign Prod. ln (Z2;t)=
 
1 + z1;2   z2;2

ln (Z2;t 1) z1;2 ln (Z2;t 2)+"z2;t
Home Oil Sup. ln
 
Y o1;t

=
 
1 + yo1;1   yo2;1

ln
 
Y o1;t 1
 yo1;1 ln  Y o1;t 2+"yo1;t
Foreign Oil Sup. ln
 
Y o2;t

=
 
1 + yo1;2   yo2;2

ln
 
Y o2;t 1
 yo1;2 ln  Y o2;t 2+"yo2;t
Home Oil Int. ln
 
Zo1;t

=
 
1 + zo1;1   zo2;1

ln
 
Zo1;t 1
 zo1;1 ln  Zo1;t 2+"zo1;t
Foreign Oil Int. ln
 
Zo2;t

=
 
1 + zo1;2   zo2;2

ln
 
Zo2;t 1
 zo1;2 ln  Zo2;t 2+"zo2;t
Home Cons. ln
 
Zc1;t

= zc1;1 ln
 
Zc1;t 1

+"c1;t
Foreign Cons. ln
 
Zc2;t

= zc1;2 ln
 
Zc2;t 1

+"c2;t
Home Imp. Pref. ln
 
Zm1;t

=
 
1 + zm1;1   zm2;1

ln
 
Zm1;t 1
 zm1;1 ln  Zm1;t 2+"zm1;t
Foreign Imp. Pref. ln
 
Zm2;t

=
 
1 + zm1;2   zm2;2

ln
 
Zm2;t 1
 zm1;2 ln  Zm2;t 2+"zm2;t
Home Inv. ln
 
Zi1;t

= zi1;1 ln
 
Zi1;t 1

+"i1;t
Home Price Mar. ^
p
1;t= 
p
1;1^
p
1;t 1+"
p
1;t
Home Wage Mar. ^
w
1;t= 
w
1;1^
w
1;t 1+"w1;t
Home In. Target core1;t = 

1;1
core
1;t 1+"

1;t
Home Gov. Exp. g^d1;t= 
g
1;1g^
d
1;t 1+"
g
1;t
Table 3.1: Exogenous Shocks
3.3 Estimating the Model
In this section, we estimate the model described in Section 2 using Bayesian
techniques. Equilibrium conditions and their log-linearizations around the
deterministic steady state are given in Appendix C. Accordingly, we describe the
data in Section 3.1 before presenting the model parameters in Section 3.2. Section
3.3 shows the estimated results. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we focus on the variance
decomposition analysis and the business cycle statistics, respectively.
3.3.1 Data
The model is estimated for the sample period 1990:Q1-2005:Q4.61 The starting
date corresponds to the earliest quarter for which data on Brent oil price was
available. Since we are interested in estimating the UK economy in the time period
that it was an oil exporter, the end of the sample coincides with the transition of
61We use the period 1988:Q1-1989:Q4 as a pre-sample.
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the UK economy from an oil exporter to an oil importer country.
We use fteen data series in the estimation because there are fteen shocks
in the theoretical model (as described in Section 2.7). More specically, the
fteen time series are: UK and foreign real GDP, UK and foreign crude
oil productions, real oil price, UK broad e¤ective exchange rate, UK private
consumption expenditure, UK total gross xed capital formation, UK oil imports,
UK non-oil goods imports, UK non-oil goods exports, UK core ination, UK wage
ination, UK nominal interest rate and UK government debt. The data series used
in the present chapter are the same as in Chapter 2, except for the UK government
debt. The latter series is taken from ONS and corresponds to the public sector
net debt. We seasonally adjust this series and express it as a share of the UK
GDP. The data sources and the construction of the remaining observed variables
are reported in Appendix C.
3.3.2 Model Parameters
Similarly to Chapter 2, we chose to split the parameters in three di¤erent sets.
The rst set corresponds to parameter values that are kept xed and are mainly
taken from previous economic literature. The second set is constructed from the
observed data of the UK and the rest of the world for sample period 1990-2005.
Finally, the third set of parameters is estimated with Bayesian methods.
First Set of Fixed Parameters. Table 3.2 presents the rst set of parameters
which can be viewed as strict priors. In particular, we assume that these
parameters have the same values for both the domestic and the foreign countries.
More specically, we set the discount factor (1) equal to 0.99, which implies
an annual steady state of the real interest rate of 4%. We assume that the annual
steady state of the capital depreciation rate is 10%, implying that 1 equals 0.025.
We set the value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1) equal to 1.
We set LSS1 equal to 0.33, implying that, in steady state, agents devote 1/3 of their
time endowment to work. In line with Bodenstein et al. (2011), we assume that
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the parameter for the bond intermediation cost (b1) is equal to 0.0001. Finally,
we x the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (1+
v
1
v1
) equal to 0.8.
Parameter Value Description Motivation
1 0:99 Discount Factor Assumption
1 0:025 Depreciation Rate Assumption
1 1 IES Assumption
LSS1 0:33 Labour Steady State Assumption
b1 0:0001 Bond Intermediation Cost Bodenstein et al. (2012)
v1  5 Determines K-L Elas. Sub. 1+
v
1
v1
= 0:8
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters According to Previous Literature
Second Set of Parameters Constructed from the Actual Data. In Table
3.3, we report the second set of parameters that are constructed from the observed
data of UK and the foreign bloc. These parameters values are kept xed when we
estimate the model and, generally, determine average ratios.62
As concerns the UK economy, the weight of capital in the value added
production function (!k1) corresponds to 0.43, the weight of oil on total production
(!oy1 ) is equal to 0.03, while the importance of oil on nal consumption (!
oc
1 ) is
0.01. Moreover, the weight of consumption goods on total imports (!mc1 ) is equal
to 0.32, while the importance of services on total imports (!mi1 ) corresponds to
0.38.
In addition, Table 3.3 shows the several parameters for the UK scal sector. In
particular, we set the steady state tax rates according to their average values for
the period 1997-2005.63 We also assume the same tax rates for National Insurance
Contribution paid by households,
 
wh1
SS
, and rms,

wf1
SS
.
62See Appendix C for the derivation of composite parameters of the model.
63Appendix C describes in detail the time series used in order to obtain the several UK tax
rates.
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Parameter Description Home Country Foreign Country
Capital Weight in Value Added !k1= 0:43 !
k
2= 0:56
Weight of Oil in Production !oy1 = 0:03 !
oy
2 = 0:03
Weight of Oil in Consumption !oc1 = 0:01 !
oc
2 = 0:01
Weight of Cons. in Tot. Imp. !mc1 = 0:32 !
mc
2 = 0:48
Weight of Services in Tot. Imp. !mi1 = 0:38 !
mi
2 = 0:39
S.S. VAT Rate ( c1)
SS = 0:11 -
S.S. Income Tax Rate
 
 l1
SS
= 0:19 -
S.S. NIC Rate (households)
 
wh1
SS
= 0:12 -
S.S. Fuel Duty Tax Rate ( oc1 )
SS = 0:51 -
S.S. NIC Rate (rms)

wf1
SS
= 0:12 -
S.S. Corporation Tax Rate
 
 d1
SS
= 0:14 -
S.S. PRT Tax Rate ( yo1 )
SS = 0:36 -
Share Gov. Exp. / GDP
(Gd1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS= 0:24 -
Share of Oil Production
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
+(Y o2 )
SS = 0:06
(Y o2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
+(Y o2 )
SS = 0:94
Share of Oil Consumption
1
2
(O1)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS+(O2)
SS = 0:03
(O2)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS+(O2)
SS = 0:97
Population Size 1= 0:02 2= 0:98
Table 3.3: Calibrated Parameters According to Observed Data
As concerns the foreign bloc, we construct the several parameters using the
Loretan (2005) technique.64 In particular, the value for the weight of capital in the
value added production function (!k2) is equal to 0.56, the parameter capturing the
weight of oil in production (!oy2 ) equals 0.03, while the weight of oil in consumption
(!oc2 ) corresponds to 0.01. Finally, the parameter determining the importance of
consumption goods in total imports (!mc2 ) and the one capturing the weight of
services in total imports (!mi2 ) are 0.48 and 0.39, respectively.
64See Appendix C for a detailed explanation of the Loretan (2005) method applied to the main
UK trading partners.
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Third Set of Parameters: Prior Distributions. Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show
the prior distributions for the remaining parameters estimated with Bayesian
techniques. We assume priors that are in line with those commonly used in
previous literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2007; Del Negro and Schorfheide,
2008; Leeper et al., 2010).
Table 3.4 shows the prior distributions for the endogenous parameters of the
model. In particular, the parameter for investment adjustment costs ('i1) and the
consumption habit coe¢ cient (1) are the same as in Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2008). We set the parameter determining the labour supply elasticity (1) in line
with the paper of Bodenstein et al. (2012).
Moreover, we assume Calvo probabilities for wages (w1 ) and prices (
p
1) as well
as indexation parameters for both wages (w1 ) and prices (
p
1) in line with Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2008).
Our assumed prior for the ination weight in the Taylor rule (1 ) has a higher
mean value than that of the output gap (y1). In addition, the policy rate smoothing
parameter (i1) has the same prior as in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008).
Turning to the price elasticity of oil demand (1+
o
1
o1
), its prior mean value is
broadly in line with empirical studies that have estimated the price elasticity of
oil demand for the US economy.65 Moreover, the prior mean for the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign non oil goods (1+
c
1
c1
) is slightly higher
than the estimated value of Hooper et al. (2000).
In general, the priors for the scal parameters concerning the distortive taxes
are chosen to be fairly di¤use and cover a reasonable large range of parameter
values. In particular, the response of the VAT to total consumption ( cc1 ) is
assumed to have a Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation
of 0.4. This prior mean value is consistent with the estimated correlation between
the UK VAT rate and the total private consumption expenditure.
65See for example Kilian and Murphy (2010), Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) and Bodenstein
et al. (2012).
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Par. Description Distrib. Mean St. Dev.
1 Degree of Habit Persistence in Cons. Beta 0.70 0.05
'i1 Investment Adjustment Cost Gamma 4.00 1.50
1 Lab. Sup. El. (
1
2
) Gamma 25.00 0.75
w1 Calvo Wages Probability Beta 0.60 0.20
p1 Calvo Prices Probability Beta 0.60 0.20
w1 Degree of Wage Indexation Beta 0.20 0.08
p1 Degree of Price Indexation Beta 0.20 0.08
1 Taylor Rule Coe¢ cient on Ination Gamma 0.20 0.10
y1 Taylor Rule Coe¢ cient on Output Gamma 0.30 0.10
i1 Degree of Int. Rate Smoothing in T.R. Beta 0.50 0.20
1+o1
o1
Price Elasticity of Oil Demand Gamma 0.40 0.20
1+c1
c1
Sub. El. between Dom. and For. Goods Gamma 2.50 0.10
 cc1 VAT / Priv. Cons. Coe¤. Gamma 0.50 0.40
 ly1 Labour Income Tax / GDP Coe¤. Gamma 0.30 0.20
 lb1 Labour Income Tax / Debt Coe¤. Normal 0.05 0.10
 wb1 NIC (hh and rms) / Debt Coe¤. Normal 0.05 0.10
 ococ1 Fuel Duty Tax / Oil Dem. Coe¤. Gamma 0.30 0.20
 dd1 Corporation Tax / Div. Coe¤. Gamma 0.20 0.10
 yopo1 Petroleum Revenue Tax / Oil Price Coe¤. Gamma 0.30 0.10
Table 3.4: Prior Distributions for the Endogenous Parameters
The response of the labour income tax to output ( ly1 ) is assumed to have
Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.3 and a standard deviation of 0.2. This
prior mean value is slightly lower than the one assumed by Leeper et al. (2010)
for the US economy.
The responses of the labour income tax ( lb1 ) and the NIC ( 
wb
1 ) to the lagged
government debt are assumed to have Normal distributions with means of 0.05
and standard deviations of 0.10. These prior mean values are in line with the
estimated correlations of the IT tax rate and the NIC rate with the one year
lagged government debt.
The response of corporation tax to domestic dividends is assumed to be Gamma
distributed with a mean of 0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.1. This prior
ensures that the domain covers the range of values corresponding to the estimated
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correlation between the corporation tax rate and the gross operating surplus of
corporations.
The response of fuel duty tax to oil demand ( ococ1 ) and the response of
petroleum revenue tax to oil price ( yopo1 ) are assumed to be Gamma distributed
with both means of 0.3 whereas their standard deviations correspond to 0.2 and 0.1,
respectively. These prior mean values are consistent with the estimated correlation
between the fuel duty tax rate and UK oil consumption and, in turn, the estimated
correlation between the PRT rate and the real oil price.
Autocorrelation Coe¢ cients Distribution Mean St. Dev.
UK Productivity: z1;1 Beta 0.010 0.005
UK Productivity: z2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Oil Supply: yo1;1 Beta 0.90 0.05
UK Oil Supply: yo2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
Foreign Oil Supply: yo1;2 Beta 0.90 0.05
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2;2 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Oil Intensity: zo1;1 Beta 0.90 0.05
UK Oil Intensity: zo2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0020
UK Consumption: zc1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Investment: zi1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Import Preferences: zm1;1 Beta 0.030 0.005
UK Import Preferences: zm2;1 Beta 0.0045 0.0040
UK Price Markup: p1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Wage Markup: w1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Ination Target: 1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
UK Gov. Expenditure: g1;1 Beta 0.70 0.20
Table 3.5: Prior Distributions for the Shock Processes: Persistence Parameters
Table 3.5 shows the prior distributions for the persistence parameters of
the shock processes. Beta distributions are chosen for all the autoregressive
coe¢ cients. We assume prior values implying that the domestic import preferences
shock is more persistent than the domestic technological shock. Moreover, we
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assume that the persistence of oil supply shocks for domestic and foreign countries
have the same priors.
As concerns the domestic oil intensity shock, zo1;1 is assumed to have a mean
of 0.90 and a standard deviation of 0.05, whereas zo2;1 has a mean equal to 0.0045
and a standard deviation equal to 0.0020. Regarding to the persistences of AR(1)
processes we set their prior means equal to 0.70 and their prior standard deviations
equal to 0.20. Finally, we use inverse Gamma distributions for standard errors of
all exogenous shocks with means equal to 0.01 and innite degrees of freedom
(Table 3.6).
Shock Standard Error Distribution Mean St. Dev.
UK Productivity: z1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Productivity: z2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Oil Supply: yo1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Oil Intensity: zo1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Oil Intensity: zo2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Consumption: zc1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Private Consumption: zc2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Import Preferences: zm1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Foreign Import Preferences: zm2 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Investment: zi1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Price Markup: p1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Wage Markup: w1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Ination Target: 1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
UK Gov. Expenditure: g1 Inv-Gamma 0.01 Inf
Table 3.6: Prior Distributions for the Shock Processes: St. Errors
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3.3.3 Estimated Results
In order to estimate the model we detrend each variable66 using HP lter with
smoothing parameter equal to 1,600.67 As we mentioned before, the model is
estimated with Bayesian methods. Our acceptance rate corresponds to 28%. In
order to test the stability of the sample we use the convergence diagnostic of
Brooks and Gelman (1998) that compares between and within moments of multiple
chains.68
Table 3.7 reports the modes and the means with 5% and 95% of the posterior
distributions of the endogenous parameters of the estimated model.69 In particular,
we observe that the estimate of the habit formation parameter (1) is well identied
by the data with a posterior mean of 0.91. This value is larger than the previous
UK estimates of the same parameter.70 Turning to the capital adjustment cost
coe¢ cient ('i1), its posterior mean estimate is higher than its prior suggesting a
lower response of investment to changes in the value of capital.
Our estimated value for 1 is much higher than the ones found by Harrison
and Oomen (2010) and Millard (2011). Indeed, our theoretical framework (based
on the two blocs open economy model) implies additional channels that a¤ect real
wages with respect to the standard small open economy models. More specically,
small open economy models miss the variation stemming from the endogenous oil
price.
Turning to nominal rigidities, the posterior mean estimates suggest that wages
66As an alternative strategy, we also estimated the model demeaning the series of UK core
ination, wage ination and nominal interest and detrending the remaining series. Then we
compared the estimated results of these two di¤erent specications and we did not nd any
particular di¤erence in the posterior estimates.
67As noticed by Leeper et al. (2010), incorporating common stochastic trends into a model
with scal policy is non-trivial since several scal variables appear to have their own trends which
require particular adjustments.
68All estimates were made using Dynare (http://www.dynare.org/).
69In Appendix C we also show the prior and posterior probability density functions for all the
estimated parameters.
70The estimates of DiCecio and Nelson (2007), Harrison and Oomen (2010), Millard (2011)
range from 0.42 and 0.78.
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are very sticky. The probability of optimally resetting nominal wages is 0.01. Our
estimated value is lower than the one found by Harrison and Oomen (2010) of
about 0.15. Moreover, wage changes are hardly indexed to lagged wage ination.71
Par. Description Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
1 Cons. Habit 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.93
'i1 Inv. Adj. Cost 4.02 4.40 2.53 6.26
1 Lab. Sup. El. (
1
2
) 24.92 24.92 23.70 26.17
w1 Calvo Wages Prob. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
p1 Calvo Prices Prob. 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.93
w1 Degree of Wage Ind. 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.21
p1 Degree of Price Ind. 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.28
1 T. R. Coef. on Ination 0.28 0.28 0.08 0.42
y1 T. R. Coef. on Output 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.34
i1 Int. Rate Smoothing Par. 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.95
1+o1
o1
Oil Elasticity 0.30 0.31 0.21 0.40
1+c1
c1
Trade Elasticity 2.83 2.81 2.65 2.96
 cc1 VAT / Priv. Cons. Coe¤. 0.14 0.41 0.00 0.85
 ly1 Lab. Tax / GDP Coe¤. 0.40 0.67 0.05 1.28
 lb1 Lab. Tax / Debt Coe¤. 0.06 0.10 -0.03 0.24
 wb1 NIC / Debt Coe¤. 0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.23
 ococ1 F. D. Tax / Oil Dem. Coe¤. 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.31
 dd1 Corpor. Tax / Div. Coe¤. 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.21
 yopo1 PRT / Oil Price Coe¤. 0.16 0.22 0.05 0.38
Table 3.7: Estimation Results of Endogenous Parameters
The posterior mean estimates also show that prices are quite sticky, being
changed roughly every ten quarters on average. The estimated value of p1 is in
line with the Calvo price probability found by Millard (2011).72 Moreover, price
71In particular, our posterior mean of w1 is 0.13 in line with the 0.19 estimated by Millard
(2011).
72In particular, Millard (2011) found that the probability of not being able to change price in
the non-energy sector is 0.90.
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indexation is quite low suggesting little ination persistence. Our estimated value
of p1 is very similar as in Millard (2011).
73
The estimated parameters of the Taylor Rule are all well identied. Our results
imply that in our sample period the interest rate shows a higher responsiveness
to ination variation than output changes. Moreover, the posterior mean of i1
implies that the nominal interest rate is highly autocorrelated.
Focusing on the price elasticity of oil demand (1+
o
1
o1
), we nd that its posterior
mean estimate is well identied. In particular, our estimated value is in line with
the results obtained by Kilian and Murphy (2010) for the US economy.74 Moreover,
our estimated trade elasticity (1+
c
1
c1
) is larger than the one found by Hooper et al.
(2000).75
Turning to the results of the scal policy parameters we observe that, in general,
most of the posterior estimates are well identied. In particular, the estimated
value of  ly1 indicates that the labour income tax rate has a highly procyclical
response to domestic output. Moreover, the estimates of the parameters  lb1 and
 wb1 show that the labour income tax and the National Insurance Contribution do
not respond strongly to debt.76
Our results also indicate a high mean value of  cc1 implying that the response
of the VAT rate to private consumption expenditure is important. Conversely, the
low estimated value of  dd1 implies that the corporation tax rate does not respond
strongly to variations in rmsdividends.
The posterior mean estimate  ococ1 indicates that the fuel duty tax rate has a
moderate response to oil demand. On the contrary, our estimated value of  yopo1
shows that the PRT rate responds strongly to oil price changes.
73In particular, Millard (2011) found that price indexation in the non-energy sector is 0.15.
74In particular, Kilian and Murphy (2010) have distinguished between two di¤erent short run
price elasticities of US oil demand: in production and in use. The absolute values of their
posterior median estimates were 0.44 and 0.26, respectively.
75In particular, these authors estimated a long-run elasticity between domestic and foreign
goods of 1.6 for the UK economy.
76Note that the estimated scal policy parameters in Table 3.7 are all positive, as sign
restrictions are imposed in equations (3.31)-(3.37).
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Finally, we focus on the estimated parameters of the stochastic shock processes
(Tables 3.8 and 3.9).
Autocorrelation Coe¢ cients Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
UK Productivity: z1;1 0.0067 0.0091 0.0020 0.0156
UK Productivity: z2;1 0.0006 0.0039 0.0001 0.0078
UK Oil Supply: yo1;1 0.9205 0.8285 0.6875 0.9633
UK Oil Supply: yo2;1 0.0011 0.0024 0.0003 0.0052
Foreign Oil Supply: yo1;2 0.9727 0.9659 0.9429 0.9899
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2;2 0.0019 0.0024 0.0011 0.0035
UK Oil Intensity: zo1;1 0.5599 0.5858 0.4574 0.7116
UK Oil Intensity: zo2;1 0.0052 0.0056 0.0019 0.0092
UK Private Consumption: zc1;1 0.2334 0.3025 0.1179 0.4942
UK Private Investment: zi1;1 0.1615 0.1901 0.0423 0.3287
UK Import Preferences: zm1;1 0.0292 0.0298 0.0217 0.0376
UK Import Preferences: zm2;1 0.0004 0.0028 0.0001 0.0068
UK Price Markup: p1;1 0.3568 0.2872 0.1250 0.4391
UK Wage Markup: w1;1 0.2691 0.3292 0.1710 0.4823
UK Ination Target: 1;1 0.8335 0.8064 0.6979 0.8990
UK Gov. Expenditure: g1;1 0.5166 0.5107 0.3456 0.6693
Table 3.8: Estimation Results of Shock Processes: Persistence Parameters
Focusing on the AR(1) processes the posterior estimates suggest that the
UK ination target shock is fairly persistent but the other shocks much less so.
Concerning AR(2) processes, the UK import preferences shock is more persistent
than the UK productivity shock. Turning to oil shocks, the foreign oil supply
shock is the most persistent followed by the UK oil supply shock and the UK oil
intensity shock. The estimated standard deviations of these stochastic processes
are in general well identied and in most of the cases signicantly higher than the
prior means (Table 3.9).
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Shock Standard Error Post. Mode Post. Mean Conf. Inter.
UK Productivity: z1 0.0850 0.0869 0.0737 0.1000
Foreign Productivity: z2 0.0847 0.0952 0.0773 0.1122
UK Oil Supply: yo1 0.1146 0.1112 0.0926 0.1290
Foreign Oil Supply: yo2 0.0141 0.0143 0.0120 0.0164
UK Oil Intensity: zo1 0.2187 0.2333 0.1773 0.2856
Foreign Oil Intensity: zo2 0.0172 0.0160 0.0128 0.0189
UK Private Consumption: zc1 0.0105 0.0115 0.0094 0.0136
Foreign Private Consumption: zc2 0.0697 0.0778 0.0645 0.0897
UK Import Preferences: zm1 0.0195 0.0199 0.0169 0.0228
Foreign Import Preferences: zm2 0.0358 0.0370 0.0312 0.0425
UK Private Investment: zi1 0.1777 0.1930 0.1090 0.2760
UK Price Markup: p1 3.1062 3.5997 1.9652 5.3767
UK Wage Markup: w1 3.8985 4.4667 3.0784 5.7339
UK Ination Target: 1 0.0451 0.0714 0.0052 0.1188
UK Gov. Expenditure: g1 0.0432 0.0440 0.0374 0.0504
Table 3.9: Estimation Results of Shock Processes: St. Errors
3.3.4 Variance Decomposition Analysis
In order to interpret the estimates of the parameters governing all the shock
processes we focus on Table 3.10. The latter table shows the variance
decomposition of the key variables obtained by simulating the model once the
parameters have been estimated. The simulation results are obtained through
10,000 iterations (neglecting the rst 1,000) and are ltered by HP lter with
smoothing parameter equal to 1,600.
As expected, oil price changes are mostly explained by foreign shocks, whereas
domestic shocks do not play a signicant role. In particular, the foreign oil intensity
shock is clearly the most important in explaining the oil price, accounting for
almost half of the variation in the oil price. Moreover, the foreign oil supply shock
and the foreign productivity shock explain 28% and 18% of the oil price variance,
respectively.
The price of oil is not the only channel for the transmission of oil shocks. Indeed,
the foreign oil intensity shock plays a signicant role in inuencing the variance
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of many UK observed variables (such as private investment, headline ination,
overall trade balance, private consumption, government debt and GDP).
Oil UK UK UK For. UK UK Ov. UK Ex. UK G.
Price GDP Cons. Inv. GDP Head. Bal. Rate Debt
(real) (real) (GDP (GDP (real) In. (GDP (real) (GDP
share) share) share) share)
H. Prod. 0 50 33 23 0 4 9 2 45
F. Prod. 18 1 1 7 76 5 10 2 9
H. Cons. 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
F. Cons. 2 2 5 4 3 4 24 0 2
H. Imp. 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 0
F. Imp. 0 1 1 0 0 8 2 76 0
H. Oil S. 6 12 15 2 1 4 16 0 2
F. Oil S. 28 5 6 19 4 16 10 1 9
H. Oil I. 1 4 8 1 0 11 6 6 1
F. Oil I. 44 9 14 35 12 27 15 2 13
H. Inv. 0 1 2 5 0 0 1 0 0
H. W. M. 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
H. P. M. 0 1 1 0 0 12 0 0 2
H. M. P. 1 12 11 3 3 3 5 1 3
H. G. Ex. 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 14
Table 3.10: Variance Decompositions (Percentage) - All Shocks
Similarly, the foreign oil supply shock accounts for a signicant variation
in several UK macroeconomic aggregates (such as private investment, headline
ination and overall trade balance). Interestingly, the UK oil supply shock has a
relevant impact on the variation of some UK observed variables such as total trade
balance, private consumption and GDP.
In general, these ndings highlight the importance of general equilibrium e¤ects
for the transmission of shocks that are specic to the oil market and are in line
with previous results on the US economy (see for example Bodestein et al., 2011,
and Bodenstein et al., 2012).
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The UK government debt variance is mostly explained by the domestic
productivity shock. This outcome can be justied as follows. The change
in domestic productivity directly a¤ects the total tax base. Since government
spending has been fairly stable during the period 1990-2005, the variation of the
tax base strongly inuenced the UK debt level.
Interestingly, we nd that the foreign oil intensity shock contributes
signicantly to the variation of UK government debt. The main reason is that
the foreign oil intensity shock strongly a¤ects the oil price. Accordingly, relevant
changes in the oil price imply more volatile oil tax revenues and, in turn, debt
levels. Finally, the variation of the UK government debt is also explained by the
domestic government spending shock.
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3.3.5 Business Cycle Statistics
We will now proceed by verifying if our estimated model is able to capture the
business cycle properties of the key variables. To do so we compare the actual
business cycle moments with those implied by our model.
As in the variance decomposition analysis, we simulate the model once the
parameters have been estimated. Table 3.11 shows the relative standard deviations
of the key variables with respect to GDP.
Variable Model Data
UK GDP 1.00 1.00
UK Oil Production 5.54 7.58
Foreign Oil Production 0.76 1.74
UK Oil Imports (GDP Share) 0.57 0.16
Real Oil Price 20.64 20.95
UK Non Oil Goods Imports (GDP Share) 0.23 0.93
UK Goods Exports (GDP Share) 0.27 0.78
UK Real Exchange Rate (qr.) 3.45 4.39
UK Private Consumption (GDP share) 0.49 0.48
UK Private Investment (GDP share) 0.37 0.64
UK Headline Ination 0.19 0.56
UK 3 Months Treasury Bills (qr.) 2.10 1.22
UK Wage Ination 0.03 0.07
UK Government Debt 2.80 2.05
Table 3.11: Observed Data and Model Implications - Relative St. Deviations to GDP
In general, the model is able to reproduce the volatilities of the actual variables.
More specically, we note that the real oil price is extremely volatile. Moreover,
the UK oil production, the UK real e¤ective exchange rate and the nominal interest
rate display higher volatilities than the UK GDP. Interestingly, the volatility of
the UK government debt is almost double than the one of the UK GDP. On the
contrary, the UK headline ination and the UK wage ination show small standard
deviations compared to the UK GDP.
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Table 3.12 shows the autocorrelations of the key variables of the model. In
general, all the variables display a strong persistence except the UK headline
ination and the wage ination.
In general, from these batteries of statistics we can conclude that the business
cycle moments implied by model t well the ones of actual data.
Variable Model Data
UK GDP 0.89 0.96
UK Oil Production 0.96 0.85
Foreign Oil Production 0.97 0.93
UK Oil Imports (GDP Share) 0.92 0.81
Real Oil Price 0.90 0.84
UK Non Oil Goods Imports (GDP Share) 0.72 0.90
UK Goods Exports (GDP Share) 0.86 0.94
UK Real Exchange Rate (qr.) 0.76 0.96
UK Private Consumption (GDP share) 0.91 0.92
UK Private Investment (GDP share) 0.95 0.89
UK Headline Ination 0.49 0.53
UK 3 Months Treasury Bills (qr.) 0.88 0.97
UK Wage Ination 0.82 0.57
UK Government Debt 0.96 0.99
Table 3.12: Observed Data and Model Implications - Autocorrelations
3.4 How Do Oil Price Changes Impact on UK Public
Finances?
In this section, we are going to analyse the specic e¤ects of oil price uctuations on
the UK scal sector and, in particular, at which rate oil price changes work through
the economy into UK public nances. With respect to previous papers that have
investigated this issue77, both the theoretical framework and the empirical strategy
adopted in this paper present several advantages.
77See for example, Powell and Horton (1985), Hall et al. (1986), Young (2000), NIESR (2000),
OECD Economic Surveys (2002), OBR (2010) and Barrell et al. (2011a) and (2011b).
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Firstly, our analysis takes into account the several sources of oil price shocks.
The particular implications of an oil price shock for UK public nances di¤er
depending on whether the shock is global or UK specic. Similarly, the e¤ects
implied by oil demand shocks are di¤erent from the ones generated by oil supply
shocks.
Secondly, the impact of oil price uctuations on UK public nances also
depends signicantly on how long the oil price change lasts. Accordingly, our
empirical strategy allows us to estimate directly the persistence of the exogenous
shocks a¤ecting oil prices.
Thirdly, the e¤ects of oil price movements on UK public nances are related
to the size of the UK price elasticity of oil demand. Thus, we estimate the latter
through Bayesian techniques.
Finally, our theoretical framework allows us to consider the response of the UK
scal sector in the case of actual and potential economy. In particular, our model
includes both real (adjustment costs and consumption habits) and nominal (price
and wage rigidities) frictions. Accordingly, we are able to assess the behaviours of
UK scal variables in the rigid and exible economy.
In Tables 3.13-3.14 and 3.15-3.16 we show the assessment of the e¤ects of oil
price uctuations on UK public nances. In particular, we consider foreign oil
intensity and foreign oil supply shocks. The shocks are chosen in order to induce a
drop in the oil price. Moreover, we distinguish between rigid and exible economy
cases. The values shown in the tables are obtained from the estimates of our
model. In particular, they follow a temporary one standard deviation change in
each exogenous shock. Finally, in order to construct the numbers reported in the
tables, we use the average value of each variable (expressed in £ billions) for the
sample period 1990-2005.
As we can see from Tables 3.13 and 3.15 a change in oil price a¤ects UK oil
revenues. In particular, a lower oil price depresses the petroleum revenue tax. Our
estimated model indicates a decline of £ 300 millions in oil revenues one year after
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a positive shock to foreign oil intensity. This loss decreases from the second year
onwards and is equal to 200 millions of Sterling Pounds. PRT revenues decrease
at lower pace in the case of a positive foreign oil supply shock.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
VAT Revenues (billions £ ) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Fuel Duty Revenues (billions £ ) -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
Corporation Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
NIC Revenues (billions £ ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government Net Debt (billions £ ) 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1
GDP (billions £ ) 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3
Table 3.13: Impact of the Foreign Oil Intensity Shock - Rigid Economy (One Positive
Estimated St. Dev. Shock to Foreign Oil Intensity)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
VAT Revenues (billions £ ) -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0
Fuel Duty Revenues (billions £ ) -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
Corporation Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
NIC Revenues (billions £ ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government Net Debt (billions £ ) 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0
GDP (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Table 3.14: Impact of the Foreign Oil Intensity Shock - Flexible Economy (One
Positive Estimated St. Dev. Shock to Foreign Oil Intensity)
As we will explain in the impulse response analysis, our estimated model
predicts a large drop in the oil price which prevails on the expansion of oil demand
by households. Consequently, we nd a loss of fuel duty revenues. As we can
observe from Tables 3.13 and 3.15, fuel duty revenues diminish following both
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shocks. Again, we notice a stronger e¤ect after the foreign oil intensity shock
(£ 400 millions the rst year after the shock).
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
VAT Revenues (billions £ ) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Fuel Duty Revenues (billions £ ) -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Corporation Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
NIC Revenues (billions £ ) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Government Net Debt (billions £ ) 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9
GDP (billions £ ) 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1
Table 3.15: Impact of the Foreign Oil Supply Shock - Rigid Economy (One Positive
Estimated St. Dev. Shock to Foreign Oil Supply)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
VAT Revenues (billions £ ) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Fuel Duty Revenues (billions £ ) -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Corporation Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income Tax Revenues (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
NIC Revenues (billions £ ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Government Net Debt (billions £ ) 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7
GDP (billions £ ) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Table 3.16: Impact of the Foreign Oil Supply Shock - Flexible Economy (One Positive
Estimated St. Dev. Shock to Foreign Oil Supply)
Table 3.13 and 3.15 show that VAT revenues fall after both shocks for two main
reasons. Firstly, the lower oil price implies the drop of oil sales. Secondly, both
shocks induce the reduction in the sales of non-oil imported goods. Consequently,
in response to the foreign oil intensity shock VAT receipts decrease by £ 100 millions
for the three years following the shock. The drop of VAT revenues is less persistent
in response to the foreign oil supply shock.
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As we can note from Tables 3.13 and 3.15, the remaining tax receipts increase
benetting from the positive e¤ects of the lower oil price on the UK economy.
Generally, in terms of tax revenues, we do not observe signicant di¤erences
between exible and rigid economy cases (Tables 3.13-3.14 and 3.15-3.16). On the
contrary, the responses of GDP and government debt are di¤erent in the cases of
actual and potential economy.
In terms of the e¤ects on GDP, a change in the oil price a¤ects the quantity
of output that rms wish to supply and therefore a¤ects the economys supply.
Similarly, the variation of oil price impacts on household incomes and inuences
their decisions in terms of consumption and savings. In turn, this implies a
variation in the economys demand. Moreover, in response to lower oil price,
the rmsmarginal cost drops implying a fall in the domestic ination. As a
consequence, Central Bank decreases its policy rate further boosting domestic
output. Nominal and real rigidities are particularly relevant in the transmission
channels of oil price variations. As we can observe from Tables 3.13-3.14 and 3.15-
3.16, the positive responses of actual GDP to foreign oil intensity and oil supply
shocks are always higher than the ones of potential GDP.
Regarding domestic government debt, as we will explain in Sections 5.1 and 5.2,
our model assumes that foreign oil intensity and foreign oil supply shocks do not
a¤ect UK government expenditure. Accordingly, the response of UK government
debt depends on the changes of tax revenues. In particular, the negative direct
e¤ects of oil price decrease on PRT, fuel duty and VAT revenues prevail on the
positive indirect e¤ects on the remaining tax receipts. As a consequence, UK public
nances worsen following both shocks. In particular, in response to a foreign oil
intensity shock, government debt increases by £ 700 millions during the rst year
and it reaches £ 1100 millions in four years. In the case of a foreign oil supply
shock, government debt rises by £ 700 millions during the rst year and it peaks in
three years (£ 1000 millions). Finally, we note that the deterioration of UK public
nances is less pronounced for the potential economy than in the case of the rigid
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economy (Tables 3.13-3.14 and 3.15-3.16).
3.4.1 Some Comparisons with Previous Studies
Although the previous studies on the e¤ects of oil price changes on the UK public
nances su¤er from the four limitations we explained above, it is useful to compare
our results with their ndings. Firstly, we compare our model with a set of less
recent analysis by the NIESR (Hall et al., 1986), the HM Treasury (Powell and
Horton, 1986) and the London Business School (Sunday Times, February 1986 and
a communication from Go¤rey Dicks). Secondly, we compare our results with the
ndings of a more recent study by the O¢ ce for Budget Responsibility (2010).
Considering the rst comparison (Table 3.17), there are two important reasons
why the results from our model and the analysis of the NIESR, the HMT and the
LBS are not directly comparable. Firstly, the sample periods are di¤erent. As we
explained above, our analysis covers the period 1990-2005, whereas the other three
studies focus on the data of the 1986. Secondly, the scale of the assumed changes
in the price of oil between our model and the other three studies is very di¤erent.
As we explained above, in our model the variation in the oil price corresponds
to the estimated standard deviation change in each exogenous shock. Conversely,
the LBS simulation considers a 25% fall in the oil price, whereas the other two
simulations assume a 10% fall.
Nevertheless, our results and the ndings of the NIESR, the HMT and the
LBS agree on several aspects. For example, our model conrms the ndings of
those studies by showing that a drop in the oil price induces a fall in the UK oil
revenues. However, our results indicate that the magnitude of the reduction in the
oil revenues is less intense than the one predicted by NIESR, the HMT and the
LBS.
There is also a substantial measure of agreement between our results and the
other three studies over the e¤ects of oil price decreases on the government nances.
Indeed, according to the analysis of the NIESR, the HMT and the LBS the decrease
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in the oil price induces an important increase in the government budget decit.
Similarly, our results show a relevant increase in the government debt in response
to a drop in the oil price.
Finally, in accordance with the results of the NIESR, the HMT and the LBS,
we nd that the UKGDP increases after a fall in the oil price. However, in contrast
with those three studies we nd that the persistence of this e¤ect is lower.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.03 -0.44 -1.28 -1.19
NIESR (10% fall) PSBR (billions £ ) 0.04 0.38 1.23 0.92
GDP (%) 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.20
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -0.70 -1.10 -1.20 -1.10
HMT (10% fall) PSBR (billions £ ) 0.70 1.10 1.00 1.10
GDP (%) 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.00
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -1.56 -2.14 -2.01 -1.96
LBS (25% fall) PSBR (billions £ ) 1.29 1.27 0.52 0.19
GDP (%) 0.44 1.21 1.28 0.94
Table 3.17: First Comparison: NIESR, HMT and LBS
Turning to the second comparison with the OBR report of 2010, from Table
3.18, we note many similarities with our results. More specically, the OBR report
of 2010 simulates the e¤ects on UK public nances of a permanent £ 10 decrease
in the oil price for the period 2000-2010.
In particular, our results agree with those of the OBR in showing a fall in oil
revenues after a drop in the oil price. However, this fall is less intense in our case
than in the OBR simulation. Secondly, both the OBR results and our ndings
predict a decrease in VAT revenues. In contrast with the OBR simulation, we nd
a fall in fuel duty revenues in response to a drop in the oil price. Finally, as in
the OBR results, we nd that the UK GDP increases after a fall in the oil price.
However, our ndings show that the magnitude of this e¤ect is weaker than in the
OBR case.
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Oil Revenues (billions £ ) -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
VAT Revenues (billions £ ) -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Fuel Duty Revenues (billions £ ) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
GDP (billions £ ) 1.7 3.5 4.1 4.5
Table 3.18: Second Comparison: OBR (Perm. 10 Pounds Decrease in the Oil Price)
3.5 Impulse Response Analysis
This section presents some impulse response functions for the estimated model. In
particular, we focus on IRFs related to the shocks that mainly a¤ect the changes
in the oil price according to our variance decomposition analysis.
The lines displayed in the various charts are generated by the mean estimates
of the posterior distributions of the model. In each gure, we show the impulse
responses following a temporary one-standard deviation change in the exogenous
shock. We chose the signs of the shocks in order to induce a decrease in the oil
price. In general, the impacts of the shocks on UK macroeconomic aggregates
displayed in the gures below are in line with results obtained in Chapter 2.
3.5.1 Foreign Oil Intensity Shock
We start by analysing the e¤ects of a positive shock to foreign oil intensity (Figures
3.1 and 3.2). An increase of Zo2;t implies that the foreign country improves its oil
e¢ ciency and decreases its oil demand. As a consequence, we observe a drop in
the real oil price in Sterling terms (Graph (a)) and a rise of the UK oil demand
(Graph (b)).
From Graph (a), we note that the shock is very persistent. This aspect implies
that the e¤ects on all endogenous variables last for a long time horizon.
Graphs (c) and (i) show the positive responses of GDP and domestic absorption
(dened as the sum of UK consumption and investment). Similarly, hours worked
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increase in response to the shock (Graph (j)).
Turning to external sector, we observe a decit of the UK overall trade balance
after the shock (Graph (k)). In particular, since the UK is a net oil exporter, a
positive foreign oil intensity shock implies a reduction of UK oil exports. As we
can note from Graph (k), the domestic non-oil trade balance is not inuenced by
the shock.
Graph (l) shows the pattern of the UK real exchange rate that we dene as the
price of the foreign consumption basket over the price of the domestic consumption
basket in a common currency. We note an immediate appreciation of the Pound.
However, from the third quarter onwards, the domestic exchange rate depreciates.
The depreciation of the UK currency is caused by the increase of the relative price
of imported goods with respect to domestic goods.
This result is di¤erent from what we found in Chapter 2 and it can be explained
considering the behaviour of UK taxation in response to the shock.
Figure 3.1: IRFs of Main Variables to a Positive Foreign Oil Intensity Shock
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Indeed, in the UK, the value added tax is also charged on road fuel. In
particular, VAT is charged on the pre-tax plus duty price. Therefore, the decrease
in the oil price (due to the positive shock to foreign oil intensity) induces a
reduction in the VAT on oil products.78 In turn, this reduction stimulates the
consumption of domestic oil goods. Since in our model nal consumption goods
are a combination of non-oil and oil goods, we observe the reduction of the price
of domestic consumption goods. Therefore, the relative price of imported goods
with respect to domestic goods increases inducing the depreciation of the Pound.
As we can see from Graph (g), the response of the marginal cost is negative
implying a reduction in ination. In particular, the drop of the marginal cost is
due to the negative gaps between the rental rates and the marginal products of
each factor input.79 From Graph (e), we note that the negative di¤erence between
the oil rental rate and the oil marginal product does not contribute substantially
to the fall of marginal cost. Conversely, the negative di¤erences between the rental
rates and the marginal products of the other two factors induce the drop of the
marginal cost (Graphs (d) and (f)).
Graph (h) shows that, after the shock, wage ination does not change
substantially. On the contrary, core ination remains negative for almost all of
the quarters. As a consequence, Bank of England reduces the nominal interest
rate.
Turning to the scal sector, Figure 3.2 displays the responses of government
debt and main tax revenues to the positive shock of foreign oil intensity.80 As
we can observe from Graph (m), the UK government debt expands persistently.
In particular, since the foreign oil intensity shock is very persistent the return of
government debt to its steady state value occurs beyond the horizons shown in the
78Our result is in line with the paper of Leicester (2005) concerning fuel taxation in UK for
the period 1990-2005.
79See relation (C154) in Appendix C for the equation expressing domestic marginal cost.
80In Figures 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6 the solid black lines correspond to the actual responses of scal
variables whereas the dotted red lines represent the responses of scal variables in the case of a
exible economy.
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gure.
This result conrms the ndings of several papers that have analysed how
UK public nances react to changes in the oil price (see, for example, Powell and
Horton, 1985; Hall et al., 1986; Young, 2000 and OECD Economic Surveys, United
Kingdom - 2002). In particular, all these studies have shown that a fall in the oil
price implies the reduction of oil revenues and, in turn, the worsening of UK public
nances.
Figure 3.2: IRFs of Fiscal Variables to a Positive Foreign Oil Intensity Shock
Moreover, our results are in line with the UK actual data that show a negative
relationship between the real oil price (expressed in Sterling Pounds) and the share
of UK government debt on GDP for the period 1990-2005.81
81The correlation between the detrended series of real oil price and the share of public sector
net debt on GDP is -0.17. Moreover, the correlation for these original series (not detrended)
corresponds to -0.38.
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Contrary to the papers mentioned above, our model takes into account several
transmission mechanisms of oil shocks on public nances. Thus, we need to be
very careful in describing each single e¤ect. In particular, considering a positive
oil intensity shock generated abroad we assume that government expenditure is
constant (since it is one of the exogenous variables of the model). Thus, the
positive response of government debt is mainly due to the decrease of total tax
receipts. Accordingly, Graphs (n)-(t) provide a breakdown of the several tax
revenues responses to the shock.
From Graph (n), we can observe that oil revenues reduce consistently in
response to the fall of oil price. Moreover, Graph (p) shows that fuel duty
tax revenues diminish considerably. In particular, although the oil demand by
households increases in response to the lower oil price, the value of oil sales
diminishes. Therefore, the large drop in the oil price prevails on the expansion
of oil demand by households inducing fuel duty tax revenues to fall.
Graph (o) shows that, in response to the shock, consumption tax revenues fall.
In particular, with the VAT paid on the oil and non-oil elements of the pump
price, VAT receipts on oil decrease. Similarly, VAT revenues from consumption of
imported non-oil goods fall. As a consequence, we observe a negative response of
total VAT revenues.
Turning to the remaining tax receipts, Graph (q) shows that corporation
tax revenues increase after the shock. Since the UK experiences a productivity
expansion due to the lower oil price, the rmsprots are higher, inducing a raise
in corporation tax revenues. Finally, in response to the shock, income tax and
NIC revenues increase because of the higher labour income experienced by the
households (Graphs (r), (s) and (t)) .
As we have stated above, the overall e¤ect of these tax revenues induces the
expansion of UK government debt (Graph (m)). In order to understand this
outcome we need to analyse several aspects. Although, the receipts from PRT,
VAT and fuel duty tax accounts for only 1/3 of total tax receipts, we should
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consider the net e¤ects of the lower oil price on each tax receipt. In particular,
our model implies that oil price changes have both direct and indirect e¤ects on
these revenues. More specically, we observe a direct e¤ect of oil price changes on
PRT and fuel duty revenues, whereas on the other revenues the e¤ects are indirect.
Accordingly, after thirty periods the shock occurs, the reductions of oil and fuel
duty revenues are relevant (they decrease 5% and 2.7%, respectively). On the
contrary, the improvements of income tax and NICs revenues are relatively small
(they increase 0.15% and 0.10%, respectively). This implies that the increases
of income tax, NIC and corporation tax revenues are not su¢ cient to o¤set
the decreases of PRT, fuel duty and VAT revenues. As a consequence domestic
government debt expands.
3.5.2 Foreign Oil Supply Shock
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the e¤ects of a positive foreign oil supply shock (Y o2;t). In
particular, the increase in the foreign oil supply causes a drop in foreign oil demand.
As a consequence, the real oil price expressed in Sterling Pounds decreases (Graph
(a)) and, in turn, the UK oil demand expands (Graph (b)). Also in this case, the
shock is extremely persistent (Graph (a)).
Similarly to the case described in the previous section, GDP (Graph (c)) and
domestic absorption (Graph (i)) increase. As we can observe from Graph (j), hours
worked mimic the behaviour of domestic output.
Considering the trade sector, the UK overall trade balance deteriorates. In
particular, the reduction of foreign oil demand implies that the UK oil balance
worsens whereas the domestic non-oil trade balance remains mostly unchanged
after the shock (Graph (k)). As in the case of the foreign oil intensity shock, after
an initial appreciation of the Pound, the UK exchange rate depreciates (Graph
(l)).
Graph (g) shows that the domestic marginal cost decreases in response to
the shock. As we can observe from Graphs (f), there is a substantial di¤erence
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between labour marginal product and nominal wage. Similarly, the gap between
capital marginal product and real rental rate is also relevant (Graph (d)). As a
consequence, these two gaps imply the fall in the marginal cost.
Graph (h) shows that core ination contracts in response to the shock.
Accordingly, the Bank of England decreases the nominal interest rate. On the
contrary, the response of wage ination is close to zero throughout all quarters.
Figure 3.3: IRFs of Main Variables to a Positive Foreign Oil Supply Shock
Turning to the responses of scal variables, Figure 3.4 shows the IRFs for UK
government debt and the several tax receipts. Again, we consider government
spending to be unchanged after the shock.
In general, the patterns of the responses displayed in Figure 3.4 mimic those
analysed in the case of the positive foreign oil intensity shock (Figure 3.2). The
only di¤erence lies in terms of magnitudes of the responses. More specically, since
foreign oil supply shock is less volatile than foreign oil intensity shock the e¤ects
on the several scal variables are also smaller.
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Figure 3.4: IRFs of Fiscal Variables to a Positive Foreign Oil Supply Shock
As we can observe from Graphs (n) and (p) oil revenues and fuel duty tax
revenues contract because of the drop in the oil price. Similarly, VAT receipts
(Graph (o)) reduce because of the lower value-added tax receipts on oil products
and imported non-oil goods.
On the contrary, corporation tax revenues (Graph (q)) increase since rms
prots expand in response to the shock. Similarly, we observe the positive
responses of income tax and NIC receipts (Graphs (r)-(s)) due to the improvement
of the households labour income.
The total e¤ect of these tax receipts implies a worsening of the UK public
nances. Indeed, the domestic government debt increases in response to the shock
(Graph (m)). As we explained in Section 5.1, the negative direct e¤ect of the lower
oil price on PRT and fuel duty receipts more than o¤sets the positive indirect e¤ect
of the lower oil price on the other tax revenues.
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3.5.3 Foreign Technology Shock
According to our variance decomposition analysis the foreign technology shock
plays an important role in terms of explanation of UK oil price volatility. Thus,
it is particularly interesting to analyse the responses of the UK economy to this
shock. In particular, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the impulse response functions of a
negative foreign technology shock (Z2;t).
As we found in Chapter 2, we note that the e¤ects generated by the oil market
channels dominate the typical e¤ects of a technology shock.
The negative foreign technology shock induces a drop in the foreign oil demand
and a consequent fall of the real oil price. As we can observe from Graph (a), UK
oil price decreases. This implies an increase of domestic oil demand (Graph (b)).
Moreover, from Graph (a), we note that the shock displays a strong persistence
causing long lasting e¤ects on the several variables.
In terms of the domestic economy, the drop of UK oil price generates positive
e¤ects on GDP (Graph (b)) and domestic absorption (Graph (i)). Moreover, hours
worked display a pattern that is very similar to domestic output (Graph (j)).
Considering the international trade, from Graph (l), we observe that UK
real e¤ective exchange rate depreciates. Indeed, the negative shock to foreign
productivity induces an increase of the relative price of imported goods with
respect to domestic goods.
Graph (k) shows the deterioration of UK oil balance. In particular, the fall
of foreign oil demand negatively a¤ects the UK oil exports. Di¤erently from the
results of Chapter 2, UK non-oil goods balance improves after the negative foreign
technology shock (Graph (k)). The explanation of this result can be found in the
behaviour of UK taxation in response to this shock. In particular, the initial drop
in the price of domestic non-oil consumption goods (due to the lower oil price)
is strengthened by the fall of VAT on oil products. Indeed, as we explained in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the fall in the oil price induces a reduction in VAT for oil
products. The lower VAT pushes down the price of domestic nal consumption
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goods and, in turn, the price of domestic non-oil goods. This large drop in the
price of domestic non-oil goods stimulate foreign demand. Therefore, as shown in
Graph (k), UK non-oil goods exports improve. However, this increase of non-oil
trade balance is not able to o¤set the fall of oil balance. Consequently, domestic
total trade balance deteriorates (Graph (k)).
Figure 3.5: IRFs of Main Variables to a Negative Foreign Technology Shock
In response to the shock, domestic goods ination drops because of the fall
of domestic marginal cost (Graph (g)). As we can see from Graphs (d) and (f),
the largest gaps correspond to capital and labour inputs, respectively. On shock
impact, the response of UK core ination rises because of the import prices increase
(Graph (h)). However, after three quarters it turns to be negative and remains
below zero for all the quarters considered. Moreover, from Graph (h) we note that
the nominal interest rate, after an initial increase, reduces throughout all quarters.
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Figure 3.6: IRFs of Fiscal Variables to a Negative Foreign Technology Shock
Finally, we analyse the responses of UK public nances (Figure 3.6). As in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we assume that, in response to the shock, domestic public
spending does not vary. As we can see from Graphs (n) and (p), the drop of oil
price implies that PRT and fuel duty tax revenues diminish. We also observe that
VAT receipts (Graph (o)) fall because of the lower value-added revenues on oil
products and imported non-oil goods.
On other hand, the improvement of rms prots induces the increase of
corporation tax receipts (Graph (q)). Similarly, the cheaper oil price implies
a higher labour income for households. In turn, income tax and NIC revenues
increase (Graphs (r), (s) and (t)). Again, the negative direct e¤ects on oil and fuel
duty revenues prevail on the positive indirect e¤ects on income, NIC and corporate
tax revenues. As a consequence, UK government debt is steadily positive for all
the quarters considered (Graph (m)).
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3.6 Conclusion
Using an open economy DSGE model with an endogenously determined price of
oil, we analysed the e¤ects of oil price uctuations on the UK economy with
particular focus on its public nances. In this regard, our theoretical framework
and the empirical strategy present several advantages with respect to existing
literature. Firstly, our analysis takes into account the several sources of oil price
shocks. Secondly, we are able to estimate directly the persistence of the exogenous
shocks a¤ecting oil prices and, in turn, their e¤ects on UK public nances. Finally,
our theoretical framework allows us to consider the response of UK scal sector in
the case of actual and potential economy.
The sample period of our study corresponds to the period in which the UK
was a net oil exporter and includes the NICE decade. In order to estimate our
model we used fteen observed series for the UK economy and the rest of the
world. As an estimation strategy we adopted Bayesian techniques on data for the
period 1990:Q1-2005:Q4. In general, our estimated model is able to reproduce the
business cycle moments of actual data.
Our theoretical model includes a detailed scal sector with several policy rules
for distortive taxes a¤ecting the economy. We are able to estimate these scal
policy rules and we nd that labour income tax rate has a highly procyclical
response to the level of output. Labour income tax and National Insurance
Contribution tax do not respond strongly to debt. The response of VAT rate
to private consumption expenditure is important while corporation tax rate is
not strongly respondent to dividends. Moreover, fuel duty tax rate responds
moderately to oil demand changes. Finally, our results show a stronger response
of petroleum revenue tax to oil price variations.
In general, our ndings conrm the importance of global oil shocks for the UK
economy. In particular, our variance decomposition analysis indicates that foreign
oil intensity shock, foreign oil supply shock and foreign productivity shock are the
most important ones in terms of UK oil price variation. We also nd that the
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foreign oil intensity shock inuences substantially the variation of UK government
debt.
Our impulse response analysis shows that UK macroeconomic fundamentals
improve after the reduction in the real oil price. In particular, GDP and its
main components increase together with hours worked. Moreover, we observe a
reduction of domestic core ination that allows UKmonetary authority to decrease
its policy rate.
Turning to trade, since the UK is a net oil exporter its oil balance deteriorates
inducing a reduction of UK overall trade balance. Moreover, we nd that the
Pound depreciates in response to positive shocks of foreign oil intensity and supply
as well as to the negative shock of foreign productivity.
Despite the fact that the UK economy benets from the low oil price, its public
nances worsen. In particular, the UK scal position is adversely a¤ected by the
reduction of North Sea revenues. Similarly, fuel duty revenues decrease because the
drop in the oil price prevails on the increase of domestic oil demand. Finally, value-
added tax falls due to the reduction of oil sales together with the consumption of
non-oil imported goods. As a consequence, the drop in the real oil price induces
an expansion of UK government debt.
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C Appendix: Chapter 3
C.1 Model Solution
This appendix shows the non-linearized and linearized versions of the key
optimality and market clearing conditions used in our analysis of the models
equilibrium dynamics. Here, we focus on the endogenous variables of the model
whereas the stochastic processes and the relative exogenous variables are reported
in Table 3.1. We denote by small letters with hat, x^i;t, the log-deviation of a given
variable, X1;t, from its steady state value, while (X1)
SS stands for its steady state
value.
C.1.1 Country-Specic Relations
In what follows we derive the relations for the domestic country assuming that the
same conditions apply to the foreign country because the model is symmetric.
Representative Household Maximization Problem. The representative
household solves the following intertemporal problem:
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and the capital accumulation equation:
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rst order condition for C1;t is:
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and c1;t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the representative household
budget constraint. The linearized equation is given by:
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that is wf1;t is the desired real wage expressed in terms of P
d
1;t. The linearized
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The rst order condition for B1;t+1 is:
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Labour Supply Decision. If wages are exible:
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If wages are sticky, the labour union solves the following maximization problem:
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the rst order condition is given by:
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SS1
(!^1;t+1   w1 !^1;t) (C17)
=
(1  w1 1) (1  w1 )
w1
 
w^f1;t+j   w^1;t+j +
(w1 )
SS
1 + (w1 )
SS
^
w
1;t
!
where:
1
SS1
(!^1;t   w1 !^1;t 1) = !^1;t   w1 !^1;t 1
The wage ination is:
!1;t = log

W1;t
W1;t 1

(C18)
the linearized equation is given by:
!^1;t = w^1;t   w^1;t 1 + ^d1;t (C19)
Capital Accumulation. The representative household solves the following
intertemporal problem:
Et
( 1X
j=0
j1
"
1
1 1
 
Zc1;tC1;t+j   1C1;t+j 1
1 1 +
1
1 1 (1  L1;t+j)
1 1
#)
(C20)
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subject to the budget constraint:
 
1 +  c1;t

P c1;tC1;t + P
i
1;tI1;t + (C21) 
Rb1;t
 1
B1;t+1 +
e1;t
 
Rb2;t
 1
Bf1;t+1
b1;t
=
 
1   l1;t   wh1;t

W1;tL1;t +R
k
1;tK1;t 1 +
 
1   d1;t

D1;t
+P o1;tY
o
1;t +B1;t + e1;tB
f
1;t
and the capital accumulation equation:
K1;t = (1  1)K1;t 1 +
 
1  S

I1;t
I1;t 1
2!
Zi1;tI1;t (C22)
The rst order condition for I1;t is:
0 = 1  q1;tZi1;t
"
1  1
2
'i1

I1;t
I1;t 1
  1
2#
+ (C23)
q1;tZ
i
1;tI1;t'
i
1

I1;t
I1;t 1
  1

1
I1;t 1
 
1
P i1;t+1
c
1;t+1
P i1;t
c
1;t
q1;t+1Z
i
1;t+1I1;t+1'
i
1

I1;t+1
I1;t
  1

I1;t+1
(I1;t)
2
where:
q1;t =
Q1;t
P i1;t
c
1;t
and Q1;t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital accumulation
equation. The linearized equation is given by:
q^1;t = '
i
1 (^{1;t   {^1;t 1)  'i11 (^{1;t+1   {^1;t)  z^i1;t (C24)
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The rst order condition for K1;t is:
q1;t = 1
q1;t+1
q1;t
P d1;t
P i1;t
Rk1;t+1
P d1;t+1
(C25)
+1 (1  1) q1;t+1
P i1;t+1
P d1;t+1
P d1;t
P i1;t
q1;t+1
q1;t
The linearized equation is given by:
q^1;t = ^
q
1;t+1   ^
q
1;t + (1  (1  1) 1)
0@r^k1;t+1  
"
P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
1A (C26)
+(1  11)
0@q^1;t+1 " P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t+1
 
"
P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
1A
The linearized capital accumulation equation is:
k^1;t = (1  1) k^1;t 1 + 1
 
z^i1;t + {^1;t

(C27)
Firms - Production of Consumption Goods. The consumption basket
equation is:
C1;t =

(!cc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Cne1;t
 1
1+o1 + (!oc1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
c
1;t
 1
1+o1
1+o1
(C28)
the linearized equation is given by:
c^1;t = !
cc
1 c^
ne
1;t + !
oc
1
 
o^c1;t + z^
o
1;t

(C29)
The non-oil consumption aggregate equation is:
Cne1;t =

(!c1)
c1
1+c1
 
Cd1;t
 1
1+c1 + (!mc1 )
c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
c
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(C30)
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the linearized equation is given by:
c^ne1;t = !
c
1c^
d
1;t + !
mc
1
 
m^c1;t + z^
m
1;t

(C31)
The rst order condition for Cd1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
P c1;t
P d1;t

!cc1
C1;t
Cne1;t
 o1
1+o1

!c1
Cne1;t
Cd1;t
 c1
1+c1
= 1 (C32)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
=   
o
1
1 + o1
 
c^1;t   c^ne1;t
  c1
1 + c1
 
c^ne1;t   c^d1;t

(C33)
The rst order condition for M c1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
Pm1;t
P d1;t
=
P c1;t
P d1;t

!cc1
C1;t
Cne1;t
 o1
1+o1

!c1
Cne1;t
Zm1;tM
c
1;t
 c1
1+c1
Zm1;t (C34)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
=
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
+
o1
1 + o1
 
c^1;t   c^ne1;t

(C35)
+
c1
1 + c1
 
c^ne1;t   m^c1;t   z^m1;t

+ z^m1;t
The rst order condition for Oc1;t in the consumption basket equation is:
 
1 +  oc1;t
 P o1;t
P d1;t
=
P c1;t
P d1;t

!cc1
C1;t
Zo1;tO
c
1;t
 o1
1+o1
Zo1;t (C36)
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the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
=   (
oc
1 )
SS
1 + ( oc1 )
SS
 ^ oc1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(C37)
+
o1
1 + o1
 
c^1;t   o^c1;t   z^o1;t

+ z^o1;t
Firms - Production of Investment Goods. The investment basket equation
is:
I1;t =
 
!i1
 c1
1+c1
 
Id1;t
 1
1+c1 +
 
!mi1
 c1
1+c1
 
Zm1;tM
i
1;t
 1
1+c1
1+c1
(C38)
the linearized equation is given by:
{^1;t = !
i
1{^
d
1;t + !
mi
1
 
m^i1;t + z^
m
1;t

(C39)
The rst order condition for Id1;t in the investment basket equation is:
P i1;t
P d1;t

!i1
I1;t
Id1;t
 c1
1+c1
= 1 (C40)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
=   
c
1
1 + c1
 
{^1;t   {^d1;t

(C41)
The rst order condition for M i1;t in the investment basket equation is:
Pm1;t
P d1;t
=
P i1;t
P d1;t

!mi1
I1;t
Zm1;tM
i
1;t
 c1
1+c1
Zm1;t (C42)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
=
"
P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
+
c1
1 + c1
 
{^1;t   m^i1;t   z^m1;t

+ z^m1;t (C43)
194
Firms - Production of Domestic Intermediate Goods. The value added
aggregate production function is:
V1;t (i) =
 
!k1
 v1
1+v1 (K1;t 1)
1
1+v1 +
 
!l1
 v1
1+v1 (Z1;tL1;t)
1
1+v1
1+v1
(C44)
the linearized equation is given by:
v^1;t = 
k
1k^1;t 1 + 
l
1

l^1;t + z^1;t

(C45)
where:
k1 =
 
!k1
 v1
1+v1
 
(K1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(C46)
l1 =
 
!l1
 v1
1+v1
 
(L1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(C47)
and:
k1 + 
l
1 = 1
The gross output aggregate production function is:
Y1;t =

(!vy1 )
o1
1+o1 (V1;t)
1
1+o1 + (!oy1 )
o1
1+o1
 
Zo1;tO
y
1;t
 1
1+o1
1+o1
(C48)
the linearized equation is given by:
y^1;t = !
vy
1 v^1;t + !
oy
1
 
o^y1;t + z^
o
1;t

(C49)
The rst order condition for K1;t 1 in the output aggregator:
Rk1;t
P d1;t
=
MC1;t
P d1;t

!vy1
Y1;t
V1;t
 o1
1+o1

!k1
V1;t
K1;t 1
 v1
1+v1
(C50)
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the linearized equation is given by:
rk1;t = mc^1;t +
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t)  
v
1
1 + v1

v^1;t   k^1;t 1

(C51)
The rst order condition for L1;t in the output aggregator:

1 + wf1;t
W1;t
P d1;t
=
MC1;t
P d1;t

!vy1
Y1;t
V1;t
 o1
1+o1

!l1
V1;t
Z1;tL1;t
 v1
1+v1
Z1;t (C52)
the linearized equation is given by:
w^1;t =  

wf1
SS
1 +

wf1
SS ^wf1;t +mc^1;t + o11 + o1 (y^1;t   v^1;t) (C53)
+
v1
1 + v1

v^1;t   l^1;t   z^1;t

+ z^1;t
The rst order condition for Oy1;t in the output aggregator:
P o1;t
P d1;t
=
MC1;t
P d1;t

!oy1
Y1;t
Zo1;tO
y
1;t
 o1
1+o1
Zo1;t (C54)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
= mc^1;t +
o1
1 + o1
 
y^1;t   o^y1;t   z^o1;t

+ z^o1;t (C55)
Evolution of the Marginal Cost. If prices are exible:
MC1;t
P d1;t
=
1
1 + p1;t
(C56)
the linearized equation is given by:
mc^1;t =   1
1 + (p1)
SS
^
p
1;t (C57)
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If prices are sticky, the prot maximization problem of rms that are allowed to
reoptimize their prices at time t can be expressed as:
max
fP d1;t(i)g
Et
1X
j=0
(p1)
j  1;t;t+j
"
d1;t;;jP
d
1;t (i)Y1;t+j (i) 
MC1;t+jY1;t+j (i)
#
(C58)
s:t : Y1;t (i) =
 
P d1;t (i)
P d1;t
!  1+p1

p
1
Y d1;t (C59)
and : d1;t;;j =
jY
s=1
n 
d1;t 1+s
p1  SS1 1 p1o (C60)
the rst order condition is given by:
Et
1X
j=0
p1;t+j
24 P d1;t(i)P d1;t 1p1;t+j 
MC1;t+J
P d1;t+J

P d1;t(i)
d
1;t;;j
P d1;t+j

1+p1;t+j
p1;t+j
35 = 0 (C61)
where:
p1;t+j = (
p
11)
j 
c
1;t+j
c1;t
 
P d1;t
d
1;t;;j
P d1;t+j
!  1

p
1;t+j
 
P d1;t (i)
P d1;t
!  1+p1;t+j

p
1;t+j
Y d1;t+j (C62)
The linearized equation is given by:
1
SS1
 
^d1;t   p1^d1;t 1

=
1
SS1
 
^d1;t+1   p1^d1;t

(C63)
+
(1  p11) (1  p1)
p1
 
mc^1;t +
(p1)
SS
1 + (p1)
SS
^
p
1;t
!
where:
1
SS1
 
^d1;t   p1^d1;t 1

= ^d1;t   p1^d1;t 1 (C64)
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Fiscal Sector. The government budget constraint is:
P g1;tG
d
1;t +B1;t = 
c
1;tP
c
1;tC1;t +

 l1;t + 
wh
1;t + 
wf
1;t

W1;tL1;t + (C65)
 d1;tD1;t + 
oc
1;tP
o
1;tO
c
1;t + 
yo
1;tP
o
1;tY
o
1;t +
 
Rb1;t
 1
B1;t+1
the linearized equation is given by:
b^1;t+1 =
1

8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
b^1;t + g^
d
1;t  

P c1
P d1
SS
(C1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS (
c
1)
SS

^ c1;t +
h
P^ c
P^ d
i
1;t
+ c^1;t   y^d1;t

  (w1)SS (L1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
 
 l1
SS h
^ l1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t
i
  (w1)SS (L1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
 
wh1
SS h
^wh1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t
i
  (w1)SS (L1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS

wf1
SS h
^wf1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t
i
  (d1)SS
(Y d1 )
SS
 
 d1
SS h
^ d1;t + d^1;t   y^d1;t
i
 

P o1
P d1
SS (Oc1)SS
(Y d1 )
SS (
oc
1 )
SS

^ oc1;t +
h
P^ o
P^ d
i
1;t
+ o^c1;t   y^d1;t

 

P o1
P d1
SS (Y o1 )SS
(Y d1 )
SS (
yo
1 )
SS

^ yo1;t +
h
P^ o
P^ d
i
1;t
+ y^o1;t   y^d1;t

9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(C66)
where the linearized equation for dividends is given by:
d^1;t = y^
d
1;t  
(MC1)
SS
1  (MC1)SS
mc^1;t (C67)
The oil revenues are:
OILREV1;t = 
yo
1;tP
o
1;tY
o
1;t (C68)
the linearized equation is given by:
oil^rev1;t = ^
yo
1;t +
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
+ y^o1;t   y^d1;t (C69)
The consumption tax (VAT) revenues are:
CONSTAXREV1;t = 
c
1;tP
c
1;tC1;t (C70)
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the linearized equation is given by:
const^axrev1;t = ^
c
1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
+ c^1;t   y^d1;t (C71)
The fuel duty revenues are:
FUELDUTY REV1;t = 
oc
1;tP
o
1;tO
c
1;t (C72)
the linearized equation is given by:
fueldu^tyrev1;t = ^
oc
1;t +
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
+ o^c1;t   y^d1;t (C73)
The dividends (corporation) tax revenues are:
CORTAXREV1;t = 
d
1;tD1;t (C74)
the linearized equation is given by:
corta^xrev1;t = ^
d
1;t + d^1;t   y^d1;t (C75)
The labour income tax revenues are:
INCTAXREV1;t = 
l
1;tW1;tL1;t (C76)
the linearized equation is given by:
incta^xrev1;t = ^
l
1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t (C77)
The households National Insurance Contribution revenues are:
NICHTAXREV1;t = 
wh
1;tW1;tL1;t (C78)
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the linearized equation is given by:
nichta^xrev1;t = ^
wh
1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t (C79)
The rms National Insurance Contribution revenues are:
NICFTAXREV1;t = 
wf
1;tW1;tL1;t (C80)
the linearized equation is given by:
nicfta^xrev1;t = ^
wf
1;t + w^1;t + l^1;t   y^d1;t (C81)
Remaining Relations. The market clearing condition for the domestic non-oil
goods market is:
Y d1;t = C
d
1;t + I
d
1;t +G
d
1;t +X1;t (C82)
the linearized equation is given by:
y^d1;t =
 
Cd1
SS 
Y d1
SS c^d1;t +
 
Id1
SS 
Y d1
SS {^d1;t +
 
Gd1
SS 
Y d1
SS g^d1;t + (X1)SS 
Y d1
SS x^1;t (C83)
The oil demand equation is:
O1;t = O
y
1;t +O
c
1;t (C84)
the linearized equation is given by:
o^1;t =
(Oy1)
SS
(O1)
SS
o^y1;t +
(Oc1)
SS
(O1)
SS
o^c1;t (C85)
The linearized expression for the real interest rate is given by:
r^rb1;t = r^
b
1;t   ^d1;t+1 =  

^
q
1;t+1   ^
q
1;t

(C86)
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The Taylor rule is:
i1;t = {1 + 
i
1 (i1;t 1   {1) + (C87) 
1  i1
  
core1;t   core1

+ 1
 
core1;t   core1   core1;t

+ y1y
gap
1;t

where:
i1;t = R
b
1;t   1 (C88)
the linearized equation is given by:
r^b1;t = 
i
1r^
b
1;t 1 +
 
1  i1
 
^core1;t + 

1
 
^core1;t   core1;t

+ y1y^
gap
1;t

(C89)
The core price level P ne1;t is given by:
P ne1;t = P
c
1;t

!cc1
C1;t
Cne1;t
 o1
1+o1
(C90)
the linearized expression is given by:"
P^ ne
P^ d
#
1;t
=
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
+
o1
1 + o1
 
c^1;t   c^ne1;t

(C91)
=
1
!cc1
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
  !
oc
1
!cc1
0@" P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
  z^o1;t
1A
As we can note from expression (C91) the shock to oil intensity enters since it
a¤ects the headline price P^ c1;t.
The ination of domestic prices is given by:
d1;t = log
 
P d1;t
P d1;t 1
!
(C92)
the linearized equation is given by:
^d1;t = p^
d
1;t   p^d1;t 1 (C93)
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The ination of core prices is given by:
core1;t = log

P ne1;t
P ne1;t 1

(C94)
the linearized equation is given by:
^core1;t =
"
P^ ne
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ ne
P^ d
#
1;t 1
+ ^d1;t (C95)
The ination of headline prices is given by:
head1;t = log

P c1;t
P c1;t 1

(C96)
the linearized equation is given by:
^head1;t =
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t 1
+ ^d1;t (C97)
The equation for aggregate imports is given by:
M1;t =
Pm1;t
P d1;t
M c1;t +
Pm1;t
P d1;t
M i1;t (C98)
the linearized expression is given by:
m^1;t =
(M c1)
SS
(M1)
SS
0@" P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
+ m^c1;t
1A+ (M i1)SS
(M1)
SS
0@" P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
+ m^i1;t
1A (C99)
because relative prices are assumed to be 1 in steady state.
The equation for aggregate exports is given by:
X1;t =
2
1
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(C100)
because country 1 real per capita exports, X1;t, and country 2 real per capita
imports, M2;t, are related by the relative population weight,
2
1
.
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The linearized expression is given by:
x^1;t =
(M c2)
SS
(M c2)
SS + (M i2)
SS
m^c2;t +
(M i2)
SS
(M c2)
SS + (M i2)
SS
m^i2;t (C101)
The ratio between total trade balance and gross output is given by:
T bal1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
=
X1;t  M1;t + P
o
1;t
P d1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

Y d1;t
(C102)
the linearized equation is given by:
t^bal1;t =
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS x^1;t   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS m^1;t + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS y^o1;t (C103)
  (P
o
1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS o^1;t   (P o1 )
SS
h
(O1)
SS   (Y o1 )SS
i
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
The ratio between non-oil goods trade balance and gross output is given by:
Gbal1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
=
X1;t  M1;t
Y d1;t
(C104)
the linearized equation is given by:
g^bal1;t =
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS x^1;t   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS m^1;t +
"
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS   (M1)SS 
Y d1
SS
#
y^d1;t (C105)
C.1.2 Bilateral Relations
For country 1, the relative import prices can be expressed as follows:
Pm1;t
P d1;t
=
e1;tP
c
2;t
P c1;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P c1;t
P d1;t
(C106)
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where e1;t is the nominal exchange rate. Considering that the consumption real
exchange rate is:
rer1;t =
e1;tP
c
2;t
P c1;t
(C107)
the linearized expression for (C106) is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
1;t
= re^r1;t  
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(C108)
For country 2, the linearized expression for the relative import prices is given by:"
P^m
P^ d
#
2;t
=  re^r1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
(C109)
The uncovered interest rate parity condition is:
q2;t+1
q2;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P c2;t+1
P d2;t+1
= b1;t
rer1;t+1
rer1;t
q1;t+1
q1;t
P d1;t
P c1;t
P c1;t+1
P d1;t+1
(C110)
the linearized equation is given by:
^
q
2;t+1   ^
q
2;t

=

^
q
1;t+1   ^
q
1;t

+ b1b^
f
1;t + re^r1;t+1   re^r1;t (C111)
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t+1
+
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t+1
The net foreign asset condition is:
e1;t
 
Rb2;t
 1
Bf1;t+1
b1;t
= e1;tB
f
1;t +
2
1
e1;tP
m
2;t
 
M c2;t +M
i
2;t

(C112)
 Pm1;t
 
M c1;t +M
i
1;t

+ P o1;t
 
Y o1;t  O1;t

the linearized equation is given by:
1b^
f
1;t+1 = b^
f
1;t + t^
bal
1;t (C113)
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where:
b^f1;t =
e1;tB
f
1;t
P d1;tY
d
1;t
(C114)
The oil market clearing condition is:
Y o1;t +
2
1
Y o2;t = O1;t +
2
1
O2;t (C115)
the linearized equation is given by:
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
y^o1;t +
(Y o2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
y^o2;t (C116)
=
1
2
(O1)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
o^1;t +
(O2)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
o^2;t
The law of one price for oil is:
P o1;t
P d1;t
= rer1;t
P c1;t
P d1;t
P d2;t
P c2;t
P o2;t
P d2;t
(C117)
the linearized equation is given by:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
= re^r1;t +
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ c
P^ d
#
2;t
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
2;t
(C118)
C.1.3 Important Denitions
The denition of GDP1;t using Laspeyres index is:
GDP1;t = GDP1;t 1
P d1;t 1Y1;t   P o1;t 1Oy1;t + P o1;t 1Y o1;t
P d1;t 1Y1;t 1   P o1;t 1Oy1;t 1 + P o1;t 1Y o1;t 1
(C119)
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the linearized equation is given by: 
1  (P
o
1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
!
(C120)
gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1

  (y^1;t   y^1;t 1)
=  
 
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
! 
o^y1;t   o^y1;t 1

+
 
(P o1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
! 
y^o1;t   y^o1;t 1

The ratio between nominal GDP and nominal gross output is:
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
= 1  P
o
1;tO
y
1;t
P d1;tY1;t
+
P o1;tY
o
1;t
P d1;tY1;t
(C121)
the linearized equation is given by:
(NGDP1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
(C122)
=
 
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS   (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
!0@y^1;t   " P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
1A
  (P
o
1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS o^y1;t + (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS y^o1;t
The equation for the oil price deated by the GDP deator is:
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
PGDP1;t
P o1;t 1
=
P o1;t
P d1;t
P d1;t 1
P o1;t 1
NGDP1;t 1
P d1;t 1Y1;t 1
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
GDP1;t
GDP1;t 1
Y1;t 1
Y1;t
(C123)
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the linearized equation is given by:
log
 
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
obs!
  log
 
P o1;t 1
PGDP1;t 1
obs!
(C124)
=  
0@"NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
 
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t 1
1A  (y^1;t   y^1;t 1)
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
 
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t 1
+ gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1
The ratio between the total trade balance and nominal GDP is:
T bal1;t
NGDP1;t
=
T bal1;t
P d1;tY1;t
P d1;tY1;t
NGDP1;t
(C125)
the linearized equation is given by:"
T^ bal
NGD^P
#
1;t
=
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
t^bal1;t (C126)
The ratio between the non-oil goods trade balance and nominal GDP is:
Gbal1;t
NGDP1;t
=
1
NGDP1;t
P d1;tY1;t
 
X1;t
Y1;t
  P
d
1;t
P d1;t
M1;t
Y1;t
!
(C127)
the linearized equation is given by:"
G^bal
NGD^P
#
1;t
=   1
(NGDP1)
SS
(P d1 )
SS
(Y1)
SS
 
(X1)
SS 
Y d1
SS  
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS
(Y1)
SS
!
(C128)
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
+
1
(NGDP1)
SS
(P d1 )
SS
(Y1)
SS
g^bal1;t
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C.1.4 Observation Equations
In what follows we denote by Xobsi;t the observed data series associated with a given
linearized variable, x^i;t. We start listing the observation equations for country 1.
The observation equation for GDP is:
log
 
GDP obs1;t
  log  GDP obs1;t 1 = gd^p1;t   gd^p1;t 1 (C129)
The observation equation for oil production is:
log

Y o;obs1;t

  log

Y o;obs1;t 1

= y^o1;t   y^o1;t 1 (C130)
The observation equation for oil imports as a share of nominal GDP is:
OIL IMP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS   (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS
!
(C131)24 "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
+
"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t
35
+
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS o^1;t   (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS y^o1;t
!
The observation equation for the real oil price is:
log
 
P o1;t
PGDP1;t
obs!
  log
 
P o1;t 1
PGDP1;t 1
obs!
=
"
P^ o
P^GDP
#
1;t
 
"
P^ o
P^GDP
#
1;t 1
(C132)
The observation equation for non-oil imports as a share of nominal GDP is:
NONOIL IMP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C133)0@m^1;t   y^1;t   "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
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The observation equation for non-oil exports as a share of nominal GDP is:
NONOIL EXP obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS
(X1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C134)0@x^1;t   y^1;t   "NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for the real exchange rate is:
rerobs1;t = re^r1;t (C135)
The observation equation for consumption as a share of nominal GDP is:
CONSobs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
(P c1 )
SS (C1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C136)0@c^1;t + " P^ c
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t  
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for total gross xed capital formation as a share of
nominal GDP is:
INV obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
(P i1)
SS
(I1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (NGDP1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C137)0@{^1;t + " P^ i
P^ d
#
1;t
  y^1;t  
"
NGD^P
P^ dY^
#
1;t
1A
The observation equation for core price ination is:
core;obs1;t = ^
core
1;t (C138)
The observation equation for wage ination is:
!obs1;t = !^1;t (C139)
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The observation equation for nominal interest rate is:
rb;obs1;t = r^
b
1;t (C140)
The observation equation for government debt as share of nominal GDP is:
GOV DEBT obs1;t
NGDP obs1;t
=
 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
(NGDP1)
SS
b^1;t (C141)
For country 2 the observation equations are the following.
The observation equation for GDP is:
log
 
GDP obs2;t
  log  GDP obs2;t 1 = gd^p2;t   gd^p2;t 1 (C142)
The observation equation for oil production is:
log

Y o;obs2;t

  log

Y o;obs2;t 1

= y^o2;t   y^o2;t 1 (C143)
C.1.5 Decomposition of the Marginal Costs
As we derived above, from the prot maximization problem of rms producing
intermediate domestic goods we have that:
k1 =
 
!k1
 v1
1+v1
 
(K1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(C144)
l1 =
 
!l1
 v1
1+v1
 
(L1)
SS
(V1)
SS
! 1
1+v1
(C145)
and:
k1 + 
l
1 = 1
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Thus, recasting (C144) and (C145), respectively:
k1 = !
k
1

shareky1
!k1sharevy1
 1
1+v1
(C146)
l1 = !
l
1

sharely1
!l1sharevy1
 1
1+v1
(C147)
and:
k1 + 
l
1 = 1
The marginal products of oil, capital and labour are respectively:
mp^o1;t =
o1
1 + o1
 
y^1;t   o^y1;t   z^o1;t

+ z^o1;t (C148)
mp^k1;t =
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t) + 
v
1
1 + v1

v^1;t   k^1;t 1

(C149)
mp^l1;t =
o1
1 + o1
(y^1;t   v^1;t) (C150)
+
v1
1 + v1

v^1;t   l^1;t   z^1;t

+ z^1;t
 

wf1
SS
1 +

wf1
SS ^wf1;t
and from the rst order conditions:"
P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
= mc^1;t +mp^o1;t (C151)
r^k1;t = mc^1;t +mp^k1;t (C152)
w^1;t = mc^1;t +mp^l1;t (C153)
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Multiplying equation (C151) by !oy1 , equation (C152) by !
vy
1 
k
1, and equation
(C153) by !vy1
 
1  k1

, and summing up these three equations we have that:
mc^1;t = !
oy
1
0@" P^ o
P^ d
#
1;t
 mp^o1;t
1A (C154)
+!vy1 
k
1
 
r^k1;t  mp^k1;t

+!vy1
 
1  k1

(w^1;t  mp^l1;t)
where:
!oy1 + !
vy
1 
k
1 + !
vy
1
 
1  k1

= 1
C.1.6 Calibrated Parameters
As we explained in the main body of the paper, some of the parameter values
are taken from observed data means. In what follows we describe the relative
expressions associated with these values.
The share of nominal oil demand on nominal gross output is:
shareoy1 =
(P o1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = (O1)SS 
Y d1
SS (C155)
because the real price of oil is assumed to be 1 in steady state.
The ratio between oil used in production and oil used in consumption is:
ratiooyoc1 =
(P o1 )
SS (Oy1)
SS 
P d1
SS
(Oc1)
SS
=
(Oy1)
SS
(Oc1)
SS
(C156)
The share of investment on gross output is:
shareiy1 =
 
Id1
SS 
Y d1
SS (C157)
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The share of government spending on gross output is:
sharegy1 =
 
Gd1
SS 
Y d1
SS (C158)
The ratio between oil production and oil demand is:
ratioyoo1 =
(Y o1 )
SS
(O1)
SS
(C159)
The share of imports on gross output is:
sharemy1 =
(M1)
SS 
Y d1
SS (C160)
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption goods
is:
ratioyoo1 =
(M i1)
SS
(M c1)
SS
(C161)
Finally, we assume that the weight of labour in the value added production function
is:
!l1 = 1 (C162)
C.1.7 Composite Parameters
Given the parameter values taken from observed data means and the expressions
listed above, we can derive the remaining parameters as follows.
The share of hours worked is:
labshare1 =
LSS1
1  LSS1
(C163)
The weight of oil input in the overall output production function is:
!oy1 =
(Oy1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = shareoyy1 (C164)
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The weight of value added input in the overall output production function is:
!vy1 = 1  !oy1 =
(V1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = sharevy1 (C165)
The real rental rate in steady state is:
 
rk1
SS
=
1
1
  1 + 1 (C166)
The share of capital on gross output is:
(K1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = 11 shareiy1 = shareky1 (C167)
The weight of capital in the value added production function is:
!k1 =
1
1

1
1
  1 + 1
 1+v1
v1 shareiy1
sharevy1
(C168)
The share of labour on gross output is:
(L1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = sharevy11  !k1  rk1SS  1v11+v1 = sharely1 (C169)
The share of nominal consumption on nominal gross output is:
(P c1 )
SS (C1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = 1 
 
P d1
SS
(I1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS  
 
P d1
SS
(G1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C170)
+
(P o1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS   (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
= sharecy1
that is:
sharecy1 = 1  shareiy1   sharegy1 + shareyoy1   shareoyy1 (C171)
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The weights of oil in the production of consumption goods is:
!oc1 =
(Oc1)
SS
(C1)
SS
= shareocc1 (C172)
where:
shareocc1 =
shareoy1   shareoyy1
sharecy1
(C173)
The weight of non-oil in the production of consumption goods is:
!cc1 = 1  !oc1 =
(Cne1 )
SS
(C1)
SS
(C174)
The weight of domestic goods in the production of consumption goods is:
!c1 = 1  !mc1 =
 
Cd1
SS
(Cne1 )
SS
= sharecdcn1 (C175)
The weight of imported goods in the production of consumption goods is:
!mc1 =
(M c1)
SS
(Cne1 )
SS
= sharemccn1 (C176)
where:
sharemccn1 =
sharemy1
sharecy1  sharecnc1
1
1 + ratiomimc1
(C177)
The weight of domestic goods in the production of investment goods is:
!i1 = 1  !mi1 =
 
Id1
SS
(I1)
SS
(C178)
The weight of imported goods in the production of investment goods is:
!mi1 =
(M i1)
SS
(I1)
SS
= sharemii1 (C179)
where:
sharemii1 =
sharemy1
shareiy1
ratiomimc1
1 + ratiomimc1
(C180)
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The share of exports on gross output of country 1 is: 
P d1
SS
(X1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS =
 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C181)
+
(P o1 )
SS (O1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
  (P
o
1 )
SS (Y o1 )
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS
= sharexy1
or:
sharexy1 = sharemy1 + shareoy1   shareyoy1 (C182)
The share of exports on gross output of country 2 is:
(X2)
SS 
Y d2
SS = (M2)SS 
Y d2
SS  
 
(O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS + (Y o1 )SS 
Y d1
SS
!  
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (C183)
or:
sharexy2 = sharemy2   (shareoy1   shareyoy1)
 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (C184)
The share of imports on gross output of country 2 is: 
P d1
SS
(M1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (O1   Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C185)
=
(e1)
SS  P d2 SS (M2)SS 
P d2
SS  
Y d2
SS
 
P d2
SS 
P d1
SS
 
Y d2
SS 
Y d1
SS 2
= sharemy2
or:
sharemy2 = (sharemy1 + (shareoy1   shareyoy1))
 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS 12 (C186)
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The ratio between nominal GDP and nominal gross output is:
(NGDP1)
SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS = 1  (P o1 )SS (Oy1)SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS + (P o1 )SS (Y o1 )SS 
P d1
SS  
Y d1
SS (C187)
or:
sharengdpny1 = 1  shareoyy1 + shareyoy1 (C188)
The ratio between gross outputs of country 1 and 2 is: 
Y d1
SS 
Y d2
SS = sharely2sharely1 (L1)
SS
(L2)
SS
(C189)
The share in world oil production for country 2 is:
(Y o2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS + (Y o2 )
SS
(C190)
=
(Y o2 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
1
2
(Y o1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS +
(Y o2 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
= shareoprod2
or:
shareoprod2 =
shareyoy2
1
2
shareyoy1
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS + shareyoy2
(C191)
The share in world oil consumption for country 2 is:
(O2)
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS + (O2)
SS
(C192)
=
(O2)
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
1
2
(O1)
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS +
(O2)
SS
(Y d2 )
SS
= shareocons2
217
or:
shareocons2 =
shareoy2
1
2
shareoy1
(Y d1 )
SS
(Y d2 )
SS + shareoy2
(C193)
The overall oil production as share of gross output is:
(Y o1 )
SS 
Y d1
SS = (Y o1 )SS(O1)SS (O1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = shareyoy1 (C194)
or:
shareyoy1 = ratioyoo1  shareoy1 (C195)
The real wage in steady state is:
(w1)
SS =
1
1 +

wf1
SS (MC1)SS 
P d1
SS (!vy1 !vy1 ) o11+o1 !vy1  l11+w1  (C196)
The ratio between real dividends and gross output is:
(d1)
SS 
Y d1
SS = 1  (MC1)SS 
P d1
SS (C197)
where:
(MC1)
SS =
1
1 + (p1)
SS
(C198)
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C.2 Data Construction
As we described in the main body of the paper, the data is quarterly and the
model is estimated for the sample period 1990:Q1-2005:Q4 with a pre-sample
from 1988:Q1 to 1989:Q4. In this appendix we provide the numerous sources and
construction methods of the observed series. Unless otherwise noted, all original
series are seasonally adjusted.
UK GDP. The UK GDP is the log of real UK GDP (code ABMI in ONS
Quarterly National Accounts).
Foreign GDP. The foreign GDP is the log of trade-weighted foreign GDP.
The data series for real GDPs of the foreign countries are taken from the OECD
- Quarterly National Accounts82. The countries are: the Euro area, the United
States, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Australia and
India. These are the most important trading partners of the United Kingdom for
the period considered. We follow the paper of Loretan (2005) in order to construct
the relative imports/exports weights.
UK crude oil production. The UK crude oil production is the log of the
UK crude oil production taken from US Energy Information Administration83 -
Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.1b.
Foreign crude oil production. The foreign crude oil production is the log of
foreign crude oil production (calculated as world production net of UK production)
taken from US Energy Information Administration84 - Monthly Energy Review -
Table 11.1b.
Real oil price. The real oil price is the log of the Europe Brent Spot Price
FOB from the US Energy Information Administration85 converted from US dollars
to Sterling Pounds using the Quarterly Average Forward Exchange Rate, 3 months,
US$ into Sterling (code XUQADS3 in Bank of England Statistical Interactive
82http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/oecd/na/2012-06.
83http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#petroleum.
84http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#petroleum.
85http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M.
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Database86) and deated by the UK GDP deator (code YBGB in ONS Quarterly
National Accounts).
UK real e¤ective exchange rate. The UK real e¤ective exchange rate
is the log of the Quarterly Average Broad E¤ective Exchange Rate Index, (code
XUQABK82 in the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database87).
UK private consumption expenditure. The UK private consumption
expenditure is the Household Final Consumption Expenditure at market prices
(code ABJQ in ONS Quarterly National Accounts) and it is expressed as a share
of UK GDP at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK total gross xed capital formation. The UK total gross xed capital
formation is the total gross xed capital formation at market prices (code NPQS
in ONS Quarterly National Accounts) and it is expressed as a share of UK GDP
at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK oil imports. The UK oil imports are the total oil gross imports
(Petroleum - Imports) taken from the US Energy Information Administration88 -
International Energy Statistics, expressed as a share of UK GDP using the Europe
Brent Spot Price FOB (British Sterling per Barrel) and the UK GDP at Market
Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK non-oil goods imports. The UK non-oil goods imports are the Goods
Imports at market prices (code BOKH in ONS Quarterly National Accounts)
minus the UK oil imports, expressed as a share of UK GDP using the UK GDP
at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK non-oil goods exports. The UK non-oil goods exports are the Goods
Exports at market prices (code BOKG in ONS Quarterly National Accounts)
minus the UK oil exports, expressed as share of UK GDP using the UK GDP at
86http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
87http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
88http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=50&pid=76&aid=3&cid=UK,
&syid=1988&eyid=2005&freq=Q&unit=TBPD.
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Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
UK core ination. The UK core ination is the log change in the
Consumer Price Index: All Items Excluding Food and Energy, Index 2010=100
and NSA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Code:
GBRCPICORMINMEI, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis89). The series is seasonally adjusted with Eviews.
UK wage ination. The UK wage ination obtained from the log change in
UK Total Compensation of Employees at Current Prices (Code DTWM in ONS -
UK Output, Income and Expenditure Tables; and LF2G in ONS - LFS).
UK nominal interest rate. The UK nominal interest rate is the Quarterly
Average Rate of Discount - 3 Month Treasury Bills (Code IUQAAJNB in Bank of
England Statistical Interactive Database90).
UK government debt. The UK government debt is Public Sector Finances -
Net Debt at Current Prices and NSA (code RUTN in ONS Public Sector Finances).
This series is seasonally adjusted with Eviews and expressed as share of UK GDP
at Market Prices (code YBHA in ONS Quarterly National Accounts).
89https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GBRCPICORMINMEI/.
90http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/index.asp?rst=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-
1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
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C.3 Construction of the Tax Rates for the UK Economy
This appendix describes the data sources and the construction of the tax rates
for the UK economy. Due to data availability, we consider the sample period
1997:Q1-2005:Q4. Moreover, we collect all data series in nominal values.
Consumption Tax Revenues. The consumption tax revenues, T c1 , are VAT
revenues (code NZGF in ONS Public Sector Finances - Table PSF3D).
Consumption Tax Rate. The average consumption tax rate is dened as:
( c1)
SS =
T c1
C1   T c1
(C199)
Labour Income Tax Revenues. The labour income tax revenues, T l1, include
self assessed income tax, paye IT, other income tax and miscellaneous revenues
(codes LIBS, MS6W, MF6X, and MF6Z in ONS Public Sector Finances - Table
PSF3D).
Labour Income Tax Rate. The average labour income tax rate is dened
as:  
 l1
SS
=
T l1
TCE1
(C200)
where TCE1 is the total compensation of employees (code DWTM in ONS UK
Economic Accounts).
National Insurance Contributions (of Households and Firms) Tax
Revenues. The National Insurance Contributions (of households and rms) tax
revenues, Tw1 , are NICs revenues (code AIIH in ONS Public Sector Finances -
Table PSF3D).
National Insurance Contributions (Households and Firms) Tax
Rates. As described in Section 3.3, we assume the same tax rates for National
Insurance Contribution paid by households,
 
wh1
SS
, and rms,

wf1
SS
. The
average NIC tax rates paid by households and rms are dened as:
 
wh1
SS
=

wf1
SS
=
Tw1
TCE1
(C201)
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Fuel Duty Tax Revenues. The fuel duty tax revenues, T oc1 , are Fuel Duty
revenues (code CUDG in ONS Public Sector Finances - Table PSF3D).
Fuel Duty Tax Rate. The average fuel duty tax rate is dened as:
( oc1 )
SS =
T oc1 =2
AFR1
(C202)
where AFR1 is the series of total retail sales of automotive fuel (code IZ57 in
ONS Retail Sales - Table ValSAT). As we can observe in the numerator of (C202),
we consider the share of the automotive sector fuel consumption as share of total
petroleum rened products (that is roughly the 50%).
Corporation Tax Revenues. The corporation tax revenues, T d1 , are
Corporation Tax revenues (code ACCD in ONS Public Sector Finances - Table
PSF3D).
Corporation Tax Rate. The average corporation tax rate is dened as:
 
 d1
SS
=
T d1   T dyo1
GOSC1
(C203)
where T dyo1 is the series of Total Corporation Tax coming from UK oil production
(in ONS Statistics of Government Revenues from UK Oil and Gas Production -
Table T11.11) and GOSC1 is the series of gross operating surplus of corporations
(code CGBY in ONS UK Economic Accounts) excluding the share of gross
operating surplus of corporations involved in oil production.
Petroleum Revenue Tax Revenues. The petroleum revenue tax revenues,
T yo1 , are Petroleum Revenue Tax revenues (code ACCJ in ONS Public Sector
Finances - Table PSF3D).
Petroleum Revenue Tax Rate. The average petroleum revenue tax rate is
dened as:
( yo1 )
SS =
T yo1 + T
dyo
1 +R
yo
1
RCOS1
(C204)
where Ryo1 is the series of Royalties coming from UK oil production (in ONS
Statistics of Government Revenues from UK Oil and Gas Production - Table
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T11.11) andRCOS1 is the series of revenue from crude oil sales (Table 4 in Scottish
National Account Project - Oil and Gas Statistics).
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C.4 Parameters Values
C.4.1 Average Ratios for the UK Economy
Unless otherwise noted, the average ratios are computed for the period 1990-2005.
The UK oil share on nominal gross output is dened as:
shareoy =
GV A GV A excl Oil and Gas
GV A
(C205)
where GV A is the total gross value added at basic prices (Code ABMM in ONS)
and GV A excl Oil and Gas is the gross value added excluding oil and gas at
basic prices (Code KLS2 in ONS). Due to data availability for these two series we
consider the sample period 1997-2005.
The ratio between oil used in production and oil used in consumption is dened
as:
ratiooyoc =
Oy
Oc
(C206)
where Oy is the total supply of products at purchasersprices of coke and rened
petroleum products (taken from ONS Input-Output Tables). Oc is the households
nal consumption expenditure of coke and rened petroleum products (taken ONS
Input-Output Tables). Due to data availability for these two series we consider
the sample period 1992-2004.
The share of investment on GDP is dened as:
shareiy =
I
Y
(C207)
where I is the real total gross xed capital formation (Code NPQT in ONS) and
Y is the real gross domestic product (Code ABMI in ONS).
The share of government spending on GDP is dened as:
sharegy =
G
Y
(C208)
where G is the general government nal consumption expenditure (Code NMRY
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in ONS).
The ratio between oil production and oil demand is dened as:
ratioyoo =
Y o
O
(C209)
where Y o is the crude oil production of the United Kingdom (taken from the US
Energy Information Administration - Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.1b) and
O is the petroleum consumption of United Kingdom (taken from the US Energy
Information Administration - Monthly Energy Review - Table 11.2).
The share of imports on GDP is dened as:
sharemy =
M
Y
(C210)
where M are the real imports of goods and services (Code IKBL in ONS).
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption
goods is dened as:
ratioyoo =
M i
M c
(C211)
where M i are total imports of services (Code IKBC in ONS) and M c are total
imports of goods (Code IKBI in ONS).
Finally, 1 is the sum of total population of the United Kingdom (taken from
the OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
C.4.2 Average Ratios for the Foreign Bloc
In order to aggregate data for the foreign countries we use the Loretan (2005)
technique. In particular, we proceed as follows. Firstly, from the Direction of
Trade Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund we compute the
average of imports/exports between the UK and foreign countries for the period
1990-2005. Secondly, we select the major UK trading partners. Specically, they
are the Euro Area, the United States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The
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average of imports/exports of the UK with this group of countries corresponds to
the 80% of total UK trade. Thirdly, we compute the average ratios for the foreign
bloc by aggregating their data series through the weighted average for the period
1990-2005.
Unless otherwise noted, the average ratios are computed for the period 1990-
2005.
Due to data availability in order to construct foreign oil share we only consider
the Euro Area and the United States. The Euro Area and the US oil shares on
their nominal gross outputs are dened as:
shareoy =
Petroleum Items Exp
GDP
(C212)
For the Euro Area, Petroleum Items Exp is the sum of crude petroleum and
natural gas expenditures and coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuels
expenditures (taken from Eurostat Input-Output Tables). GDP is the nominal
gross domestic product (taken from the Eurostat interactive database). Due to
data availability the sample period is 2000-2008.
For the US, Petroleum Items Exp is the sum of natural gas expenditures
and petroleum expenditures (taken from the Annual Energy Outlook of US EIA).
GDP is the nominal gross domestic product (taken from FRED).
Due to data availability, in order to construct foreign oil share we only consider
the Euro Area and the United States. The ratio between oil used in production
and oil used in consumption is dened as:
ratiooyoc =
Oy
Oc
(C213)
For the Euro Area, Oy is the total use at basic price of coke, rened petroleum
products and nuclear fuel (taken from the Eurostat Input-Output Tables). Oc
is the nal consumption expenditure at basic price of coke, rened petroleum
products and nuclear fuel (taken from the Eurostat Input-Output Tables). Due to
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the availability of these two series we consider the sample period 2000-2005.
For the US, Oy is the total commodity output of petroleum and coal products
(taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output Tables). Oc is the
personal consumption expenditures of petroleum and coal products (taken from
Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output Tables). Due to the availability of
these two series we consider the sample period 1998-2005.
The share of investment on GDP for foreign countries is dened as:
shareiy =
I
Y
(C214)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India, I is the gross xed capital formation
(taken fromOECD - Quarterly National Accounts) whereas Y is the gross domestic
product (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
For China (sample period 1998-2005), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, I is the gross xed capital formation (Code 93E.ZF in International
Financial Statistics - IMF) whereas Y is the gross domestic product (Code 99B.ZF
in International Financial Statistics - IMF).
The share of government spending on GDP for foreign countries is dened as:
sharegy =
G
Y
(C215)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India, G is the general government nal
consumption expenditure (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts)
whereas Y is the gross domestic product (taken from OECD - Quarterly National
Accounts).
For China (sample period 1998-2005), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, G is the government consumption expenditure (Code 91F.ZF in
International Financial Statistics - IMF) whereas Y is the gross domestic product
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(Code 99B.ZF in International Financial Statistics - IMF).
The ratio between oil production and oil demand for theforeign bloc is dened
as:
ratioyoo =
Y o
O
(C216)
For the Euro Area, the United States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Norway, Canada, Denmark, Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, Y o is petroleum production (taken from the US Energy
Information Administration - International Energy Statistics) whereas O is the
petroleum consumption (taken from the US Energy Information Administration -
International Energy Statistics).
The ratio between imports of investment goods and imports of consumption
goods for the foreign bloc is dened as:
ratioyoo =
M i
M c
(C217)
For the Euro Area, the United States, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, Australia and India,M i is the series of imports of goods (taken
from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts) whereas M c is the series of imports
of services (taken from OECD - Quarterly National Accounts).
Finally, 2 is the sum of the total population of the Euro Area, the United
States, China, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Australia,
India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (taken from OECD - Quarterly
National Accounts).
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C.5 Prior and Posterior Parameters Distributions
In the following gures, prior distributions correspond to dashed blue lines whereas
posterior distributions correspond to solid blue black lines.
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Conclusion
Large uctuations in oil prices have been a recurrent feature of the macroeconomic
environment since the 1970s. In this regard, media, policymakers and economists
have paid close attention to changes in globally traded oil prices and worried
about the potential impact of oil price shocks on economic performance. Most
of the studies on oil price uctuations have exclusively focused on the US case.
Consequently, economists have furnished a clear picture of the relationship between
oil price shocks and the US macroeconomy. On the other hand, previous economic
literature did not focus extensively on the United Kingdom. However, the UK
is an interesting case as it represents an advanced economy that was a net oil
importer during the 1970s shifting to a net oil exporter in the 1980s and, nally,
came back to be a net oil importer in the mid-2000s. Hence in this thesis, using
di¤erent approaches, we examine the causes and the e¤ects of oil price changes on
the UK economy.
In the rst chapter, we investigate how the impact of oil price changes on the
UK economy di¤ers depending on the underlying source of the shock, that is,
whether oil price uctuations are driven by shifts in oil demand or supply. In
line with existing literature, our results indicate that oil demand shocks have been
responsible for the major episodes of oil price increases from the mid-1970s until
today. Moreover, we nd that the specic source of the shock a¤ects the size and
nature of the responses of main UK macroeconomic aggregates. In particular,
when a rise in oil prices is caused by an oil supply disruption the UK experiences
a persistent decline in its GDP and an increase in its CPI ination. In contrast,
a rise in oil prices due to an expansion of global economic activity does not a¤ect
immediately UK real output whereas domestic ination increases on impact. Our
impulse response analysis also suggests that in response to a positive oil demand
shock the Bank of England increases the nominal interest rate whereas a negative
oil supply shock induces the BoE to reduce its policy rate. Finally, we nd that
the increase in the oil price induces a reduction of government decit because the
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UK benets from the higher oil revenues coming from the North Sea.
In the second chapter, we develop an open economy two-bloc DSGE model
in order to analyse the main transmission channels and the e¤ects of oil price
uctuations on the UK economy. In particular, our theoretical framework: i)
assumes the endogenous determination of the real oil price, ii) models the world
economy, iii) has a new Keynesian structure, and iv) distinguishes between demand
and supply channels of oil shocks. In order to estimate our model we use Bayesian
methods over the sample 1990:Q1-2005:Q4 covering the period in which the UK
was a net oil exporter. As observed data for our analysis, we consider data series of
the UK economy and rest of the world. In particular, the data series for the foreign
bloc are taken from the main UK trading partners and are aggregated using the
Loretan (2005) method of trade weights.
Our results show that global oil shocks largely a¤ect the UK economy. In
particular, we nd that foreign oil intensity shocks explain most of the UK oil
price volatility. Moreover, our impulse response analysis suggests that a reduction
in the real oil price induces an increase in domestic GDP and a fall in ination.
As a consequence, the Bank of England reduces the nominal interest rate. Our
results also indicate that the UK exchange rate reacts di¤erently depending on
the source of oil price shocks. Thus, for example, increases in foreign oil intensity
imply an appreciation of the Pound. Conversely, the British Sterling depreciates
in response to positive shocks to foreign oil production and negative shocks to
foreign technology. In general, we nd that large reductions in the oil price worsen
the UK trade balance. Finally, the results of our historical decompositions for the
period 1990-2005 indicate that episodes of sharp increases in the oil price explain
large reductions in domestic output and signicant rises in ination.
In third chapter, we set up an open economy DSGE model in order to
investigate the e¤ects of oil price shocks on the UK economy with a particular
focus on its government sector. In particular, we evaluate how oil price changes
a¤ect the main UK tax receipts and, in turn, which is the e¤ect on UK public
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nances. The theoretical framework of Chapter 3 extends the one of Chapter 2
considering a detailed scal bloc. Again, our model is estimated with Bayesian
techniques over the sample 1990:Q1-2005:Q4.
Our results show that UK government debt volatility is largely explained
by foreign oil intensity shocks as these shocks cause important uctuations in
government oil revenues. Moreover, in line with the results of Chapter 2, we nd
that foreign oil shocks are the main responsible of UK oil price variation. The
estimates of our scal rulesparameters indicate that the fuel duty tax has a weak
response to changes in the domestic oil demand. Conversely, the petroleum revenue
tax has a stronger response to oil price changes.
Our impulse response analysis conrms the results of Chapter 2. In particular,
we nd that decreases in the oil price have positive e¤ects on the domestic economy
increasing GDP and lowering ination. In such scenario the UK oil balance worsens
causing a decrease in the UK overall trade balance. Di¤erently from the second
chapter, our results indicate that the Pound depreciates in response to positive
foreign oil intensity shocks. The last e¤ect is due to the reduction of the VAT in
the UK which implies a lower price for domestic consumption goods. Finally, we
quantify the e¤ects of oil price changes on UK public nances. In particular, we
nd that, in response to a fall in the oil price, domestic government debt increases
since total tax revenues diminish.
Given the promising results of this thesis, there are at least three research
extensions that deserve to be analysed. Firstly, we aim to assess whether the
Scotland and the rest of the UK react di¤erently to oil price shocks. More
specically, our objective is to develop an open economy DSGE model that is
able to disentangle the overall UK economy into two distinct regions (namely,
Scotland and rest of UK) which, in turn, trade oil and non-oil goods with the rest
of the world. Accordingly, this model will extend the theoretical frameworks of
Chapter 2 and 3.
We believe that this analysis is particularly important because the oil industry
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signicantly contributes to the Scottish economy. As reported by the Fiscal
Commission Working Group (2013), the oil activity is the largest industrial sector
in Scotland in terms of its contribution to GDP, acts as a major source of
employment and investment, and provides the vast majority of Scotlands oil and
gas needs. Moreover, the majority of UK oil production takes place o¤ the coast
of Scotland. In this regard, Scotland has been net oil exporter since the 1980s and
it is still today. Therefore, our model will o¤er a careful distinction between the
two UK regions considering an oil importer bloc (rest of UK) and an oil producer
and exporter bloc (Scotland).
Our analysis will also address the future economic challenges that Scotland and
rest of the UK may face. Recently, the main parties in the UK Parliament pledged
to extend the powers of the Scottish Parliament. In this regard, an all-party
commission was formed in order to discuss about a further devolution of taxes
and expenditure to the Scottish Parliament. In particular, it may be that the
responsibility for regulating UK oil production, which currently resides with the
UK Government, will be transeferred to the Scottish Government. Accordingly,
our model will provide a careful modelling of Scottish and rest of UK scal policies
allowing for the analysis of monetary policy interactions with scal provisions for
oil revenues. In this regard, our work will provide a clear understanding of the
economic impact of oil price changes on the Scottish and rest of UK economies.
In addition, our study will o¤er a useful tool for policy makers in order to respond
to the several determinants underlying oil price shocks as well as wider aspects of
scal devolution.
The second research extension that we have in mind concerns assessing the
e¤ects of oil price shocks when UK policy rates are at the zero lower bound. In
particular, Bodenstein et al. (2013) have shown that, in the US case, the zero
lower bound constraint tends to cushion rather than amplify the fall in GDP that
occurs in response to higher oil prices in normal times when monetary policy is
unconstrained by the zero lower bound. Bodenstein et al. (2013) have also shown
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that the mitigation of the output decline from the zero lower bound depends on
the source of the shock and on the persistence that alternative shocks induce in
the price of oil. Our idea is to extend the analysis of Bodenstein et al. (2013) to
the UK economy starting from to 2008 until the current period. Accordingly, our
analysis would consider the recent plunge of oil price below $50 a barrel. Thus, it
would be extremely useful to analyse the behaviour of main UK macroeconomic
fundamentals in a situation of very low oil price and policy rates at the zero lower
bound.
Finally, as future research extension we aim to analyse the relationship
between government debt structure and oil shocks for an emerging and small
oil-exporter country. As Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) have argued,
debt crises in emerging economies are often blamed on governments borrowing
extensive quantities of short-term debt in international capital markets. Short-
term borrowing leaves an economy with large amounts of debt to roll over, which
becomes problematic when interest rates rise and access to external credit is
restricted. In their paper Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) show that long-
term debt provides a hedge against future uctuations in spreads, whereas short-
term debt is more e¤ective at providing incentives to repay.
Our idea is develop a DSGE model in order to assess the behaviour of the
scal sector in an emerging and small oil-exporter country in the presence of a
plunge in the oil price. In particular, it would be extremely useful to analyse the
e¤ects of the di¤erent maturities of bonds issued by the government in the case
of a fall in oil revenues. In particular, in a small oil-exporting country the public
sector benets from the revenues coming from oil sales. Thus, the government is
able to balance its scal policy xing a certain share of oil income in its budget
constraint. Accordingly, in the case of a plunge in the oil price the government
should hedge against the worsening of its nances issuing bonds with di¤erent
maturities. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyse the interactions of scal
policy and monetary policy in such scenario.
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In conclusion, we believe that these proposal features are crucial in order
to better understand the e¤ects of oil global price changes and are important
contributions with respect to the existing economic literature.
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